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Abstract
A striking way that humans differ from other species is our unique ability to represent and
manipulate symbols. This ability to process numerical magnitudes symbolically (e.g., ‘three’,
‘3’) is widely thought to be supported by an ancient system that evolved to process
nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes (i.e., quantities). In this thesis, I present four empirical
studies to uncover whether symbolic representations are indeed supported by the system that
evolved to process quantities, or if symbolic representations are sub-served by a similar but
ultimately distinct system.
In experiments 1 and 2, I investigate how the adult brain processes symbols and quantities
using quantitative neuroimaging meta-analytic techniques (Experiment 1), and a tightly
controlled fMRI paradigm (experiment 2). Results from the meta-analysis indicate that
symbols and quantities are sub-served by both common and distinct brain regions along the
frontal-parietal lobes. However, using a tightly controlled adaptation paradigm to isolate
brain regions that underpin symbols and quantities reveal that regions supporting symbols are
quite distinct from those supporting quantities, spatially and representationally. Thus,
symbols might not be processed using the system that evolved to process quantities.
In experiment 3, I examine whether the processing of symbols is similar to quantities under
different attentional conditions. I discover that in addition to participants being more
efficient at effortfully comparing symbols than quantities, embedding distracting symbols
into stimuli during a quantity comparison task affected performance more than embedding
quantities into a symbolic comparison task. This indicates that symbols and quantities are
processed differently, under different attentional conditions, and therefore are likely subserved by different representational systems.
In experiment 4, I investigate the origin of the difference between how humans process
symbols and quantities by exploring whether children’s symbolic number knowledge relates
to their spontaneous attending to quantities. I find that children are more likely to attend to
quantity if they know the number word that corresponds to the quantity, suggesting that
learning symbols may influence how children conceptualize quantities.
ii

In summary, while there are some similarities in how humans process symbols and
quantities, there are many important differences both behaviourally, and the neural level of
organization. Consequently, these findings challenge the longstanding belief that the
culturally acquired ability to conceptualize numbers symbolically is grounded in the ancient
system that evolved to estimate quantities.

Keywords
Symbolic numerical magnitude, nonsymbolic numerical magnitude, non-numerical
magnitude, functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), human uniqueness, cognitive
development,

Summary for Lay Audience
The uniquely human ability to think about numbers as symbols sets us apart from other
species that can only think about numbers nonsymbolically (i.e., quantities, such as
collections of dots). How does the human brain support this exceptional ability to
conceptualize numbers symbolically? Are the ancient systems that evolved to estimate
quantities repurposed for symbolic thinking? I examine similarities and differences in how
humans think about symbolic numbers compared to quantities.
I explore whether the parts of the adult human brain that are activated in response to
symbolic numbers are also activated in response to quantities. Specifically, I 1) synthesize
previous research that examines brain responses to symbols and quantities to identify
consistencies across these studies and 2) collect measures of brain activation while
participants passively view symbols, quantities, and physical sizes. I discover that brain
regions that are associated with thinking about numbers symbolically are quite distinct from
brain regions that evolved to understand quantities.
Subsequently, I examine whether the similarities and differences between thinking about
symbols and quantities depend on what participants are instructed to pay attention to. I
discover that participants are faster and more accurate, comparing two symbols than two
quantities. Additionally, when participants compare quantities, they perform more poorly if
there is a distracting symbol present. Interestingly, the presence of a quantity when
comparing symbols is less distracting. Together, this work shows that how human adults
think about symbols and quantities is quite different.
To understand the origin of this difference I explore the relationship between how humans
think about symbols and quantities in children, while these systems are developing. I
examine whether having knowledge of symbolic numbers influences the degree to which
children notice quantities in their environment. I find that children are more likely to notice
and use quantities to solve a problem if they have learned the verbal number word that
corresponds to the quantity.
Discoveries from this thesis reveal that humans conceptualize symbolic numbers in a way
that is quite distinct from nonsymbolic quantities. This indicates that humans possess a

system used to process symbols that is distinct from the evolutionarily ancient system used to
estimate quantities. Future investigations are needed to understand better how we learn
numerical symbols over the course of our development.
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Chapter 1

1

General Introduction

Contemporary society could not function without numbers. We would be unable to draft
architectural plans, calculate the value of a currency, design engines and motors, identify
how many calories we need to maintain a healthy weight, or even tabulate votes in a
democratic election. Since basic number processing is a cognitive foundation that
supports mathematical thinking, understanding the development of the behavioural and
neural signatures of number processing provides insight into how the brain manages the
critical and distinctly human task of understanding complex math. Moreover, as
mathematical ability is a learned skill that builds on related, previously acquired
knowledge, the study of numerical and mathematical processing serves as a model for
understanding learning more broadly, across multiple domains. The examination of
numerical processing also has important practical implications. Indeed, early
mathematical competence is the single strongest predictor of later academic achievement
and financial stability (Duncan et al., 2007; Romano, Babchishin, Pagani, & Kohen,
2010). At the societal level, improving math scores is tightly linked with cross-national
GPD growth (OECD, 2010). In direct contrast, low mathematical ability is related to
higher rates of mental and physical illness, unemployment, and incarceration (Bynner &
Parsons, 1996; Parsons & Bynner, 2005).
Critically, mathematical performance of Canadian students on international math
assessments has been on a steady decline since 2003 (Stokke, 2015). As recently as last
year, half of grade 6 students in Ontario failed to meet provincial standards for
mathematics (Alphonso, 2018). Thus, the study of the neuropsychological underpinnings
of numerical processing is not only intellectually fascinating but also practically relevant
– and urgently needed – in understanding and improving the world-wide debilitating
effects linked to low math achievement.
In what follows, I will introduce you as the reader to the field of numerical cognition. As
such, I will provide a brief overview of dominant theories relating to basic number
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processing across developmental time. Following this, I will summarize the current state
of the field and present outstanding questions. Finally, I will outline the four empirical
studies that address these outstanding questions and comprise the body of this thesis.
Following the conclusion of chapter 1, the four empirical studies and their results will be
described in detail within their own chapters. The thesis will conclude with a sixth
chapter that integrates findings from the four empirical studies and outlines future
directions for the field of numerical cognition.

1.1 Nonsymbolic Numerical Magnitudes
Humans share with other animals, such as non-human primates, birds, bears, amphibians,
and fish, the ability to process the quantities of nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes such
as set of objects or an array of dots (For review see: Cantlon, 2012; Dehaene, DehaeneLambertz, & Cohen, 1998; Nieder & Miller, 2004). This capacity to estimate and
discriminate between nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes often referred to as ‘number
sense,’ has been quantified and delineated across a large body of research (Cantlon, 2012;
Dehaene, 2007; Dehaene et al., 1998; Nieder & Dehaene, 2009). This research has
revealed that the ability to process nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes is conserved
across species (Brannon, 2006; Cantlon, 2012; Dehaene et al., 1998; Nieder & Dehaene,
2009) and that it emerges early in development (Izard, Dehaene-Lambertz, & Dehaene,
2008; Starr, Libertus, & Brannon, 2013; Xu, 2003; Xu, Spelke, & Goddard, 2005). This
suggests that the ability to estimate nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes has a long
evolutionary history. One potential explanation for the phylogenetic and ontogenetic
continuity of this ability, to process nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes, is that the
capacity to estimate quantities supports functions that have been and are currently critical
for survival, such as identifying regions with an abundance of food or approximating the
number of approaching predators (Cantlon, 2012; Geary, Berch, Mann Koepke, 2015;
McComb, Packer, & Pusey, 1994; Vonk & Beran, 2012). Critically, it has been
suggested that the evolutionarily ancient ability to process nonsymbolic numerical
magnitudes may be a necessary element of the foundation that supports the capacity to
understand numerical information. However, humans also have developed the ability to
represent numbers symbolically.

3

1.2 Symbolic Numerical Magnitudes
Relatively recently in human history, a broad set of capabilities emerged that resulted in
the uniquely human capacity for symbolic abstraction (Ansari, 2008; Coolidge &
Overmann, 2012). In view of this, in addition to having an ancient, nonsymbolic ‘number
sense’ that is shared among non-human species and emerges early in development,
humans have a unique ability to represent numerical magnitudes symbolically such as
with the verbal word ‘three’ or the Arabic digit ‘3’ (Ansari, 2007, 2008; Coolidge &
Overmann, 2012; Kersey & Cantlon, 2017; Núñez, 2017). In direct contrast to the
evolutionarily ancient system that evolved to support the processing of nonsymbolic
numerical magnitudes, the uniquely human capacity to represent numbers symbolically
emerged as a result of enculturation (Ansari, 2008; Núñez, 2017). This culturally
acquired capacity to understand and manipulate symbolic numerical magnitudes is
foundational for later, more advanced mathematical abilities (De Smedt, Noël, Gilmore,
& Ansari, 2013).
The striking way that humans differ from non-human animals in our ability to represent
and process numerical magnitudes symbolically is undoubtedly a core element of our
unique human capacity for higher-level mathematical thinking. A key question in the
field of numerical cognition has been whether the ancient system(s) that evolved to
process nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes are repurposed for symbolic thinking in
humans (Dehaene & Cohen, 2007). Researchers hypothesized that if the ancient systems
that evolved to process nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes are indeed repurposed for
symbolic thinking, then different number formats (i.e., ‘3’, ‘three’, and ‘•••’) would be
processed in the same way (i.e., abstractly). Therefore, researchers have examined
whether numerical magnitudes are processed abstractly, using a single formatindependent number processing system, or if the underlying representations that support
symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitude processing are format-dependent
(Ansari, 2016; Cohen Kadosh & Walsh, 2009; Coolidge & Overmann, 2012; Dehaene et
al., 1998). Despite years of research, it remains hotly debated whether symbolic
numerical thinking is rooted in the evolutionarily ancient system used to process
nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes.

4

1.3 Number Processing is Abstract
For decades, the dominant perspective in the field of numerical cognition has been that
symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical quantities are processed using an evolutionarily
ancient abstract number processing system that supports numerical magnitude processing,
regardless of number format (Brannon, 2006; Dehaene, 2007; Dehaene, Piazza, Pinel, &
Cohen, 2003; Halberda, Mazzocco, & Feigenson, 2008; Nieder & Dehaene, 2009). This
idea has been supported by findings from both behavioural and neuroimaging research in
adult and child populations.
This dominant view, that symbolic and nonsymbolic numbers are processed using the
same abstract number processing system, was first supported by the finding that similar
behavioural effects are obtained for symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical stimuli when
participants make comparative judgements between two numerical magnitudes (Dehaene
et al., 1998; Fias, Lammertyn, Reynvoet, Dupont, & Orban, 2003; Fulbright, Manson,
Skudlarski, Lacadie, & Gore, 2003; Holloway & Ansari, 2009; Holloway & Ansari,
2008; Moyer & Landauer, 1967). Two examples of behavioural effects that have been
reported during both symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitude comparison tasks
are the distance effect and the size effect. The distance effect refers to the finding that
participants are faster and more accurate when comparing numbers – be they symbolic or
nonsymbolic – if the distance between the two numbers being compared is relatively
large (Buckley & Gillman, 1974; Krajcsi, 2017; Moyer & Landauer, 1967). For example,
participants are typically faster and more accurate when comparing the numerical
magnitudes ‘2’ and ‘8’ (a distance of 6) compared to ‘2’ and ‘3’ (a distance of 1).
Complementary, the size effect is the finding that participants are faster and more
accurate at comparing numerical magnitudes, again both symbolic and nonsymbolic,
when the magnitudes are smaller (e.g., 1 vs. 2) compared to larger magnitudes (e.g., 8 vs.
9), when holding distance constant (Krajcsi, 2017; Moyer & Landauer, 1967). Distance
and size effects (i.e., the effects that number comparisons are easier with large distances
or small sizes) often combined into a single effect thought to reflect both distance and
size, referred to as the ratio effect (Krajcsi, 2017). Distance, size and ratio effects have
often interpreted to be a measure of representational precision (Nieder & Dehaene, 2009;
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Verguts & Fias, 2004). These reports of similar behavioural signatures for the processing
of symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes that have been replicated across
many studies (Buckley & Gillman, 1974; Holloway & Ansari, 2008; Holloway, Price, &
Ansari, 2010; Krajcsi, Lengyel, & Kojouharova, 2016; Moyer & Landauer, 1967),
including developmental samples (e.g., Holloway & Ansari, 2008, 2009), have ultimately
been taken as evidence of shared underlying representations (Dehaene, 2007; Dehaene et
al., 1998).
In addition to behavioural data in both adults and children suggesting that symbolic and
nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes produce similar behavioural effects, researchers have
canvassed the human brain, using neuroimaging methodologies, in search of brain
regions that support both symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitude processing
(For review see: Sokolowski & Ansari, 2016). Many neuroimaging studies have reported
overlapping neural activation during symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitude
processing in adults (e.g., Holloway, Price, & Ansari, 2010; Piazza, Pinel, Le Bihan, &
Dehaene, 2007; Pinel, Piazza, Le Bihan, & Dehaene, 2004) as well as children (e.g.,
Cantlon, Libertus, et al., 2009; Holloway & Ansari, 2010). Regions of overlap are
typically found along the bilateral intraparietal sulcus (hIPS). In view of this, the hIPS
has been identified as an abstract number processing region (Cantlon, Brannon, Carter, &
Pelphrey, 2006; Dehaene, 2007; Dehaene et al., 2003; Fias et al., 2003; Piazza et al.,
2007; Santens, Roggeman, Fias, & Verguts, 2010). Researchers have taken the finding
that the same brain regions support different formats of numerical magnitudes to suggest
that symbolic numerical magnitudes are processed using the ancient system that evolved
to process nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes. In other words, the evolutionarily ancient
system used to process nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes has been repurposed to be an
abstract number processing system that is used to process numerical magnitudes of all
formats. Together, these behavioural and neuroimaging findings in adults and children
have led researchers to conclude that symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes
are represented using the same abstract number processing system.
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1.4 Number Processing is Format-Dependent
Although many have argued, against the background of evidence reviewed above, that
symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes have the same underlying
representations, recent evidence has suggested otherwise. Indeed, a growing body of data
has accumulated that suggests that symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitude
processing is more distinct than previously assumed (Ansari, 2007; Bulthé, De Smedt, &
Op de Beeck, 2014; Cohen Kadosh & Walsh, 2009; Lyons, Ansari, & Beilock, 2012,
2014; Lyons & Beilock, 2013; Sokolowski & Ansari, 2016). Here, I outline several
important behavioural and neuroimaging findings that support this claim.
A key study that supports the idea that symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes
are supported by distinct systems, examined participant’s performance on a number
comparison task when the two stimuli being compared were either the same format (i.e.,
both symbolic or both nonsymbolic) or different formats (i.e., comparing a symbolic
numerical magnitude to a nonsymbolic numerical magnitude) (Lyons et al., 2012).
Critically, if symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes are indeed supported by
an abstract number processing system, one would predict that there would be no cost of
mixing. In other words, conditions during which participants compared symbolic
numerical magnitudes to nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes should not differ
significantly from conditions where participants compared numerical magnitudes within
the same format. However, results revealed that when participants directly compared a
symbolic numerical magnitude to a nonsymbolic numerical magnitude they were slower
and less accurate than when they compared two numerical magnitudes that were the same
format (i.e., two symbolic numerical magnitudes or two nonsymbolic numerical
magnitudes) (Lyons et al., 2012). This suggests that the way that humans process
symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes may be more distinct than has been
assumed. Converging recent behavioural evidence has revealed that the similar
behavioural effects (namely the distance, size, and ratio effects) observed during
comparison tasks for symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes do not correlate
with each other, and may, in fact, be produced by two distinct systems (Krajcsi, 2017;
Krajcsi et al., 2016). Notably, the finding that ratio effects (i.e., the single effect thought
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to encompass both distance and size effects) for symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical
magnitude processing are not as related to each other as has been assumed has also been
reported in a cross-sectional developmental sample (Lyons, Nuerk, & Ansari, 2015).
Specifically, in a longitudinal sample of almost 2000 children, researchers revealed that
the whether a child’s nonsymbolic ratio effect was significant was not predictive whether
the same was true of that child’s symbolic ratio effect. In other words, the presence of a
nonsymbolic ratio effect is not related to the presence of a symbolic ratio effect at the
individual level. These findings converge with data from human adults (e.g., Krajcsi,
2017; Krajcsi et al., 2016; Lyons et al., 2012) to suggest that perhaps symbolic and
nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes are supported by distinct, systems that have some
similarities that lead to similar behavioural signatures. Krajsci and colleagues
hypothesize that while nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes are likely represented using an
evolutionarily ancient approximate magnitude system, symbolic numerical magnitudes
may be supported by a discrete semantic system. Here, the term ‘discrete’ refers to a set
of items where each item is distinct (i.e., the quantity of an array of dots). This is in
contrast to the term continuous, which refers to a set that can take on any value within a
finite or infinite interval (e.g., the amount of physical space taken up by an array of dots).
In a discrete semantic system, representations of symbolic numerical magnitudes are
stored as values in a semantic network, that operates similarly to a mental lexicon or a
conceptual network (Krajcsi, 2017; Krajcsi et al., 2016). Together, these findings
contribute to a growing body of behavioural research that suggests that symbols and
quantities are not processed as similarly as had previously been concluded.
In addition to the behavioural evidence, discussed above, neuroimaging studies have
revealed distinct neural activity supporting the processing of symbolic and nonsymbolic
magnitudes using both traditional univariate analysis techniques as well as newer cuttingedge multivariate approaches (Ansari, 2007; Bulthé et al., 2014; Cohen Kadosh et al.,
2011; Fias et al., 2003; Holloway et al., 2010; Lyons et al., 2014; Lyons & Beilock, 2018;
Santens et al., 2010). In traditional univariate analyses, a General Linear Model (GLM)
is used to fit a model to the time course of each voxel independently within a region of
interest or at the whole-brain level. Notably, a voxel is a 3D pixel within the brain.
Univariate analyses provide insight into whether a set of voxels in a particular area of the

8

brain are significantly activated in relation to a particular stimulus. When using a
multivariate analytic approach, the patterns of activation that would normally be averaged
are analyzed and compared between conditions. More specifically, using multivariate
analytic techniques allows for the examination and comparison of distributed patterns of
activity within a region of interest or at the whole-brain level. Indeed, studies that include
univariate analyses (i.e., analyses where each voxel is examined independently) reveal
spatially distinct patterns of activation for symbolic compared to nonsymbolic numerical
magnitudes (e.g., Bulthé et al., 2014; Lyons & Beilock, 2013). Relatedly, studies that
used multivariate analyses (i.e., analyses that explore patterns of activation within
regions) indicate that the patterns of brain activation differ greatly between symbolic and
nonsymbolic numerical magnitude processing both within the hIPS and at the wholebrain level (e.g., Bulthé, De Smedt, & Op de Beeck, 2014; Lyons et al., 2015). Taken
together, these neuroimaging data indicate that there are many brain regions along the
frontal and parietal lobes that represent numerical magnitude processing in a formatdependent way (For review see: Sokolowski & Ansari, 2016). Moreover, even the
regions that exhibit spatial overlap at the univariate level typically have distinct patterns
of activation at the multivariate level. This more recent body of evidence highlights that
the extent to which symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes are processed using
common representations should be more carefully examined. Additional research is
needed to unravel whether the similarities between symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical
magnitude processing are due to the fact that these distinct formats of numerical
magnitudes are processed using a shared abstract number processing system, or if instead
symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes are processed using two distinct
systems that have some similarities.

1.5 The Role of Non-Numerical Magnitudes
To complicate matters further, the processing of non-numerical magnitudes (such as
physical size, duration, and luminance) have been reported to exhibit similar effects to
the processing of symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes, both at the
behavioural and the neural level (Cantlon, Platt, & Brannon, 2009; Cohen Kadosh,
Lammertyn, & Izard, 2008; Sokolowski, Fias, Bosah Ononye, & Ansari, 2017).
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In addition to the similarities between symbolic, nonsymbolic and non-numerical
magnitude processing, research has shown that the stimuli that are commonly used to
assess nonsymbolic numerical magnitude processing are inherently confounded by nonnumerical magnitudes such as the size of the dots, and density of the dots (For review
see: Leibovich & Henik, 2013). For example, if there are four dots in one array and three
dots in another array and all the dots are of the same size, the four dots have a greater
total surface area than the three dots. To control for surface area, the size of the dots can
be adjusted to equate the total surface area. However, doing this changes the density and
the average size of the dots. Therefore, when judging which of three or four dots is
greater, participants can use either nonsymbolic numerical magnitude, a non-numerical
magnitude (such as surface area), or a combination thereof. Researchers have interpreted
this data to suggest that the processing of numerical quantities is sub-served by a general
magnitude system, rather than a system (or systems) that are specific to discrete
numerical stimuli (Henik, Leibovich, Naparstek, Diesendruck, & Rubinsten, 2011;
Sokolowski, Fias, Bosah Ononye, et al., 2017). Therefore, in addition to a lack of
conclusive evidence regarding whether symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes
are sub-served by a single abstract number processing system or distinct formatdependent systems, it is also of great importance to examine how numerical the
processing of nonsymbolic stimuli (e.g., arrays of dots) actually is, and consequently
examine the extent to which the processing of non-numerical variables plays a central
role in nonsymbolic numerical magnitude processing.

1.6 The Acquisition of Symbolic Number Knowledge
The data reviewed above suggest that representing numerical magnitudes symbolically
involves processes that are at distinct from the way that nonsymbolic numerical
magnitudes are processed in human adults. These conclusions contradict the dominant
perspective in the field of numerical cognition: that symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical
magnitudes are processed using a single abstract number processing system. From a
developmental perspective, the dominant assumption in the field of numerical cognition
would support the idea that symbolic representations are formed by mapping arbitrary
labels onto pre-existing representations of nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes (Cantlon,
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2012; Dehaene, 2007; Nieder & Dehaene, 2009; Piazza, 2010). However, a plausible
alternative mechanism is that symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitude processing
are supported with similar but distinct mechanisms (Ansari, 2008; Leibovich & Ansari,
2016). A key question that follows is: what would be the best developmental approach to
investigating the relationship between symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitude
processing across developmental time?
The majority of the research that has measured symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical
magnitude processing across developmental time has compared symbolic and
nonsymbolic numerical magnitude processing within a sample of older child participants
who have already acquired comprehensive knowledge of the symbolic number system
(e.g., Bartelet, Vaessen, Blomert, & Ansari, 2014; Holloway & Ansari, 2009; Holloway
& Ansari, 2008; Lyons & Ansari, 2015; Lyons et al., 2015; Reynvoet & Sasanguie, 2016;
Sasanguie, Defever, Maertens, & Reynvoet, 2013). As with the adult data, this data
seems to suggest that symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes are not as linked
as has been previously assumed and may, in fact, be supported by distinct mechanisms.
However, a key developmental approach for investigating the relation between symbolic
and nonsymbolic representations of numerical magnitudes is to probe at the link between
symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitude processing during the developmental
window where children are in the process of acquiring symbolic number knowledge
(Batchelor, Keeble, & Gilmore, 2015; Dehaene, 2007; Gunderson et al., 2015; Le Corre
& Carey, 2007; Mix, 1999, 2008; Mussolin, Nys, Leybaert, & Content, 2014; Negen &
Sarnecka, 2015; Shusterman et al., 2016, 2017; Slusser & Sarnecka, 2011; Slusser, Ditta,
& Sarnecka, 2013; Wagner & Johnson, 2011). Before I describe the findings from
research examining the link between learning the meaning of symbolic numerical
magnitudes and nonsymbolic numerical magnitude processing I will briefly outline the
developmental process of acquiring symbolic number knowledge.
Learning the meaning of symbolic numerical magnitudes is a slow process that typically
takes children several years to master. Children acquire the ability to recite the count
sequence, procedurally, before understanding the semantic meaning of number words and
Arabic digits (Karen Wynn, 1990, 1992). Typically, it takes children two to three years
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from the time they master the count sequence to master the principle of cardinality (often
referred to as the cardinal principle (CP)): that the last number word that is stated when
counting a set refers to the total quantity of objects within that set (Gelman & Gallistel,
1978). The gradual process of acquiring the cardinal principle (i.e., becoming a cardinal
principle knower) is as follows. First, children do not know the cardinal meaning of any
number words and are consequently referred to as “pre-knowers.” Following this,
children learn the meaning of small number words (i.e., numbers one to four) in a stepwise manner (Wynn, 1992). Children who know the meaning of the word ‘one’ and are
referred to as “one-knowers.” Several months later, children learn the meaning of the
word ‘two’ and therefore have progressed to being “two-knowers”. Subsequently, over
time children become “three-knowers,” and some studies report the presence of “fourknowers.” This set of children who know the meaning of some small verbal number
words (i.e., words one to four), but have not yet mastered the principle of cardinality (i.e.,
they do not understand that all number words in their count sequence refer to specific
numerical magnitudes and that the last number counted refers to the total quantity of
items in a set) are collectively referred to as “subset-knowers.’ Children who have
learned the cardinal principle (i.e., CP-knowers) are qualitatively different from subsetknowers in that they can generate cardinality for all numbers using their knowledge of the
cardinal principle (Le Corre & Carey, 2007). It is only once children have learned the
cardinal principle that they are considered to have a preliminary understanding of the
meaning of symbolic numerical magnitudes.
Research exploring the link between learning the semantic meaning of symbolic
numerical magnitudes and the ability to process nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes has
resulted in mixed findings (e.g., Batchelor, Keeble, & Gilmore, 2015; Dehaene, 2007;
Gunderson et al., 2015; Le Corre & Carey, 2007; Mix, 1999, 2008; Mussolin, Nys,
Leybaert, & Content, 2014; Negen & Sarnecka, 2015; Shusterman et al., 2016, 2017;
Slusser & Sarnecka, 2011; Slusser, Ditta, & Sarnecka, 2013; Wagner & Johnson, 2011).
Indeed, some research indicates there is a link between children’s symbolic number
knowledge and their ability to discriminate between nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes
(e.g., Wagner & Johnson, 2011) whereas other research has indicated that children’s
ability to process nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes is independent of that child’s

12

developing understanding of the meaning of symbolic numbers (Le Corre & Carey, 2007;
Negen & Sarnecka, 2015).
This body of research that has examined the link between symbolic and nonsymbolic
numerical magnitudes during the developmental window where children are acquiring
symbolic number knowledge (i.e., learning verbal number words) does not entirely
support the assumption, based on the dominant perspective in the field of numerical
cognition, that symbols are learned by mapping arbitrary labels onto a pre-existing
evolutionarily ancient system used to processing nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes
(Dehaene, 2007, 2008; Shusterman et al., 2016; Wagner & Johnson, 2011). More
specifically, findings that suggest that preschool-age children’s nonsymbolic numerical
magnitude processing abilities correlate with early symbolic number abilities (e.g.,
Mussolin et al., 2014; Wagner & Johnson, 2011) have been taken as support for the idea
that children learn abstract number symbols by attaching the arbitrary number symbol
onto a pre-existing nonsymbolic numerical magnitude representation. However, there is a
growing body of evidence that contradicts this dominant assumption (For a
comprehensive review see: Leibovich & Ansari, 2016; Merkley & Ansari, 2016). For
example, research has reported that some children can count out an exact number of
objects when asked to do so but did not use the corresponding number words when asked
to map verbal number words onto nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes (Le Corre &
Carey, 2007). Relatedly, when the nonsymbolic numerical magnitude processing task is
modified to make sure that children respond on the basis of numerical magnitude (rather
than correlated non-numerical magnitude cues), the correlation between verbal number
knowledge and nonsymbolic numerical magnitude processing abilities in typically
developing children disappears (Negen & Sarnecka, 2015). These data suggest that the
link between symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitude processing is not as
straightforward as previously assumed. Consequently, these data have driven researchers
to question whether there is indeed a causal, developmental relationship between
nonsymbolic numerical magnitude processing and the acquisition of the capacity to
conceptualize numbers symbolically (Barner, 2017; Merkley & Ansari, 2016).
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An alternative explanation that may explain the link between nonsymbolic number
processing and the acquisition of the cardinal principle in young children is that learning
the cardinality of symbols may facilitate and even constrain children’s understanding of
discrete nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes. This idea is supported by evidence showing
that children’s verbal number knowledge was a stronger predictor of nonsymbolic
numerical magnitude processing seven months later than the reverse relationship between
nonsymbolic numerical magnitude processing acuity and subsequent verbal number
knowledge (Mussolin, Nys, Leybaert, et al., 2014). This finding, in conjunction with
other data suggesting that CP-knowers outperform subset knowers on a variety of
nonsymbolic numerical magnitude tasks (e.g., Batchelor, Keeble, & Gilmore, 2015; Mix,
Sandhofer, Moore, & Russell, 2012; Slusser & Sarnecka, 2011; Slusser, Ditta, &
Sarnecka, 2013), suggests that the relationship between symbolic and nonsymbolic
numerical magnitude processing in children who are in the process of learning symbolic
numbers may be bidirectional, rather than unidirectional (Goffin & Ansari, 2019). More
research is needed to unravel whether acquiring the ability to represent numbers
symbolically influences how children conceptualize discrete nonsymbolic numerical
magnitudes.

1.7 Summary and Outstanding Questions
The field of numerical cognition has been dominated by the question of how numerical
symbols are connected to evolutionarily ancient, pre-existing, representations of
nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes (Dehaene, 2007). However, despite decades of
research, it remains fiercely contested whether the uniquely human capacity to process
numerical magnitudes symbolically is underpinned by mechanisms that are overlapping
or distinct from the evolutionarily ancient system used to process nonsymbolic numerical
magnitudes (for review see: (Ansari, 2008; Cohen Kadosh & Walsh, 2009; Sokolowski &
Ansari, 2016). Moreover, additional research is needed to understand how the system(s)
that support symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes emerge over the course of
development (for review see: Leibovich & Ansari, 2016; Merkley & Ansari, 2016).
One potential explanation for these contradictory findings is that the relation between
symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitude processing may not be static. Indeed,
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perhaps numbers can be processed both abstractly and in a format-dependent way
depending on the cognitive demands of the task and the individual’s developmental stage.
Testing this idea requires an examination of whether the association between symbolic
and nonsymbolic numerical magnitude processing changes when cognitive demands of
the task change. For example, one could examine whether the processing of symbolic and
nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes differ depending on whether the task requires
participants to estimate, manipulate or ignore the magnitude of the stimuli.
The key goal of the current thesis is to explore the link between symbolic and
nonsymbolic numerical magnitude processing, both behaviourally and at the neural level,
as well as examine how this relationship can be influenced by task factors. Specifically,
in adults, I explore the relationship between symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical
magnitude processing in the brain by extracting regularities across a large set of studies
with various task tasks demands; and by examining processing of symbolic and
nonsymbolic numerical magnitude processing in the absence of task demands; and
manipulating task conditions intended to make the numerical magnitude more or less
salient. In children, I explore the link between the acquisition of symbolic number
knowledge and spontaneously attending to nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes. Together,
these different approaches provide novel insights into the way humans process symbolic
and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes, both behaviourally and at the neural level, under
different attentional conditions and at different points in development.

1.8 Overview of the Current Thesis
Many researchers have canvassed the brain in search of brain systems that support
symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitude processing. Although researchers have
probed at this question using cutting-edge neuroimaging techniques for nearly two
decades, there is a lack of convergence among these neuroimaging studies regarding
which brain regions support symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitude processing.
Consequently, it remains unclear whether the human brain represents numerical
magnitudes abstractly, or if representations of numerical magnitudes in the human brain
are format-dependent. In chapter 2 of this thesis, I quantitatively evaluate available
neuroimaging evidence to examine whether symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical
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magnitudes are supported by common or distinct brain regions at the meta-analytic level.
Specifically, I use activation likelihood estimation (ALE) to conduct the first quantitative
meta-analysis of 57 empirical neuroimaging papers examining neural activation during
symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitude processing. This method is a necessary
first step to quantify previous research that has examined symbolic and nonsymbolic
numerical magnitude processing in order to identify whether the adult human brain hosts
abstract and/or format-dependent representations of numerical magnitudes. This study
has been published journal Neuroimage (Sokolowski, Fias, Mousa, & Ansari, 2017).
As revealed in chapter 2, a large body of research has examined the neural correlates of
symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitude processing (Sokolowski, Fias, Mousa, et
al., 2017). Critically, the majority of these studies use active tasks, and do not adequately
control for non-numerical magnitudes that are inherently correlated with nonsymbolic
numerical stimuli. In active tasks, it is notoriously difficult to discern whether neural
activation is associated with processing the magnitude of the stimulus or with decision
making, motor processing, and task difficulty (Göbel, Johansen-Berg, Behrens, &
Rushworth, 2004). To overcome the major limitations of active tasks, a small subset of
research has used functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging adaptation (fMR-A)
paradigms. fMR-A is a passive design that measures the neural correlates associated with
a stimulus of interest without requiring participants to make a decision or motor response.
This task relies on the principle that neural populations habituate (i.e., adapt) their
activity following repeated presentations of the same stimulus (Grill-Spector, Henson, &
Martin, 2006). In fMR-A paradigms, a particular stimulus (i.e., the habituation stimulus)
is repeatedly presented to evoke adaptation of brain regions associated with encoding this
stimulus. Following this period of adaptation, a stimulus that differs in some way from
the habituation stimulus (i.e., a deviant stimulus) is presented. The presentation of the
deviant stimulus results in a rebound of activation in regions that are associated with the
attributes of the particular deviant compared to the habituation stimulus. This rebound of
activation in response to a deviant stimulus is referred to as the ‘neural rebound effect’.
The extent of the neural rebound effect in response to a deviant is a function of the
difference between the adapted stimulus and the deviant.
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Despite the large body of research that has examined symbolic and nonsymbolic
numerical magnitude processing, no single study has examined the neural underpinnings
of both symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitude processing within-subjects,
while accounting for the confounds of general magnitude processing (e.g., physical size)
and decision making. In chapter 3 of this thesis, I develop and use a method I refer to as
parallel fMR-A, to investigate which brain regions specifically support the processing of
symbolic numerical magnitudes (symbol), nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes (quantity),
and physical size (size). In the parallel adaptation task, participants are repeatedly
presented with a specific quantity of the same symbol in a white font of a specific
size. Following this, one aspect of the stimulus is changed (symbol, quantity, or
size) while the other aspects remain constant. Using this design, I examine whether
symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes as well as non-numerical magnitudes
are sub-served by similar or distinct systems in the human adult brain.
In chapter 2 and 3, I explore the way that the human brain represents symbolic and
nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes by extracting regularities across a large set of
attentional task demands (chapter 2) and by using a paradigm that removes confounds
associated with active task demands (chapter 3). Critically, although these two
methodologies are useful for developing our understanding of the way the human brain
represents symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes in the absence of a task, they
do not identify the attentional conditions under which symbolic and nonsymbolic
numerical magnitudes are either linked or separate. Chapter 4 of this thesis addresses the
question of whether the similarities and differences between symbolic and nonsymbolic
numerical magnitude processing depend on whether the magnitudes are being processed
effortfully or automatically/unintentionally. Specifically, in chapter 4 I develop and
implement a Symbolic-Nonsymbolic Stroop Task that assesses the effortful and automatic
processing of symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes. In the SymbolicNonsymbolic Stroop task, participants are presented with two adjacent arrays of digits
(e.g., 333 vs. 4444) and asked to either indicate the side containing the greater quantity of
symbols (i.e., the nonsymbolic task) or the side containing the symbol associated with the
greater numerical magnitude (i.e., the symbolic tasks). The task includes congruent trials,
where the larger symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitude appeared on the same
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side of the screen (e.g., 22 vs. 66666), incongruent trials, where the larger symbolic and
nonsymbolic numerical magnitude appeared on opposite sides of the screen (e.g., 222222
vs. 66), and neutral trials, where the irrelevant dimension was the same across both sides
of the screen (e.g., 22 vs. 66 for nonsymbolic; 22 vs. 222222 for symbolic). Additionally,
the numerical distance between the numerical quantities being compared is systematically
varied across trials as a way of manipulating the salience of the numerical magnitudes.
This manipulation is based on the finding that numerical information is more likely to be
processed (i.e., more salient) when the numerical distance between the stimuli being
compared is relatively large. Examining whether numerical distance interacts with the
effortful and automatic processing of symbols compared to quantities provides additional
insight into the structure of the underlying representations supporting symbolic compared
to nonsymbolic numerical magnitude processing. Using this task, I examine the effortful
and automatic processing of symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes to assess if
there is an asymmetry in the way that adults attend to these different formats of numerical
magnitudes. Identifying 1) whether there is an asymmetry in the way that human adults
process symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes and 2) if this asymmetry exists
during effortful and/or automatic processing of the numerical magnitudes is essential to
gain insight into the representational structure of the underlying mechanisms that support
symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitude processing.
The findings from chapters 2, 3 and 4 assess whether there is an asymmetry in the way
that human adults represent and process symbolic compared to nonsymbolic numerical
magnitudes. To understand the origin of the asymmetry between symbolic and
nonsymbolic numerical magnitude processing in adults it is critical to examine the
relation between these different formats of numerical magnitudes while these systems are
developing.
As discussed above, learning the meaning of verbal number words is a major milestone
for young children’s numerical thinking. Although a large body of research has examined
how number words are mapped onto representations of nonsymbolic numerical
magnitudes (e.g., Le Corre & Carey, 2007; Wagner & Johnson, 2011), no study to date
has examined how the acquisition of verbal number words relates to the degree to which

18

children spontaneously attend to nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes in the world. In
Chapter 5 of this thesis, I develop and use The Train Task to examine the degree to which
preschool-aged children attended to discrete numerical magnitudes over and above
attending to physical size. The train task is an un-cued matching task that measures
whether children use a number strategy or physical size strategy when being asked to
make a train that is the same as the experimenter’s train. The study in Chapter 5
identifies whether verbal number word knowledge relates to the degree to which
preschool-aged children attend to discrete numerical magnitudes of varied quantities.
This final empirical chapter is essential to unravel how learning the association between
symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes effects how children spontaneously
attend to numerical information in their environment.
In summary, the four empirical chapters that follow will present the data that investigates
similarities and differences in the way that the human brain processes symbolic and
nonsymbolic numerical magnitude, under different attentional conditions. Specifically,
the data presented will address the four areas our inquiry described above. Together, they
will provide insight into the attentional conditions under which symbolic and
nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes are processed similarly and distinctly both
behaviorally and at the neural level in adults and young children.
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Chapter 2

2

Common and Distinct Brain Regions in both Parietal
and Frontal Cortex Support Symbolic and Nonsymbolic
Number Processing in Humans: A Functional
Neuroimaging Meta-Analysis
2.1

Introduction

The question of how the human brain represents numbers has been addressed through a
multitude of neuroimaging experiments. The overarching results from this rapidly
growing body of research are consistent with a large body of neuropsychological
evidence (Cipolotti, Butterworth, & Denes, 1991; Dehaene, Piazza, Pinel, & Cohen,
2003). Specifically, neuroimaging research, like preceding neuropsychological studies,
has suggested the bilateral parietal lobes, and specifically the bilateral intraparietal sulci,
are important brain regions for processing the quantity of a discrete set of items (i.e.,
number) (for review see: Dehaene et al. 2003; Nieder 2005; Brannon 2006; Ansari 2008).
Humans have the unique ability to represent numbers either symbolically, such as with
Arabic symbols (2) or number words (two), or nonsymbolically, appearing as an array of
items (••). The system used to process nonsymbolic numbers (e.g.,••), often referred to as
the approximate number system, is thought to be innate, meaning that infants are born
with the ability to process nonsymbolic numbers (Cantlon, Libertus, et al., 2009) and has
a long evolutionary history (Brannon, 2006; Dehaene, Dehaene-Lambertz, & Cohen,
1998). In contrast, the acquisition of the culturally acquired, uniquely human ability to
process abstract numerical symbols (e.g., 2 or two) is a product of learning and
development and has emerged recently in human evolution (e.g., Ansari 2008; Coolidge
and Overmann 2012). Because different stimulus formats can be used to represent the
same quantity, numbers are said to have an abstract (i.e., format-independent) quality. As
a result, one of the most dominant theories in the cognitive neuroscience of number
processing, namely the three parietal circuits model, states that symbolic and
nonsymbolic numbers are sub-served by the same underlying neuronal circuitry (Dehaene
et al., 1998, 2003). More specifically, the three parietal circuits model (Dehaene et al.,
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2003) predicts that three distinct neural systems support different aspects of basic number
processing. Importantly, the model was based on a qualitative synthesis of previous
literature (Dehaene et al., 2003). This qualitative meta-analysis suggests that the bilateral
intraparietal sulci support the processing of abstract numerical magnitudes, the left
angular gyrus supports verbal aspects of basic number processing, and the bilateral
posterior superior parietal lobules support visual attentional aspects of number
processing. To empirically evaluate the parietal circuits model, researchers have
canvassed the brain in search of neural responses associated with abstract representations
of numbers (e.g., Dehaene et al. 1998, 2003; Brannon 2006; Piazza et al. 2007; Cantlon,
Libertus, et al. 2009).
Such efforts have generated a large body of research which has identified bilateral
inferior parietal regions as brain regions that respond to numbers across stimulus formats
(Dehaene et al., 2003). Specifically, this research revealed that the intraparietal sulcus
was activated by numbers when the numerical information was presented symbolically,
either as Arabic digits (Ansari, Garcia, Lucas, Hamon, & Dhital, 2005; Chochon, Cohen,
van de Moortele, & Dehaene, 1999; Holloway, Price, & Ansari, 2010; Pesenti, Thioux,
Seron, & De Volder, 2000), number words (Ansari, Fugelsang, Dhital, & Venkatraman,
2006), or nonsymbolically, such as dot arrays (Ansari & Dhital, 2006; Holloway et al.,
2010; Piazza, Izard, Pinel, Le Bihan, & Dehaene, 2004; Piazza et al., 2007; Venkatraman,
Ansari, & Chee, 2005). This activation in the intraparietal sulcus during number
processing was also found when the stimuli were presented visually (Arabic numerals) or
auditorily (Eger, Sterzer, Russ, Giraud, & Kleinschmidt, 2003). Together, these results
suggest that the intraparietal sulcus hosts a format and modality independent
representation of number. However, the finding that the intraparietal sulcus is
consistently activated across varying task types and methodologies do not necessarily
imply that number is represented using only an abstract format-independent system.
In recent years, there has been a growing interest in the distinction between the neural
correlates of symbolic processing and nonsymbolic processing (Holloway & Ansari,
2010; Lyons, Ansari, & Beilock, 2014; Shuman & Kanwisher, 2004; Venkatraman et al.,
2005). Recent empirical research has highlighted striking differences in the brain
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activation patterns of numerical stimuli based on stimulus format (Ansari, 2007; Cantlon,
Libertus, et al., 2009; Holloway et al., 2010; Piazza et al., 2007; Venkatraman et al.,
2005). Right-lateralized parietal and frontal regions have been found to show greater
activation for nonsymbolic addition compared to symbolic addition (Venkatraman et al.,
2005). However, brain regions in the left intraparietal sulcus have been shown to be more
finely tuned to numbers presented as Arabic symbols compared to nonsymbolic dot
arrays (Piazza et al., 2007). Holloway et al., (2010) directly tested whether the functional
neuroanatomy underlying symbolic and nonsymbolic processing is overlapping or
distinct. They found overlapping activation for symbolic and nonsymbolic stimuli in the
right inferior parietal lobule. They also found that distinct brain regions responded to
symbolic compared to nonsymbolic numbers. Specifically, symbolic number processing
recruited the left angular gyrus and left superior temporal gyrus while nonsymbolic
number processing recruited regions in the right posterior superior parietal lobule
(Holloway et al., 2010). These findings imply that distinct brain regions support formatgeneral and format-specific processing of numbers.
This converging evidence that showed that distinct brain regions support format-specific
processing led Cohen Kadosh and Walsh, (2009) to mount a significant challenge to the
predominant view in the field that number is represented abstractly in the brain. These
authors highlighted caveats associated with studies that conclude that number is
processed abstractly. For example, Cohen Kadosh and Walsh, (2009) called attention to
the fact that many of the conclusions of these studies are based on null results and point
out that shared neural representations may be driven by general task-related processing
rather than by shared magnitude representations. The authors subsequently proposed the
format-dependent processing hypothesis, postulating that the human brain possesses
format-specific semantic representations of number.
Although the primary focus in the field of numerical cognition has been on the
relationship between activation in the parietal cortex and number processing, converging
evidence has shown that brain regions in the bilateral prefrontal and precentral cortex are
also consistently activated during numerical processing (Ansari et al., 2005; P Pinel,
Dehaene, Rivière, & LeBihan, 2001). The frontal cortex has been identified as important
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for number processing in single-cell recordings from neurons in non-human primates
(Nieder, Freedman, & Miller, 2002; Nieder & Miller, 2004). Additionally,
developmental imaging studies have documented that brain activation during numerical
processing shifts from the frontal cortex to the parietal cortex across development (Ansari
et al., 2005; Cantlon et al., 2006; Kaufmann et al., 2006). A quantitative meta-analysis
that synthesized studies examining brain regions that are correlated with basic number
processing and calculation tasks in adults further supported the idea that the frontal cortex
is important for number processing in adults (Arsalidou & Taylor, 2011). This metaanalysis revealed that large regions of activation in both the parietal and frontal cortex
support basic number and calculation tasks. Results showed that calculation tasks
elicited greater activation in the prefrontal cortex compared to basic number tasks.
Consequently, these authors concluded that the prefrontal cortices are essential in number
and computational tasks (Arsalidou & Taylor, 2011). Together, these studies suggest that
a frontoparietal network may support the processing of numerical information. Although
the large body of research examining numerical processing in adults concluded that the
parietal lobes support numerical processing, it remains unclear whether frontal activation
is as consistent as parietal activation during numerical processing. One potential
explanation that parietal activation is more consistently reported than frontal activation
during number processing tasks is that frontal activation may vary more than parietal
activation between individuals. Since fMRI methodology cannot measure individual
neural firing and requires averaging across many participants (Scott & Wise, 2003), it is
possible that frontal activation varies more strongly than parietal activation between
individuals. An alternative explanation is that perhaps parietal regions are selected more
often than frontal regions in analyses involving regions of interest (ROI). This selection
bias could perpetuate an erroneous impression that the parietal lobe is more important
than the frontal lobe for processing numbers. Consequently, quantitative meta-analytic
tools are needed to overcome this potential unintentional bias within the field of
numerical cognition.
While converging evidence supports the notion that the processing of symbolic and
nonsymbolic numbers relies on both common and distinct brain regions, this evidence
has never been quantitatively synthesized. Previous meta-analyses by Dehaene et al.
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(2003), Cohen Kadosh et al. (2008) and Cantlon, Platt, et al. (2009) examining brain
activation patterns underlying number processing in adults did not investigate how the
brain activation patterns during number processing differ based on number format (i.e.,
symbolic vs. nonsymbolic). Instead, these qualitative meta-analyses grouped symbolic
and nonsymbolic numerical stimuli into a general term: number (See also, Arsalidou &
Taylor, 2011; Dehaene et al., 2003; Houdé, Rossi, Lubin, & Joliot, 2010; Kaufmann,
Wood, Rubinsten, & Henik, 2011). However, it is critical to examine symbolic and
nonsymbolic numerical stimuli separately since a large body of empirical research has
highlighted striking differences in the brain activation patterns of symbolic compared to
nonsymbolic number processing (Ansari, 2007; Cantlon, Libertus, et al., 2009; Holloway
et al., 2010; Piazza et al., 2007; Venkatraman et al., 2005). Additionally, despite
converging evidence revealing consistent activation in frontal brain regions (such as the
medial frontal gyrus, inferior frontal gyrus and precentral gyrus) during number
processing tasks (Ansari et al., 2005; Pinel et al., 2001), previous qualitative analyses
focused exclusively on parietal regions (Cantlon, Platt, et al., 2009; Cohen Kadosh et al.,
2008; Dehaene et al., 2003). Moreover, these previous meta-analyses used Caret software
(Cohen Kadosh et al. 2008; Cantlon, Platt et al. 2009), a tool that is widely used to
visualize neuroimaging data by projecting the spatial mappings of brain activation
patterns onto a population-averaged brain (Van Essen, 2012; Van Essen et al., 2001).
This method of merging foci from several contrasts into a single figure or table has been
the most common approach that researchers have used to combine data across studies
(Turkeltaub, Eden, Jones, & Zeffiro, 2002). Visualization-based methods like Caret may
be safely used for presenting the results of a few studies but should not be used for large
sets of studies. The use of this technique requires judgments of convergence or
divergence across studies that are largely subjective. This subjectivity is undesirable for
rigorous evaluation of the convergence of neuroimaging findings. Therefore, quantitative
meta-analytic tools, such as activation likelihood estimation (ALE) are critical for
synthesizing studies with varying methodologies and inconsistent findings (Eickhoff et
al., 2009; Turkeltaub et al., 2002, 2012).
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2.1.1

The Present Meta-analysis

There has been an emergence of quantitative meta-analytic techniques that use
coordinate-based approaches to statistically determine concordance across functional
imaging studies (Eickhoff et al., 2009; Turkeltaub et al., 2002, 2012). These methods
minimize the subjectivity of meta-analyses by using statistical models to determine interstudy trends. The present study uses activation likelihood estimation (ALE) to examine
brain activation patterns underlying symbolic and nonsymbolic number processing. The
aim of an ALE meta-analysis is to quantify the spatial reproducibility of a set of
independent functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies. ALE identifies 3Dcoordinates (foci) from independent studies and models probability distributions that are
centred around foci. The unification of these probability distributions produces statistical
whole-brain maps (ALE maps) that show statistically reliable activity across independent
studies (Eickhoff, Bzdok, Laird, Kurth, & Fox, 2012; Eickhoff et al., 2009; Laird,
Lancaster, & Fox, 2005; Turkeltaub et al., 2002, 2012). The current study is the first
study to use ALE to objectively examine brain activity that is overlapping and distinct for
symbolic and nonsymbolic numbers. This study aims to reveal which brain regions
support abstract and format dependent number processing.

2.2
2.2.1

Materials and Methods
Literature Search and Article Selection

A stepwise procedure was used to identify all relevant research articles. First, the
literature was searched using a standard search in the PubMed (http://www.pubmed.gov)
and PsychInfo (http://www.apa.org/psychinfo/) databases. Combinations of the key terms
“magnitude”, “number*”, “symbol*”, “nonsymbolic”, “PET”, “positron emission”,
“fMRI”, “functional magnetic resonance imaging”, “neuroimaging” and “imaging” were
entered into these databases. Second, the reference list of all relevant papers found in the
first step and all relevant review papers were reviewed. A study was considered for
inclusion if it included a passive or active symbolic number task, a passive or active
nonsymbolic number task or both symbolic and nonsymbolic number passive or active
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tasks. The term ‘study’ refers to a paper and the term ‘contrast’ is defined as an
individual contrast reported within a paper.

2.2.2

Additional Inclusion/Exclusion Criteria:

1. Studies had to use at least one of the following tasks: comparison, ordering,
passive viewing, numerical estimation, numerosity categorization, counting,
matching, size congruity, naming or target detection.
•

These studies were chosen to include both explicit and automatic
magnitude processing. Studies with tasks that required cognitive
processing (such as calculation) were excluded in order to have activation
that is specifically related to format-independent or format-dependent
magnitude processing.

2. Studies had to include a sample of healthy human adults.
3. Brain imaging had to be done using fMRI or PET.
•

PET and fMRI studies were included because these imaging methods have
comparable spatial uncertainty (Eickhoff et al., 2009).

4. Studies had to use whole-brain group analyses with stereotaxic coordinates in
Talairach/Tournoux or Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) space.
•

Contrasts that used only region of interest analyses were excluded.

•

Contrasts that used only multivariate statistical approaches were excluded.

5. Studies had to have a sample size of > 5 participants.
6. Studies had to be written in English.
Fifty-seven studies met the inclusion criteria, providing data on 877 healthy subjects. All
of these studies included at least one symbolic and one nonsymbolic number task. See
tables 2.1 and 2.2 for a detailed description of the main characteristics of each selected
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study. Together, these studies reported 575 activation foci obtained from 121 contrasts.
The studies were reported in either Talairach or MNI spaces. Studies that reported data
in MNI space were transformed into Talairach space using the Lancaster transformation
tool (icbm2tal) (Laird et al., 2010; Lancaster et al., 2007).

2.2.3

Analysis Procedure

Quantitative, coordinate-based meta-analyses were conducted using the revised version
of the ALE method (Eickhoff et al., 2012, 2009; Turkeltaub et al., 2012). ALE analyses
were conducted using GingerALE, a freely available application by Brainmap
(http://www.brainmap.org). ALE assesses the overlap between contrast coordinates (i.e.,
foci) by modelling the coordinates as probability distributions centred on coordinates to
create probabilistic maps of activation related to the construct of interest. Specifically,
foci reported from contrasts were combined for each voxel to create a modelled
activation (MA) map. An ALE null-distribution is created by randomly redistributing the
same number of foci as in the experimental analysis throughout the brain. To differentiate
meaningful convergence of foci from random clustering (i.e., noise), an ALE algorithm
empirically determines whether the clustering of converging areas of activity across
contrasts is greater than chance as shown in the ALE null-distribution. In most empirical
studies, a single group of subjects perform multiple similar tasks. Therefore, as most
studies report many different contrasts, these contrasts use the same participants in the
same scanning session. Consequently, the activation patterns produced by different
contrasts do not represent independent observations. The ALE algorithm was modified to
address this issue (Eickhoff et al., 2009; Turkeltaub et al., 2012). Additionally, an
alternative approach of organizing datasets according to subject group (rather than by
contrasts) was implemented (Turkeltaub et al., 2012). The current study used the
modified ALE algorithm and organizational approach to prevent subject groups with
multiple contrasts from influencing the data more than studies in which only a few
contrasts are reported from the same group of participants (Turkeltaub et al., 2012).
Two separate ALE maps were created: One for symbolic numbers and one for
nonsymbolic numbers. The current study examined brain regions that were active during
each of symbolic (both Arabic and verbal) number processing and nonsymbolic number
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processing. A conjunction ALE analysis was then computed to examine brain regions
that were active during both symbolic and nonsymbolic number processing. Contrast
analyses were computed between the symbolic number map of activation and the
nonsymbolic number map of activation to determine which regions symbolic and
nonsymbolic numbers specifically activated.

2.2.4

Single Dataset ALE Maps

Two separate ALE meta-analyses were conducted to examine the convergence of foci for
1) symbolic number processing and 2) nonsymbolic number processing. These two ALE
maps used both active and passive contrasts. In addition, three separate ALE metaanalyses were conducted to examine convergent foci for passive number processing: 1)
all passive number processing (passive), 2) passive symbolic number processing (passive
symbolic), 3) passive nonsymbolic number processing (passive nonsymbolic). All papers
were coded using Scribe (either version 2.3 or version 3.0.8). Coordinates were compiled
using Sleuth (version 2.4b). ALE meta-analyses were conducted using GingerALE
(version 2.3.6). Of the 57 studies, 31 were used to create the symbolic map of activation
(477 subjects, 69 contrasts, 265 foci) (cf. Table 2.1) and 26 were used to create the
nonsymbolic map of activation (400 subjects, 52 contrasts, 310 foci) (cf. Table 2.2). 13
studies were used to create the passive map of activation (184 subjects, 30 contrasts, 139
foci) (cf. Table 2.3), of which 5 were used to create the passive symbolic map of
activation (cf. Table 2.3), and 7 to create the passive nonsymbolic map of activation (cf.
Table 2.3). One of the studies only included a conjunction analysis with both symbolic
and nonsymbolic stimuli and therefore was not used to create the passive symbolic or
passive nonsymbolic map. All ALE analyses were performed in GingerALE using a
cluster-level correction that compared significant cluster sizes in the original data to
cluster sizes in the ALE maps that were generated from 1000 threshold permutations.
This was in order to correct for false-positive clusters that could arise as a result of
multiple comparisons within the same voxel. Specifically, these maps had a cluster-level
threshold of p<.05 and a cluster-forming (uncorrected) threshold of p<.001. The ALE
maps were transformed into z-scores for display. This recently developed thresholding
technique provides a faster, more rigorous analytical solution for producing the null-
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distribution and addresses the issue of multiple-comparison corrections (Eickhoff et al.,
2012). All single dataset ALE maps (symbolic, nonsymbolic and passive) were created
using this correction.
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Table 2.1 Studies Included in the Symbolic Meta-Analysis
1st

Imaging

Mean

Author

Year

Journal

N

Method

Age

Ansari D

2005

NeuroReport

12

fMRI

19

Ansari D

2006

NeuroImage

14

fMRI

21

Gender

Task(s)
Comparison

8F 6M

Size
Congruity

Contrast Name
Distance effect (small>large) adults

12

Main effect: distance (small > large)

10

Main effect of distance in the
neutral condition (small>large)
Journal of
Ansari D

2007

Cognitive

13

fMRI

21.5

Comparison

Neuroscience

Attout L

2014

PLoS ONE

26

fMRI

21

Chassy P

2012

Cerebral Cortex

16

fMRI

28

15F,

Order

11M

Judgment

16M

Comparison

Loc

Conjunction of Small and Large
symbolic number

7

8

Distance effect of numerical order

7

Positive Integers<Negative Integers

1

41

Chen C

Chochon
F

Damarla
SR

Eger E

2007

NeuroReport

20

fMRI

22.7

10F,
10M

Journal of
1999

Cognitive

8

fMRI

4F, 4M

Neuroscience

2013

2003

Human Brain
Mapping

Neuron

10

9

fMRI

fMRI

25.5

27.9

7F, 3M

5F, 4M

Delayednumbermatching

Naming,
Comparison

Unmatched Numbers > Matched
Numbers

Digit Naming vs. Control

2

Comparison vs. Control

13

Comparison vs. Digit Naming

1

Passive

Stable Parietal lobe voxels in Digit-

Viewing

object mode

Targetdetection

8

2

Modality-related effects: Auditory
Numbers >Visual Numbers (fixed-

2

effect)
Modality-related effects: Auditory
Numbers >Visual Numbers

4

(random-effect)
Modality-related effects: Auditory
Numbers >Visual Numbers

5

42

Modality-related effects: Auditory
Numbers >Visual Numbers

4

(random-effect)
Numbers > Letters and Colours
(fixed-effect)
Numbers > Letters and Colours
(random-effect)

Journal of
Fias W

2003

Cognitive

18

PET

23

18M

Comparison

Neuroscience

Fias W

2007

Journal of
Neuroscience

4

2

Numbers > Letters (fixed-effect)

2

Numbers > Letters (random-effect)

2

Numbers > Colours (fixed-effect)

4

Numbers > Colours (random-effect)

3

Number comparison vs
Nonsymbolic Stimuli Comparison

13

(Number comparison-number
17

fMRI

9F, 8M

Comparison

dimming) - (letter comparison-letter
dimming)

3

43

Franklin
MS

Journal of
2009

Cognitive

17

fMRI

21.8

10F, 7M

Neuroscience

Ordering
Task

Magnitude Near>Far (common
regions with Order Near>Far)

Order Far>Near (common regions
with Magnitude Near>Far)
Magnitude Near>Far (Unique
regions)

Fulbright
RK

He L

American
2003

Journal of

19

fMRI

24

8F, 11M

20

fMRI

21

8F, 12M

Neuroradiology
2013

Cerebral Cortex

Order,
Identification

Comparison

1

1

3

Order Far>Near (Unique regions)

1

Number vs Shapes

0

Symbolic > Nonsymbolic

2

Digit-digit > cross notation trials

1

Overlap between
(Symbolic>nonsymbolic) and

2

(small>large)
Holloway I
D

2010

Neuroimage

19

fMRI

23.5

10F, 9M

Comparison

(symbolic - control) - (nonsymbolic control)

2

44

Holloway I
D

Kadosh R

Kadosh R
C

Kadosh R
C

Journal of
2013

Cognitive

26

fMRI

25

22F, 4M

15

fMRI

28

7F, 8M

Neuroscience

2005

2007

Neuropsychologia

NeuroImage

17

fMRI

31

7F, 10M

Frontiers in
2011

Human
Neuroscience

19

fMRI

26.3

12F, 7M

Passive

Adaptation to Hindu-Arabic

Viewing

Numerals for both groups

Comparison

Stroop

Passive
Viewing

2

Numerical vs. Size

7

Numerical vs. Luminance

8

Numerical Distance

3

Numerical Distance (IPS)

2

Notation Adaptation

2

Quantity Adaptation

1

Notation x Adaptation

1

Magnitude Change Digits

10

Magnitude Change Digits>Dots

3
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Kaufmann
L

2005

Neuroimage

17

fMRI

31

7F, 10M

Stroop

Numerical comparison > physical
comparison
Numerical comparison (Distance 1
> Distance 4, only neutral trials)

Le Clec'H
G

2000

Neuroimage

5

fMRI

37

5M

6

fMRI

27

3F, 3M

23

fMRI

35

fMRI

Compare to
12
Compare to
12

5

5

Numbers > Body Parts (Block)

4

Numbers > Body Parts (Error)

3

Distance of 18 vs. Distance of 27

6

Journal of
Liu X

2006

Cognitive

7 F, 5M

Stroop

Neuroscience
Journal of
Lyons I M

2013

Cognitive
Neuroscience

16F,
17M

Comparison

Symbolic: Number Ordinal >
Luminance Ordinal

3

Symbolic: Number Ordinal >
Luminance Ordinal and Number
Cardinal >Luminance Cardinal

10

46

Notebaert
K

Journal of
2011

Cognitive

13

fMRI

6F,7M

Neuroscience

Journal of
Park J

2012

Cognitive

Passive
Viewing

Ratio 1.25 Below > Ratio 1

1

Ratio 1.5 Below > Ratio 1

1

Ratio 2 Below > Ratio 1

1

Ratio 2 Below > Ratio 1.25 Below

1

Ratio 1.5 Above > Ratio 1

1

Ratio 2 Above > Ratio 1

1

Ratio 2 Above > Ratio 1.25 Above

1

Number > Letter

1

Comparison vs. Orientation, Digits

7

Arabic Number > Verbal Number

1

Visual
20

fMRI

23.4

11F, 9M

Neuroscience

matching
task

Journal of
Pesenti M

2000

Cognitive

8

PET

11

fMRI

8M

Comparison

Neuroscience

Pinel P

1999

NeuroReport

26

2F, 9M

Compare to
5

47

Pinel P

Pinel P

2001

2004

Neuroimage

Neuron

13

15

fMRI

fMRI

Comparison

24

18 F,
6M

Stroop

Close Distance > Far Distance

1

Far Distance > Close Distance

1

Verbal vs. Arabic

3

Arabic vs. Verbal

6

Distance Effect

7

Number Comparison vs. Size
Comparison

5

Number Comparison Small
Distance vs. Number Comparison

3

Large Distance

Price G R

2011

Vogel S E

2013

Neuroimage

Neuropsychologia

19

fMRI

22.17

6F, 13M

14

fMRI

25

7F, 7M

Passive

(Conjunction) Arabic digits>Letters

Viewing

and Arabic digits>Scrambled digits

Number line
estimation

1

Number > Control

10

Number Specific Activation

5

Loc, number of locations reported in contrast; fMRI, functional magnetic resonance imaging; PET, positron emission tomography; N,
sample size of each study; M – Male, F – Female.
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Table 2.2 Studies Included in the Nonsymbolic Meta-Analysis
1st
Author

Year

Ansari D

2006

Journal
Brain
Research

Imaging

Mean

Gende

N

Method

Age

r

16

fMRI

20.4

16M

9

fMRI

19.8

6M, 3F

13

fMRI

21.5

Task(s)
Passive

Contrast Name

Loc

Number Change Effect

4

Comparison

Distance Effect in Adults

7

Comparison

Small Nonsymbolic > Large Nonsymbolic

1

Large Nonsymbolic > Small Nonsymbolic

2

Viewing

Journal of
Ansari D

2006

Cognitive
Neuroscience
Journal of

Ansari D

2007

Cognitive
Neuroscience

Conjunction of small nonsymbolic and large
nonsymbolic
Cantlon J
F
Castelli F

2006

PLoS Biology

12

fMRI

25

5F, 7M

2006

PNAS

12

fMRI

24

4F, 8M

Passive
viewing
Comparison

3

Number > Shape (Adults)

2

Estimating Numerosity: In space and time

7

Difficulty Effect Estimating Numerosity: Space

2

49

Chassy P

Damarla S
R
Demeyere
N

2012

2013

2014

Cerebral
Cortex
Human Brain
Mapping
Human Brain
Mapping

16

fMRI

28

16M

10

fMRI

25.5

7F, 3M

12

fMRI

26

9F, 3M

Comparison

Passive
Viewing

Difficulty Effect Estimating Numerosity: Time

2

Disk > Dots

1

Stable Parietal lobe voxels in Pictoral Mode

6

Passive

Adaptation to categories (repeated pairs vs.

Viewing

different pairs)
Repetition of small category versus large
category (large < small)
Repetition of small category versus large
category (small < large)

4

1

9

Numerosity specific repetition [RepetitionCategory > (Repetition-numerosity +

14

Repetition-Exact)]
Interaction Small/Large with
Category/Numerosity/Exact
Small numerosity < Small category

3

4

50

Dormal V

2009

Dormal V

2012

Human Brain
Mapping
Human Brain
Mapping

14

fMRI

21

14M

15

fMRI

21

15M

Numerosity
Categorization
Numerosity
Categorization

Numerosity Processing - Reference for
Numerosity

Numerosity - Reference for Numerosity

(Numerosity - Reference for Numerosity) (Duration vs Reference for Duration)

Dormal V

2010

Neuroimage

15

fMRI

21

15M

Numerosity
Categorization

[Simultaneous Numerosity]-[Reference
Simultaneous Numerosity]
[Sequential Numerosity]-[Reference
Sequential Numerosity]

9

5

1

6

6

[Simultaneous Numerosity–Reference for
Simultaneous Numerosity]-[Sequential
Numerosity–Reference Sequential

4

Numerosity]
[Sequential Numerosity-Reference Sequential
Numerosity]-[Simultaneous NumerosityReference Simultaneous Numerosity]

3

51

[Sequential Numerosity]-[Reference
Sequential Numerosity] and [Simultaneous

3

Numerosity]-[Reference Simultaneous]

Eger E

Hayashi M
J

He L

2009

2013

2013

Current
Biology

Journal of
Neuroscience
Cerebral
Cortex

10

fMRI

27

fMRI

20

fMRI

23

5F, 5M

14F,
12M

21

8F,
12M

Comparison

Number Comparison Same List

8

Number Comparison Different List

10

Comparison

Main Effect of Numerosity Task

13

Comparison

Nonsymbolic > Symbolic

8

Dot-dot > cross-notation trials

4

Overlap between (nonsymbolic>symbolic)
and (large>small)
Holloway I
D

Holloway I
D

2010

Neuroimage

19

fMRI

23.5

26

fMRI

25

Journal of
2013

Cognitive
Neuroscience

10F,
9M

Comparison

22F,

Passive

4M

Viewing

6

(nonsymbolic-control)-(symbolic-control)

7

Nonsymbolic Comparison

6
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European
Jacob S N

2009

Journal of

15

Passive

fMRI

Viewing

Neuroscience

Kadosh R
C

Leroux G

Frontiers in
2011

Human

19

fMRI

26.3

Neuroscience

2009

Developmenta
l Science

9

fMRI

33

fMRI

23

Journal of
Lyons I M

2013

Cognitive

12F,

Passive

7M

Viewing

9M

16F,
17M

Neuroscience

Number-length
interference

Comparison

Dot Proportion full brain analysis

1

Adaptation to Dot Proportion

27

Numerosity full brain analysis

1

Magnitude Change Dots

10

Magnitude Change Dots>Digits

6

(Interference-reference interference ) AND
(Covariation-Reference covariation)

Nonsymbolic: Number ordinal>Luminance
Ordinal

Dot Ordinal >Luminance Ordinal (dot) and
Dot Cardinal >Luminance Cardinal (dot)
Piazza M

2002

Neuroimage

9

PET

29

9M

Count

10

7

10

All 6-9 > All 1-4

8

6-9 Random > 1-4 Random

6

53

Piazza M

2004

Piazza M

2006

Roggeman
C

Santens S

2011

2010

Neuron

Brain
Research

Journal of
Neuroscience

Cerebral
Cortex

12

fMRI

10

fMRI

23

16

fMRI

fMRI

Passive

23

Viewing

3F, 7M

25.8

22.2

23M

Estimation,
Counting

Passive
Viewing

13M,

Match-to-

1F

numerosity

6-9 Canonical > 1-4 Canonical

5

Regions Responding to Deviations in Number

7

Estimation > Matching

9

Counting > Matching

14

Counting > Estimation

7

Large vs. Small Numerical Deviants

2

Far vs. Close Numerical Deviants

1

conjunction: (Numerosity large > Numerosity
medium) and (Numerosity medium >

6

Numerosity small)
Experiment 1: Nonsymbolic number

Shuman M

2004

Neuron

9

fMRI

2F, 7M

Comparison

comparison > Nonsymbolic colour

2

comparison

Loc, number of locations reported in contrast; fMRI, functional magnetic resonance imaging; PET, positron emission tomography; N,
Sample size of each study; M – Male, F – Female.
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Table 2.3 Studies Included in the Passive Meta-Analyses
Imaging

Mean

*Symbolic or

1st Author

Year

Journal

N

Method

Age

Gender

Nonsymbolic

Contrast Name

Ansari D

2006

Brain Research

16

fMRI

20.4

16M

Nonsymbolic

Number Change Effect

4

2006

PLoS Biology

12

fMRI

25

5F, 7M

Nonsymbolic

Number > Shape (Adults)

2

10

fMRI

25.5

7F, 3M

Nonsymbolic

Cantlon J
F
Damarla S
R

2013

Human Brain
Mapping

Symbolic

Demeyere
N

2014

Human Brain
Mapping

Stable Parietal lobe voxels in Pictoral
Mode
Stable Parietal lobe voxels in Digitobject mode

Loc

6

2

Adaptation to categories (repeated
12

fMRI

26

9F, 3M

Nonsymbolic

categories pairs vs. different

4

categories pairs)
Repetition of small category versus
large category (large < small)
Repetition of small category versus
large category (small < large)

1

9
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Numerosity specific repetition
[Repetition-Category > (Repetition-

14

numerosity + Repetition-Exact)]
Interaction Small/Large with
Category/Numerosity/Exact
Small numerosity < Small category

Holloway I
D

Journal of
2013

Cognitive

26

fMRI

15

fMRI

25

Neuroscience

22F,
4M

Symbolic

Adaptation to Hindu-Arabic Numerals
for both groups

3

4

2

European
Jacob S N

2009

Journal of

Nonsymbolic

Line Proportion full brain analysis

1

Adaptation to Dot Proportion

27

Numerosity full brain analysis

1

Notation Adaptation

2

Quantity Adaptation

1

Notation x Adaptation

1

Neuroscience

Kadosh R
C

2007

NeuroImage

17

fMRI

31

7F,
10M

Symbolic

56

Notebaert
K

Piazza M

Piazza M

Journal of
2011

Cognitive

13

fMRI

6F,7M

Symbolic

Ratio 1.25 Below > Ratio 1

1

Ratio 1.5 Below > Ratio 1

1

Ratio 2 Below > Ratio 1

1

Ratio 2 Below > Ratio 1.25 Below

1

Ratio 1.5 Above > Ratio 1

1

Ratio 2 Above > Ratio 1

1

Ratio 2 Above > Ratio 1.25 Above

1

Neuroscience

2004

2007

Neuron

Neuron

12

14

fMRI

fMRI

23

Nonsymbolic

**Symbolic &
Nonsymbolic

Regions Responding to Deviations in
Number

7

Overall fMRI Adaptation Effect
(Activation decrease with repetition of

16

same approximate quantity)
Distance-Dependent Recovery from
Adaptation across conditions
(Far>Close)

21

57

Price G R

Roggeman
C

2011

2011

Neuroimage

Journal of
Neuroscience

19

fMRI

22.17

23

fMRI

25.8

6F,
13M

23M

Symbolic

Nonsymbolic

(conjunction) Arabic digits>Letters and
Arabic digits>Scrambled digits

Large vs. Small Numerical Deviants

2

Far vs. Close Numerical Deviants

1

Loc, number of locations reported in contrast; fMRI, functional magnetic resonance imaging; PET, positron emission tomography
*Symbolic vs. Nonsymbolic column shows whether contrast was used in symbolic or nonsymbolic map for format-specific passive
viewing maps.
**Study used in the full passive map but not in symbolic or nonsymbolic

1

58

2.2.5

Conjunction and Contrast Analyses

Conjunction and contrast analyses were computed to examine overlapping and distinct
brain regions for the two ALE maps that included both active and passive tasks for
symbolic and nonsymbolic number processing (Eickhoff et al., 2011). All conjunction
and contrast ALE analyses were performed in GingerALE and used an uncorrected
threshold of p<.01 with 5000 threshold permutations and a minimum volume of 50mm3.
Although the cluster-level correction used to produce the single file ALE maps is the
optimal thresholding technique available (Eickhoff et al., 2012), this correction is not yet
available for conjunction and contrast analysis. The only available correction available to
date for conjunction and contrast analysis is false discovery rate (FDR) thresholding.
However, because ALE models the foci as 3D Gaussian distributions and FDR is not
recommended to be used with Gaussian data (Chumbley & Friston, 2009), an uncorrected
threshold of .01 was used for the conjunction and contrast analyses. Therefore, due to
methodological constraints, a cluster-level correction was used for the single file maps
and uncorrected thresholding for the conjunction and contrast analyses1,2. An
uncorrected threshold of .01 was appropriate for the conjunction and contrast analyses
because the algorithm used by these analyses only includes clusters that have already
passed the strict threshold of cluster-level .05 and uncorrected .001, used to create the
single file maps. Therefore, this threshold is ideal to ensure that the threshold is stringent

1

Leading experts on ALE are recommending against using FDR and thus, for the use of uncorrected
thresholds when doing conjunction and contrast analyses.
Discussions on the GingerALE forum:
http://www.brainmap.org/forum/viewtopic.php?f=3&t=499&sid=6c3ba03dfecbce73933a22acbd6fe2c1
http://brainmap.org/forum/viewtopic.php?f=3&t=320#p1012
http://brainmap.org/forum/viewtopic.php?f=3&t=485#p1505
2

The main findings do not change when using an FDR correction of .05 to calculate the conjunction and
contrast analyses comparing symbolic and nonsymbolic single file ALE maps with a cluster-level threshold
of p<.05 and a cluster-forming (uncorrected) threshold of p<.05.
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without masking any important regions. This threshold was combined with an extent
threshold, which suppressed clusters that were smaller than 50 mm3.
A conjunction analysis was computed to examine the similarity of activation between the
ALE maps generated by symbolic number processing and nonsymbolic number
processing. The voxel-wise minimum value of the input ALE images was used to create
the conjunction map. The conjunction was considered to be significant for each voxel if
all contributing ALE maps showed significant activation in that voxel at the thresholds
described. A conjunction ALE map was created to determine overlapping activation of
symbolic and nonsymbolic numbers.
Contrast analyses were computed to compare activation between the ALE maps
generated for symbolic and nonsymbolic number processing. ALE contrast images are
created by directly subtracting one input image from the other. GingerALE creates
simulated null data to correct for unequal sample sizes by pooling foci and randomly
dividing the foci into two groupings that are equal in size to the original data sets. One
simulation dataset is subtracted from the other and compared to the true data. This
produces voxel-wise p-value images that show where the true data sit in relation to the
distribution of values within that voxel. The p-value images are converted to Z scores.
The following ALE contrasts were computed: 1) symbolic > nonsymbolic, 2)
nonsymbolic > symbolic.
It is possible that the activation commonly found across studies is related to top-down
task-related brain activations during the explicit processing of number tasks. Although
the majority of neuroimaging studies investigating number processing have used active
paradigms in which participants have to make a decision about numerical stimuli being
presented, there is a growing body of research that has examined the neural processing of
symbolic and nonsymbolic numbers in the absence of an explicit numerical processing
task (e.g., Piazza et al. 2004, 2007; Ansari, Dhital, et al. 2006; Holloway et al. 2013;
Vogel et al. 2014). In order to determine which brain regions support symbolic and
nonsymbolic number processing in the absence of task demands, ALE maps were created
included papers which exclusively used passive viewing paradigms. Specifically, an
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ALE map was computed to examine convergent activation of all papers that used a
passive viewing paradigm (symbolic and nonsymbolic). Additionally, two separate ALE
maps were created using papers that employed passive viewing paradigms: One for
passive viewing of symbolic numbers and one for passive viewing of nonsymbolic
numbers.
There were not enough papers to conduct conjunction and contrast analyses to examine
the overlapping and distinct activation for the passive symbolic and passive nonsymbolic
single file ALE maps. Therefore, these maps were compared qualitatively.

2.2.6

Anatomical Labeling

Anatomical labels from the Talairach Daemon (talairach.org) were determined
automatically using GingerALE software for each of the automatically generated peak
ALE locations within all clusters. All (x, y, z) coordinates and anatomical labels of peak
ALE values are reported in Table 2.4, Table 2.5 and Table 2.6.

Results

2.3

This section is organized in the following manner. First, the results are presented for the
two meta-analyses that include active and passive tasks: 1) symbolic number processing,
2) nonsymbolic number processing. This is followed by the results of the conjunction
analysis for symbolic and nonsymbolic magnitude processing. Following this, the brain
regions active for the following contrasts are shown for symbolic>nonsymbolic,
nonsymbolic>symbolic. These contrast analyses are repeated using a symbolic map that
only includes Arabic digits. Subsequently, the results are presented for the three ALE
maps that include only passive tasks: 1) passive (both symbolic and nonsymbolic), 2)
passive symbolic and 3) passive nonsymbolic. Finally, reliability analyses for the
symbolic and nonsymbolic ALE maps are presented.

2.3.1

Single Dataset Meta-Analyses (Passive and Active)

Two separate single dataset ALE meta-analyses were conducted to examine the
convergence of foci for symbolic number processing and nonsymbolic number
processing.
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2.3.1.1

Symbolic ALE Map

The symbolic number processing single dataset meta-analysis revealed activation in a
widespread frontoparietal network of brain areas during symbolic number processing
(Fig. 2.1 and Table 2.4). The largest clusters of converging brain activation across 31
studies (Table 2.1) were in the left superior parietal lobule, inferior parietal lobule and the
precuneus, as well as the right inferior parietal lobule and precuneus. In addition to the
parietal lobes, there was convergent activation in the left lingual gyrus and the left middle
occipital gyrus as well as in the right superior frontal gyrus.

2.3.1.2

Nonsymbolic ALE map

The nonsymbolic number processing single dataset meta-analysis also revealed activation
in a widespread frontoparietal network of brain areas during nonsymbolic number
processing (Fig. 2.2 and Table 2.4). Convergent brain activation across 26 studies (Table
2.2) was found in a region spanning the right inferior parietal lobule, superior parietal
lobule, precuneus and middle occipital gyrus, as well as a region spanning the left
superior parietal lobule and the precuneus. Convergent activation was also found in the,
right medial frontal gyrus and cingulate gyrus, the right insula, right precentral gyrus, and
left middle occipital gyrus.
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Table 2.4 Single Dataset Analyses (Active and Passive)
Hemisphere

Brain Area

BA

X

Y

Z

ALE

Vol/mm

L

Superior Parietal Lobule

7

-28

-58

42

0.026

8944

L

Superior Parietal Lobule

7

-26

-54

44

0.026

L

Inferior Parietal Lobule

40

-38

-48

48

0.022

L

Inferior Parietal Lobule

40

-40

-44

38

0.021

L

Inferior Parietal Lobule

40

-34

-52

36

0.020

L

Precuneus

31

-20

-72

30

0.014

R

Inferior Parietal Lobule

40

34

-44

40

0.031

R

Precuneus

19

30

-64

38

0.028

R

Precuneus

7

22

-52

46

0.021

L

Lingual Gyrus

18

-22

-74

-4

0.017

L

Middle Occipital Gyrus

18

-26

-86

2

0.014

R

Superior Frontal Gyrus

6

2

10

48

0.021

768

R

Inferior Parietal Lobule

40

44

-40

46

0.032

10448

R

Precuneus

7

28

-50

48

0.030

R

Superior Parietal Lobule

7

28

-58

46

0.026

R

Precuneus

7

18

-64

50

0.026

R

Middle Occipital Gyrus

19

30

-78

18

0.020

R

Precuneus

31

28

-72

24

0.018

R

Middle Occipital Gyrus

18

34

-84

4

0.013

L

Superior Parietal Lobule

7

-30

-54

46

0.032

L

Precuneus

19

-26

-70

30

0.019

L

Precuneus

7

-22

-64

36

0.018

L

Precuneus

7

-20

-58

54

0.017

L

Precuneus

7

-20

-62

44

0.016

L

Superior Parietal Lobule

7

-26

-52

60

0.012

R

Medial Frontal Gyrus

32

4

10

46

0.032

L

Cingulate Gyrus

32

-6

12

40

0.013

R

Insula

13

32

20

8

0.034

1888

R

Precentral Gyrus

6

42

2

28

0.036

1704

L

Middle Occipital Gyrus

19

-26

-88

18

0.020

824

Symbolic

6208

1096

Nonsymbolic

X, Y and Z – x,y,z values of the location of the maximum ALE value

5472

3464

63

ALE - maximum ALE value observed in the cluster
Vol/mm3 - volume of cluster in mm3

Figure 2.1 Single dataset ALE map of symbolic number processing. The ALE analysis
revealed significant clusters of convergent brain clusters (cf., table 2.4). Activations were
identified using a cluster-level threshold of p<.05 with 1000 threshold permutations and
an uncorrected p<.001 Brain slices are shown at coordinates (x, y, z) in Talairach space.

Figure 2.2 Single dataset ALE map of nonsymbolic number processing. The ALE
analysis revealed significant clusters of convergent brain clusters (cf., table 2.4).
Activations were identified using a cluster-level threshold of p<.05 with 1000 threshold
permutations and an uncorrected p<.001 Brain slices are shown at coordinates (x, y, z) in
Talairach space.
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2.3.2
2.3.2.1

Conjunction and Contrast Analyses
Conjunction ALE Map

A conjunction analysis was conducted to reveal brain regions with convergent clusters of
activation between the symbolic and nonsymbolic single dataset ALE maps. Significant
clusters of activation for symbolic and nonsymbolic number processing converged in the
bilateral inferior parietal lobules, bilateral precuneus, left superior parietal lobule, as well
as the right superior frontal gyrus (Table 2.5 Figure 2.3).

2.3.2.2

Contrast ALE Maps

To assess which brain regions were specifically activated for symbolic and nonsymbolic
number processing, contrast analyses were conducted to compare the symbolic and
nonsymbolic single dataset ALE maps. These contrast analyses revealed significant
clusters of activation in the right supramarginal gyrus and inferior parietal lobule, as well
as the left angular gyrus, for symbolic>nonsymbolic (Table 2.5, Figure 2.3). There were
significant clusters of activation in a right-lateralized frontoparietal network including the
superior parietal lobule, inferior parietal lobule, precuneus, insula, superior frontal gyrus,
and middle occipital gyrus for nonsymbolic>symbolic (Table 2.5, Figure 2.3).
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Table 2.5 Conjunction and Contrast Analyses
Hemisphere

Brain Area

BA

X

Y

Z

ALE

Vol/mm

2544

Symbolic and Nonsymbolic
L

Superior Parietal Lobule

7

-26

-54

44

0.026

L

Inferior Parietal Lobule

40

-34

-48

44

0.016

R

Precuneus

7

22

-52

46

0.021

R

Inferior Parietal Lobule

40

36

-46

44

0.020

R

Inferior Parietal Lobule

40

38

-42

42

0.020

R

Inferior Parietal Lobule

40

32

-46

44

0.019

R

Precuneus

19

30

-62

42

0.017

R

Superior Frontal Gyrus

6

2

10

48

0.021

728

L

Precuneus

7

-28

-66

32

0.014

184

L

Precuneus

7

-26

-64

36

0.013

L

Precuneus

19

-24

-72

30

0.012

R

Precuneus

7

22

-66

38

0.012

24

R

Precuneus

7

24

-66

36

0.012

8

304

2464

Symbolic > Nonsymbolic
R

Supramarginal Gyrus

40

36

-48

32

2.911

R

Inferior Parietal Lobule

40

34

-52

34

2.820

L

Angular Gyrus

39

-36

-60

36

2.878

240

1128

Nonsymbolic > Symbolic
R

Precuneus

7

18

-61

51

2.848

R

Precuneus

7

15.5

-64.5

52

2.820

R

Superior Parietal Lobule

7

21.3

-66.7 51.3

R

Insula

13

38

20

11

3.156

R

Insula

13

32

20

14

2.636

R

Inferior Parietal Lobule

7

34

-56

46

3.156

R

Inferior Parietal Lobule

40

34

-48

54

2.794

R

Superior Frontal Gyrus

6

8

22

50

3.156

408

R

Inferior Parietal Lobule

40

46

-44

49

2.652

328

R

Middle Occipital Gyrus

19

34

-80

12

2.687

200

2.794
648

440

X, Y and Z – x,y,z values of the location of the maximum ALE value
ALE – conjunction analysis: maximum ALE value observed in the cluster, contrast
analyses: maximum z-score observed in the cluster
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Vol/mm3 - volume of cluster in mm3.

Figure 2.3 ALE maps of the conjunction and contrasts between the symbolic and
nonsymbolic single dataset ALE maps. The ALE conjunction analysis revealed
significant clusters of convergence between symbolic and nonsymbolic (blue). ALE
contrast analyses reveal specific activation for symbolic>nonsymbolic (orange) and
nonsymbolic>symbolic (green). Conjunction and contrast analyses were conducted using
an uncorrected p<.01 with a minimum volume of 50mm3. Brain slices are shown at
coordinates (x, y, z) in Talairach space.

2.3.2.3

Contrast ALE Maps (Arabic Digits Only)

Of the 31 studies, which were included in the symbolic single file ALE map, 24 studies
visually presented Arabic digits. Of the remaining 8 studies, 2 visually presented either
number words or a combination of number words and Arabic digits, and 6 studies used
both visual and auditory presentations of numbers. In order to determine whether the
significant clusters of activation revealed by the symbolic vs. nonsymbolic contrast
analyses were driven by the diversity of the symbolic number formats, a single dataset
ALE map was created containing papers that contrasted Arabic digits (24 papers, 399
subjects, 43 contrasts, 172 foci). To assess which brain regions were specifically
activated for Arabic digits and nonsymbolic number processing, contrast analyses were
conducted to compare the Arabic digit and nonsymbolic single dataset ALE maps.
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These contrast analyses revealed significant clusters of activation in the left inferior
parietal lobule and precuneus for Arabic digits>nonsymbolic (Table 2.6, Figure 2.4).
There were significant clusters of activation in a right-lateralized frontal-parietal network
including the superior parietal lobule, insula, and medial frontal gyrus,
nonsymbolic>Arabic digits (Table 2.6, Figure 2.4).
Table 2.6 Contrast Analyses: Arabic Digits vs. Nonsymbolic
Hemisphere

Brain Area

BA

X

Y

Z

ALE

Vol/mm

152

Arabic Digits > Nonsymbolic
L

Inferior Parietal Lobule

39

-35

-62

40

2.590

L

Precuneus

19

-30

-62

40

2.576

Nonsymbolic > Arabic Digits
R

Superior Parietal Lobule

7

23.1

-62.5

53.3

3.719

R

Superior Parietal Lobule

7

38

-57

48

3.540

R

Inferior Frontal Gyrus

13

38

24

8

2.948

R

Insula

13

38

20

12

2.911

R

Insula

13

36

24

12

2.848

R

Medial Frontal Gyrus

8

9.3

21.3

48.7

2.794

2064

416

208

X, Y and Z – x,y,z values of the location of the maximum ALE value
ALE – conjunction analysis: maximum ALE value observed in the cluster, contrast
analyses: maximum z-score observed in the cluster
Vol/mm3 - volume of cluster in mm3
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Figure 2.4 ALE maps of contrasts between the Arabic digits and nonsymbolic single
dataset ALE maps. ALE contrast analyses reveal specific activation for Arabic
digits>nonsymbolic (orange) and nonsymbolic>Arabic digits (green). Contrast analyses
were conducted using an uncorrected p<.01 with a minimum volume of 50mm3. Brain
slices are shown at coordinates (x, y, z) in Talairach space.

2.3.3

Single Dataset ALE Maps (Passive only)

In order to determine which brain regions support symbolic and nonsymbolic number
processing in the absence of task demands, ALE maps were created that only included
papers that used passive viewing paradigms (Table 2.7, Figure 2.5).

2.3.3.1

Passive (symbolic and nonsymbolic) ALE Map

The passive single dataset meta-analysis revealed a frontoparietal network of brain areas
that qualitatively overlaps with many of the regions that were found in the ALE maps
from the conjunction and contrast analyses (Table 2.7, Figure 2.5, Figure 2.6).
Specifically, the single dataset ALE map for passive symbolic and nonsymbolic revealed
convergence of activation in the left superior parietal lobule, precuneus and middle
temporal gyrus, the right inferior parietal lobule and precuneus, and left cingulate gyrus.
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2.3.3.2

Passive Symbolic ALE Map

The single dataset meta-analysis for passive symbolic revealed a large cluster of brain
activation in the left precuneus and in the left fusiform gyrus (Table 2.7, Figure 2.6).

2.3.3.3

Passive Nonsymbolic ALE Map

The single dataset meta-analysis for passive nonsymbolic revealed brain activation in the
right precuneus, superior parietal lobule, and middle occipital gyrus (Table 2.7, Figure
2.6).
Table 2.7 Passive Single Dataset Analyses
Hemisphere

Brain Area

BA

X

Y

Z

ALE

Vol/mm

3736

Symbolic and Nonsymbolic
L

Precuneus

19

-30

-66

36

0.022

L

Precuneus

7

-22

-66

36

0.015

L

Superior Parietal Lobule

7

-26

-62

48

0.014

L

Superior Parietal Lobule

7

-32

-66

52

0.014

L

Middle Temporal Gyrus

39

-26

-52

34

0.014

L

Superior Parietal Lobule

7

-30

-54

44

0.012

R

Precuneus

7

24

-52

48

0.017

R

Inferior Parietal Lobule

40

36

-48

48

0.013

L

Cingulate Gyrus

24

-8

6

46

0.015

640

L

Precuneus

19

-30

-66

36

0.014

1016

L

Fusiform Gyrus

37

-46

-48

-12

0.014

560

R

Precuneus

7

26

-50

50

0.014

1272

L

Superior Parietal Lobule

7

-28

-54

44

0.011

688

L

Superior Parietal Lobule

7

-28

-62

48

0.010

L

Middle Occipital Gyrus

18

-24

-88

2

0.013

2128

Symbolic

Nonsymbolic

X, Y and Z – x,y,z values of the location of the maximum ALE value
ALE - maximum ALE value observed in the cluster
Vol/mm3 - volume of cluster in mm3

608
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Figure 2.5 Single dataset ALE map using only studies with a passive design (purple)
overlaid on top of Figure 2.3. Activations of passive ALE map were identified using a
cluster-level threshold of p<.05 with 1000 threshold permutations and an uncorrected
p<.001 Brain slices are shown at coordinates (x, y, z) in Talairach space.
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Figure 2.6 Single dataset ALE map of all studies (symbolic and nonsymbolic) that used a
passive design (purple). Single file ALE maps of studies using passive designs with
symbolic stimuli (orange) and nonsymbolic stimuli (yellow) are overlaid. Activations of
passive ALE maps were identified using a cluster-level threshold of p<.05 with 1000
threshold permutations and an uncorrected p<.001 Brain slices are shown at coordinates
(x, y, z) in Talairach space.

2.3.4

Split Half Reliability Analyses

The contrast analyses between symbolic and nonsymbolic ALE maps of activation
revealed significant differences between symbolic and nonsymbolic number processing at
the meta-analytic level (Table 2.5, Figure 2.3). Follow-up reliability analyses were
conducted in order to determine the extent to which the noise in the data can account for
some of the between symbolic versus nonsymbolic activations. Specifically, the
contrasts that comprise the symbolic and nonsymbolic number processing ALE maps
were each split into two random halves (an ALE map of activation was created for each
half). A contrast analysis was run in order to determine regions that were significantly
more activated for half one>half two and for half two>half one. This analysis was
repeated three times for each symbolic and nonsymbolic ALE map. These analyses
revealed that for the symbolic ALE reliability analysis, only one of the six contrasts
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showed a significant difference between half one and half two. However, for the
nonsymbolic ALE reliability analysis, five of the six contrasts showed a significant
difference between half one and half two (Table 2.8). See Table 2.9 for a description of
which brain regions showed significant differences. Table 2.9 reports the random regions
that come out when contrasting half of the map against the other half. The regions
reported in this table are small and random. The purpose of this table is to detail the
regions that came out as significant in the reliability analyses in order to highlight that the
regions that were different between the two halves are small and span many different
regions across the brain.
Table 2.8 Reliability Analyses: Number of Significant Regions
Run

Contrast

Number of Regions

Half 1 > Half 2

0

Half 2 > Half 1

1

Half 1 > Half 2

0

Half 2 > Half 1

0

Half 1 > Half 2

0

Half 2 > Half 1

0

Half 1 > Half 2

1

Half 2 > Half 1

1

Half 1 > Half 2

3

Half 2 > Half 1

1

Half 1 > Half 2

1

Half 2 > Half 1

0

Symbolic
Run 1

Run 2

Run 3

Nonsymbolic
Run 1

Run 2

Run 3
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Table 2.9 Reliability Analyses: Location of Significant Clusters
Hemisphere

Brain Area

BA

X

Y

Z

ALE

Vol/mm

L

Inferior Parietal Lobule

40

-39

-55

36

2.652

216

L

Inferior Parietal Lobule

40

-34

-56

36

2.501

L

Middle Occipital Gyrus

18

-36

-86

-2

2.794

L

Middle Occipital Gyrus

18

-35

-85

2

2.652

L

Middle Occipital Gyrus

18

-29

-85

2

2.605

L

Inferior Occipital Gyrus

18

-25

-89

1

2.382

L

Precuneus

31

-18

-48

39

3.156

504

L

Superior Parietal Lobule

7

-32

-52

52

2.652

512

R

Precuneus

7

28

-54

50

2.794

144

R

Superior Parietal Lobule

7

26

-52

42

2.468

R

Precuneus

7

20

-60

42

2.727

120

L

Cingulate Gyrus

32

1

16

39

3.719

640

R

Medial Frontal Gyrus

6

8

16

44

2.418

L

Superior Parietal Lobule

7

-26

-58

56

2.848

Symbolic

Nonsymbolic
464

120

X, Y and Z – x,y,z values of the location of the maximum ALE value
ALE – conjunction analysis: maximum ALE value observed in the cluster, contrast
analyses: maximum z-score observed in the cluster
Vol/mm3 - volume of cluster in mm3

2.4

Discussion

The current meta-analysis examined the neural bases of the ability to process symbolic
and nonsymbolic numbers. Quantitative meta-analytic techniques were used to address
two important questions. First, the study examined whether neural representations of
numbers are represented abstractly or if the human brain hosts format-dependent
representations for number. This question was addressed by identifying both overlapping
and distinct brain regions that are activated by symbolic and nonsymbolic numbers.
Second, the study examined whether these converging regions of activation were related
to magnitude processing rather than top-down task demands.
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The current study represents the first quantitative meta-analysis examining the neural
correlates of symbolic and nonsymbolic magnitude processing. Specifically, two ALE
meta-analyses were computed to identify the neural correlates of symbolic and
nonsymbolic number processing. These meta-analyses revealed that brain regions in the
frontoparietal network were associated with symbolic and nonsymbolic number
processing across studies. Activation in regions within the bilateral parietal and frontal
cortex was correlated with both symbolic and nonsymbolic number processing. The left
middle occipital gyrus was activated during symbolic number processing and the bilateral
middle occipital gyri were activated during nonsymbolic number processing. The spatial
distributions of the single dataset quantitative ALE maps that were generated for
symbolic and nonsymbolic numbers suggest that both overlapping and distinct brain
regions are associated with symbolic and nonsymbolic numbers.

2.4.1

Symbolic vs. Nonsymbolic

In order to quantitatively address whether numbers are represented abstractly or if the
human brain hosts format-dependent representations for number, conjunction and
contrast analyses were conducted to compare symbolic and nonsymbolic ALE maps.
Conjunction analyses revealed that regions along the bilateral inferior parietal lobules and
precuneus, as well as the left superior parietal lobule, and right superior frontal gyrus,
were specifically activated by the conjunction of symbolic and nonsymbolic numbers.
Contrast analyses revealed that the right supramarginal gyrus and inferior parietal lobule,
as well as the left angular gyrus, were specifically activated for symbolic compared to the
nonsymbolic numbers. Notably, only the left inferior parietal lobule was significant
specifically for Arabic digits compared to nonsymbolic numbers. A right-lateralized
frontoparietal network including the right superior parietal lobule, inferior parietal lobule,
precuneus, superior frontal gyrus and insula as well as the middle occipital gyrus were
specifically activated for nonsymbolic compared to symbolic numbers. These findings
are consistent with empirical research suggesting that symbolic and nonsymbolic
numbers are processed using both overlapping and distinct neural mechanisms (e.g.,
Holloway et al., 2010; Lyons and Beilock, 2013; Piazza et al., 2007).
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In addition to quantitatively replicating the finding that overlapping and distinct neural
populations support different number formats, these conjunction and contrast analyses
provide valuable insights into the highly debated question of whether number is
processed abstractly (e.g., Ansari, 2007; Cohen Kadosh and Walsh, 2009; Cohen Kadosh
et al., 2007; Dehaene et al., 1998; Nieder and Dehaene, 2009; Piazza et al., 2007). The
finding that several neural regions were activated by the conjunction of symbolic and
nonsymbolic number maps supports the notion that the human brain represents numbers
abstractly. This finding implicates the bilateral inferior parietal lobules and precuneus, as
well as the left superior parietal lobule, and right superior frontal gyrus, as candidate
regions that may support abstract number processing. However, the nature of the overlap
between symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical maps is unclear because the statistical
algorithms that underlie ALE do not evaluate patterns of activation within overlapping
regions. Therefore, while it is possible that the overlap could represent common
semantic processing, the overlap could also represent common task demands such as
attention or response-selection. In empirical studies, researchers addressed this limitation
of coarse spatial resolution by implementing multi-voxel pattern analysis (MVPA) to
examine patterns of activation for symbolic and nonsymbolic numbers in the intraparietal
sulcus (Damarla & Just, 2013; Eger et al., 2009; Lyons et al., 2014) and at the wholebrain level (Bulthé et al., 2014). These studies consistently reported a lack of association
between patterns of activation for symbolic and nonsymbolic number processing. Such
findings challenge the idea that overlapping activation for symbolic and nonsymbolic
numerical processing implies that numbers are processed abstractly. It is important to
interpret overlapping activation with caution until data-analysis techniques become
available that can analyze patterns of activation across multiple studies.
Meta-analytic contrast analyses revealed that distinct neural mechanisms are activated by
symbolic compared to nonsymbolic numbers and supported the theory that numerical
representations are dependent on format (Cohen Kadosh et al., 2011, 2007; Cohen
Kadosh & Walsh, 2009). In particular, the contrast symbolic>nonsymbolic revealed
activation in the right supramarginal gyrus and the inferior parietal lobule, as well as the
left angular gyrus. Conversely, the contrast nonsymbolic>symbolic showed that
nonsymbolic numbers correlate with activation in the right superior parietal lobule,
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inferior parietal lobule, and precuneus (as well as right-lateralized regions not in the
parietal cortex including the insula, superior frontal gyrus, and middle occipital gyrus).
Interestingly, regions specifically activated by either symbolic or nonsymbolic stimulus
formats seemed to be lateralized within the parietal cortex. Specifically, the right parietal
lobule supported both symbolic and nonsymbolic specific processing, while activation in
the left parietal lobule was specific to symbolic number processing. However, even
though symbolic and nonsymbolic maps both show activation in the right parietal cortex,
the localization in the right parietal lobe is different. Specifically, activation
nonsymbolic>symbolic activation is more superior, while symbolic>nonsymbolic
activation more inferior. In other words, the contrast analyses comparing symbolic and
nonsymbolic ALE maps suggest that within the right parietal cortex, symbolic and
nonsymbolic number processing are associated with different spatial patterns of
activation.
The symbolic ALE map included several symbolic number formats: Arabic digits, written
number words, and verbal number words. In contrast, the nonsymbolic ALE map
included only visual displays of arrays of objects. One potential explanation for the
significant activation revealed by the contrast analyses is that the symbolic number map
consists of not only of visual but also written and auditory stimuli. To test this, a single
file ALE map with only Arabic digits was created and compared to the nonsymbolic map.
This contrast analysis revealed that the processing of Arabic digits correlated with
activity in only the left inferior parietal lobule while processing nonsymbolic numbers
correlated with activity in the right superior parietal lobule, insula and medial frontal
gyrus. Therefore, the left inferior parietal lobule may be specific to the processing of
Arabic digits, while the right supramarginal gyrus and inferior parietal lobule may host
more abstract symbolic number representations. The finding that the symbolic passive
map reveals left-lateralized parietal activation provides converging evidence supporting
the notion that the left inferior parietal lobe is important for symbolic number
representations.
Significantly, a majority of the papers that were included in the ALE meta-analyses used
visual stimuli. Analyzing overlapping and distinct activation for number processing
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tasks, measured using different modalities at the meta-analytic level, would aid in
evaluating abstract number representations. To date, there are not enough studies that
measure number in the verbal, or tactile domains to form an ALE map that can be
contrasted against a visual number processing map. Consequently, additional empirical
research is necessary to investigate the neural correlates of number processing in nonvisual domains.
In addition to these differences in brain activation, a reliability analyses revealed that the
nonsymbolic ALE map has more variability than the symbolic ALE map. More
specifically, we examined the extent to which there were significant differences within
formats, by randomly splitting the included contrasts in half and contrasting the two
halves. One would predict that if the activations are highly consistent, then no
differences in such an analysis should be observed. While we found this to be the case
for symbolic number processing, the analyses of the nonsymbolic data revealed some
significant variability. Specifically, the split half analysis of the nonsymbolic data
revealed that in five out of the six contrasts revealed greater activation in one half of the
nonsymbolic dataset compared to the other half. Given that the data were randomly split,
conclusions regarding the potential processing differences between the two halves of the
data cannot be made. However, it should be noted that the significant regions within the
reliability analyses did not reveal systematic locations (i.e., there were regions across the
frontal, parietal, and occipital lobes). This suggests that the lack of reliability in the
nonsymbolic map was due to variable data across studies rather than systematic
variability within specific brain regions.
The finding from the reliability analyses indicate, that the symbolic ALE map is more
reliable than the nonsymbolic ALE map when using equivalent numbers of papers, and
the same thresholds suggest that this distinction is a predicament of the data in the field
rather than the methodology of the meta-analyses. This finding of differences in the
reliability of the symbolic and nonsymbolic map should be taken into account when
considering the results of contrast analyses contrasting symbolic and nonsymbolic ALE
maps. Specifically, regions that are more activated by nonsymbolic numbers compared to
symbolic numbers should be interpreted with caution within the context of the current
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meta-analysis. Additionally, this finding should be considered when evaluating brain
regions that correlate with nonsymbolic number processing within empirical studies.
Overall, these reliability data provide valuable insights into underlying differences
between format-dependent neural responses and set the foundation for future empirical
research which needed to disentangle the difference in variability between symbolic and
nonsymbolic number processing at the meta-analytic level.
The findings that symbolic numbers activated the bilateral inferior regions of the parietal
lobe while nonsymbolic numbers activated right-lateralized superior regions of the
parietal lobe conflicts with the notion that the brain processes numbers using only a
number module that is indifferent to number format. Instead, regions that are formatspecific may imply differential semantic processing of symbolic and nonsymbolic
numbers. However, as meta-analyses do not include experimental manipulations, they
cannot determine what brain regions sub-serve specific processes. This is important to
consider with respect to the current meta-analytic contrasts because these contrasts alone
cannot confirm that the areas revealed are really engaging in format-specific semantic
processing. These regions of activation may reflect other processes that differ between
formats. Although it is possible that specific regions activated by symbolic>nonsymbolic
and nonsymbolic>symbolic reflect something other than format-specific processing, there
are several aspects of the analysis that speak against this. First, all contrasts that were
entered into the single file ALE maps contrast basic number processing against a control
task that was matched in terms of perceptual and other non-semantic processing
dimensions. Second, the symbolic and nonsymbolic passive ALE maps show similar
differences. This suggests that the regions that are specifically activated by symbolic and
nonsymbolic number processing are likely related to semantic differences between
symbolic and nonsymbolic number processing. Ultimately, this question of format
specificity in the human brain calls for further experimental investigation in order to
understand the process of how the brain represents symbols compared to nonsymbolic
numbers. In this way, the present meta-analysis may pave the way for new investigations
into the specific nature of format-specific processing in the parietal cortex.
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The concept of format-specific hemispheric specialization within the parietal lobes has
previously been supported by developmental studies (e.g., Holloway and Ansari 2010).
For example, researchers revealed increasing specialization of the left intraparietal sulcus
for processing of symbolic numbers across development (e.g., Vogel et al. 2014) but
consistent activation across children and adults in the right intraparietal sulcus for
nonsymbolic numbers (e.g., Cantlon et al., 2006). The idea that this hemispheric
asymmetry in the parietal cortex is a result of developmental specialization is further
supported by a developmental quantitative meta-analysis that identified brain regions
supporting symbolic and nonsymbolic number processing in children (Kaufmann et al.
2011). The results of this meta-analysis showed that the notation of the number
(symbolic vs. nonsymbolic) influenced the location of neural activation patterns both
within and outside the parietal lobes (Kaufmann et al. 2011). In accordance with the
current meta-analyses, Kaufmann et al., (2011) showed that symbolic number magnitude
processing was correlated with bilateral parietal activation while activation during
nonsymbolic number processing was lateralized to the right parietal lobe. Together, these
findings challenge the notion that the parietal cortex hosts a single system that processes
number abstractly. Instead, it is probable that hemispheric specialization for number
formats in the parietal cortex emerges over the course of development.
Beyond the parietal cortex, it has long been predicted that the ventral visual stream might
house a number form area (NFA, Dehaene and Cohen 1995). In support of this
prediction, the ALE passive symbolic map revealed activation in the ventral stream.
However, contrary to this prediction, the contrast of symbolic > nonsymbolic in the
present meta-analysis did not reveal regions in the ventral visual stream that were more
active for symbolic than nonsymbolic processing of number. Therefore, this metaanalysis does not lend strong support to the NFA as no contrasts were able to reveal
symbolic-specific activation. Recently, the existence of an NFA in the ventral stream was
revealed using intracranial electrophysiological recording (Shum et al., 2013). This study
also reported evidence to suggest that the region that was shown to exhibit categoryselectivity for numerals is located within or near a zone in which there is a drop-out of
the fMRI signal due to the auditory canal and venous sinus artifacts. Indeed, a recent
study in which this fMRI signal drop out was reduced revealed category selectivity for
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numerals in bilateral regions of the inferior temporal gyri (Grotheer, Herrmann, &
Kovacs, 2016). It is possible, therefore, that the absence of evidence for an NFA in the
current meta-analysis stems from an fMRI signal drop out masking category-selective
activation for numerals in the ventral stream. Having said that, the evidence for the
existence of an NFA is, to date, sparse and there is a need for more evidence using
methods that control for the fMRI signal drop out in the inferior temporal gyrus. Once
sufficient evidence has been accumulated, a meta-analytic approach, such as the one used
in the present paper could be employed to quantify the consistency of evidence for the
existence of the NFA.

2.4.2

The Three Parietal Circuits Model

Several different theories of numerical cognition propose potential mechanisms that may
underlie mathematical abilities (Campbell, 1994; Dehaene et al., 2003; McCloskey,
1992). Among these theories is the three parietal circuits model (Dehaene et al., 2003)
which is distinct from other theories because it makes specific predictions about the
neuroanatomical underlying number processing. This is an influential, highly cited model
that is often claimed to be predictive of empirical data (e.g., Neumärker 2000;
Schmithorst and Brown 2004). The current meta-analysis has the potential to further
constrain existing theories, such as the three parietal circuits model, that propose potential
mechanisms that underlie basic number processing. The three parietal circuits model
(Dehaene et al., 2003), predicts that three distinct systems of representation are recruited
for basic numerical processing and calculation tasks. These systems include a quantity
system (which processes abstract numerical representations that are not related to number
format), a verbal system (which represents numbers as words) and a visual system (which
encodes numbers as strings of Arabic digits). Dehaene et al., (2003) used threedimensional visualization software to examine how parietal activation related to this
model. Using these qualitative meta-analytic data, they proposed that three distinct, but
functionally related networks coexist in the parietal lobes and that these networks are
used to support numerical processing. Briefly, the three parietal circuits model suggests
that the bilateral horizontal segments of the intraparietal sulci are related to the quantity
system, the left angular gyrus is related to the verbal system, and the posterior superior
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parietal lobules are related to the visual system, and specifically, attention processes. For
over a decade, this model has driven researchers to examine the neural underpinnings of
basic number processing and calculation. This influential model has been both supported
and challenged by empirical research (Chassy & Grodd, 2012; Eger et al., 2003; Piazza et
al., 2004, 2007; Price & Ansari, 2011). Results of the current quantitative meta-analysis
challenge several aspects of the three parietal circuits model. First, the finding from the
conjunction analysis that reveals that both symbolic and nonsymbolic number processing
activate the regions in the bilateral inferior parietal lobules and precuneus, and left
superior parietal lobule challenges the notion put forward by Dehaene et al., (2003) that
“the horizontal segment of the intraparietal sulcus (HIPS) appears as a plausible
candidate for domain specificity” (p.487). Second, the finding that the left angular gyrus
was specifically activated for symbolic numbers supports the idea that the left angular
gyrus is related to the verbal system. This was supported by the contrast analysis from
the current meta-analyses. However, the right supramarginal gyrus and inferior parietal
lobule were also activated by symbolic>nonsymbolic number processing. Therefore,
although it is possible that the activation in the left angular gyrus is related to the verbal
system, which is likely used more by symbolic compared to nonsymbolic number
processing, the activation in the right parietal lobe does not fit with this account. An
alternative explanation is that these bilateral parietal regions are part of a format-specific
number-processing region for symbolic number processing. Specifically, perhaps the left
angular gyrus supports the verbal aspects of number processing while the right
supramarginal gyrus and inferior parietal lobule support other aspects of symbolic
number processing. In lieu of these results, perhaps the left angular gyrus supports the
verbal processing and reading of symbols whereas the right supramarginal gyrus and
inferior parietal lobule support processes that use this verbal symbolic knowledge and
attentional processes to perform higher-level tasks such as calculation. This suggestion is
consistent with results from the calculation meta-analysis (Arsalidou & Taylor, 2011),
which report that the right angular gyrus is activated during calculation. Third, findings
from the current meta-analysis both support and challenge the idea that activation in the
superior parietal lobules is a consequence of attending to visual dimensions of numbers.
Evidence from the conjunction analyses of the current meta-analyses showed that the left
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superior parietal lobule was activated for the conjunction of symbolic and nonsymbolic
magnitude processing. Therefore, based on these findings, the left superior parietal
lobule is an equally plausible candidate for domain specificity of number processing.
Although, this convergence of activation could be due to a visual attention orienting
response as proposed by Dehaene et al., (2003), the left superior parietal lobule was also
found in the passive meta-analysis. Thus, there is superior parietal lobule activation even
when the task demands, and therefore the attentional demands, are reduced. Importantly,
the fact that nonsymbolic>symbolic was correlated with activation in the right superior
parietal lobule conflicts with the idea that the superior parietal lobule supports only visual
attention processes. Instead, these findings reveal hemispheric asymmetry in the bilateral
superior parietal lobules that might suggest that the right superior parietal lobule hosts
format-dependent representations of nonsymbolic numbers and the left superior parietal
lobule hosts and abstract number processing region. One possible explanation for this
finding is that the right superior parietal lobule is specifically correlated with visual
attentional processes associated with nonsymbolic number tasks. Another possible
explanation for the format-specific activation of the right intraparietal sulcus is that this
region is associated with processes that are specific to nonsymbolic numerical magnitude
processing. Using a computational model, Verguts and Fias (2004) trained a neural
network to map a symbolic or nonsymbolic numerical visual input onto a place-coded
representation. Place-coding is a way of representing the cardinal value of the total
number of items in a set by representing the quantity of the set as a place on a number
line. In the computational model, symbolic inputs are mapped directly onto a placecoding representation. However, nonsymbolic inputs undergo an intermediate step
between the nonsymbolic visual input and a place-coding representation. This
intermediate step is referred to as summation coding. In summation coding, the size of
the neural representation monotonically varies with the number of objects being
presented. During this intermediate step, neurons accumulate proportionally to the
number of objects that were visually processed. A large body of neuroscience evidence
converges with these computational models suggesting that place-coded neurons exist
within the primate brain (for review see, Nieder and Dehaene, 2009 or Nieder, 2013).
These studies typically use single-cell recordings, monitoring individual neurons, while
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non-human primates discriminate between nonsymbolic arrays (e.g., Nieder and Miller,
2004; Nieder and Miller, 2003; Tudusciuc and Nieder, 2007). Overwhelming evidence
indicates that the primate brain place codes numerosity (Nieder & Miller, 2004;
Okuyama, Kuki, & Mushiake, 2015) even in monkeys that were never trained to
discriminate numbers (Viswanathan & Nieder, 2013). Converging evidence from human
fMRI adaptation studies revealed that tuned number neurons respond to dot arrays (Jacob
& Nieder, 2009; Piazza et al., 2004). These tuned number neurons mirror place-coding
neurons within the non-human primate brain (Jacob & Nieder, 2009).
Additionally, the existence of this type of summation coding has been found in humans
both behaviourally (Roggeman, Verguts, Fias, Vergutsa, & Fias, 2007) and at the
neuronal level (Roggeman, Santens, Fias, & Verguts, 2011; Santens et al., 2010). In
particular, neuroimaging studies have identified the right superior parietal lobule as a
potential region that might support the process of accumulation during summation coding
(Roggeman et al., 2011; Santens et al., 2010). Therefore, one possible explanation for
activation in the right superior parietal lobule relating specifically to nonsymbolic
number processing is that this region supports summation coding. Ultimately, these metaanalytic findings question the idea that the intraparietal sulcus hosts a system that
processes numbers abstractly and the superior parietal lobule solely supports visual
attentional processing.
It has been over a decade since the initial proposal of the three parietal circuits model.
The results of the current quantitative meta-analysis do not converge with the data that
support the three parietal circuits model (Dehaene et al., 2003). On the basis of these
discrepancies, it is recommended that the three parietal circuits model should be updated.
The parietal lobules should be canvased in search of regions that support both formatdependent and format-independent numerical representations. This will illuminate the
extent to which format-specific regions reflect various components of format-specific
processing including semantic, perceptual and decision-making processing. Furthermore,
the examination of brain regions that support format-dependent and format-independent
numerical representations will clarify which regions in the intraparietal sulcus, inferior
parietal lobule and superior parietal lobule are associated with various aspects of basic
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magnitude processing. This should ultimately illuminate the mechanism underlying
magnitude processing in the parietal lobes.

2.4.3

Frontal vs. Parietal

During the last decade, there has been an intense focus on the parietal lobes as brain
regions involved in number processing (e.g., Dehaene et al. 2003; Eger et al. 2003; Fias
et al. 2003; Cohen Kadosh et al. 2007; Cohen Kadosh and Walsh 2009). However, many
neuroimaging studies reported activation in regions of the frontal cortex during number
processing (e.g., Eger et al. 2003; Cohen Kadosh et al. 2007; Franklin and Jonides 2008;
Cohen Kadosh and Walsh 2009; Dormal and Pesenti 2009; Dormal et al. 2012; Hayashi
et al. 2013). The importance of the frontal cortex in number processing was revealed in
research that used single-cell recordings in animals as well as in pediatric neuroimaging
studies. Specifically, invasive single-cell recordings in non-human primates identified
putative ‘number neurons’ in the parietal as well as the prefrontal cortex; these neurons
responded to specific quantities (such as two dots) while animals performed a numerical
discrimination task (Nieder, 2013; Nieder et al., 2002). These findings suggested that
regions of the frontal cortex may host pure magnitude representations. Similarly,
pediatric neuroimaging studies showed that young children recruited the prefrontal cortex
more than adults during number discrimination tasks. In contrast, intraparietal sulcus
activation during number comparison increased across development (Ansari et al., 2005;
Kaufmann et al., 2006). Researchers suggested that this frontal to parietal shift from
childhood to adulthood may reflect a decrease in the need for domain-general cognitive
resources such as working memory and attention as children begin to process number
symbols automatically (Cantlon et al., 2006; Cantlon, Libertus, et al., 2009; Venkatraman
et al., 2005). The notion that regions in the frontal cortex are still important for number
and calculation tasks among adults is further supported by a quantitative meta-analysis
that identified brain regions supporting number processing and calculation in adults
(Arsalidou & Taylor, 2011). Unlike the current meta-analysis, Arsalidou and Taylor,
(2011) focused on calculation tasks such as arithmetic and subtraction tasks. Their metaanalysis showed that prefrontal regions are essential for number and calculation.
Moreover, they revealed that activation in regions along the prefrontal cortex was related
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to the difficulty of the task. Specifically, IFG was activated during the processing of
simple numerical tasks while the MFG and superior frontal gyrus were involved in more
complex calculation problems (Arsalidou & Taylor, 2011). In view of this, Arsalidou
and Taylor, (2011) suggested that this activation in the prefrontal cortex was a result of
domain-general processes, such as working memory, that are essential for number and
calculation tasks. A common explanation for the consistent activation reported in the
frontal cortex during number and calculation tasks was that the frontal cortex is activated
in response to general cognitive processes associated with the task (e.g., Cantlon et al.
2006; Arsalidou and Taylor 2011). However, it has also been argued that frontal
activation is supporting number representations rather than general cognitive processes
(for a review see: Nieder and Dehaene, 2009).
The current meta-analysis lends additional support to the idea that frontal activation is
important for number processing during basic number tasks. Results revealed consistent
activation in frontal regions during symbolic and nonsymbolic number processing.
Moreover, results showed that neural activation in response to number processing is no
less consistent in the frontal cortex than in the parietal cortex. In particular, the single
dataset ALE maps revealed that the superior frontal gyrus was consistently activated
during symbolic magnitude processing and the right medial frontal gyrus and cingulate
gyrus were activated during nonsymbolic magnitude processing. The right superior
frontal gyrus was also activated in the conjunction analysis of symbolic and nonsymbolic
and specifically for nonsymbolic number processing the contrast analyses comparing
nonsymbolic>symbolic. The current meta-analysis deliberately included only basic
magnitude processing tasks in order to minimize the recruitment of additional cognitive
resources typically needed for complex calculation tasks. Additionally, all contrasts
included in the current meta-analysis were contrasted against control conditions. These
attributes make it likely that the activation revealed in the current meta-analyses is
related, at least in part, to magnitude representations. The superior frontal gyrus was also
found to activate to complex calculation tasks (Arsalidou & Taylor, 2011), however the
location of activity differs such that complex calculations elicit activity in anterior parts
of the superior frontal gyrus (BA 10), whereas basic number tasks elicit activity in
superior frontal gyrus (BA 6), a region often associated with the premotor cortex. Further
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evidence for the idea that the frontal cortex may support magnitude representations
comes from the contrast analyses, which revealed that the right superior frontal gyrus was
specifically activated by nonsymbolic numbers but not by symbolic numbers. The
specificity of frontal activation for nonsymbolic numbers suggests that this rightlateralized frontal region may be essential for identifying the number of objects within a
set. Therefore, similarly to activation in the parietal cortex, the activation patterns within
the frontal cortex vary as a function of format (symbolic vs. nonsymbolic). Together, the
data from the current meta-analysis offer no reason to think that the parietal cortex is
more specialized for number than the frontal cortex.
Although the pattern of frontal activation suggests that the superior frontal gyrus may
support basic number processing, the fact that many of the studies included in the
symbolic and nonsymbolic meta-analyses were active tasks, and therefore had general
cognitive processes such as decision-making, precludes the conclusion that the superior
frontal gyrus supports magnitude representations rather than general cognitive processes.
To overcome this limitation, single file ALE meta-analyses were computed to examine
converging activation of studies that used passive tasks. These single file passive maps
are essential to illuminate which brain regions are activated by responding to a task. The
brain activation that was associated with passive symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical
tasks was consistent with activation revealed in the ALE contrast maps comparing
symbolic and nonsymbolic maps of activation that included both passive and active tasks.
Specifically, both the active and passive maps and passive only maps revealed bilateral
activation in the left superior parietal lobule and precuneus and the right inferior parietal
lobule and precuneus as well as the left cingulate gyrus for symbolic and nonsymbolic
number processing. Although the current study did not have enough power to
statistically contrast the passive symbolic and passive nonsymbolic maps, the qualitative
comparison of the passive symbolic and passive nonsymbolic single file ALE maps
depicted in Figure 2.6 is consistent with the contrast analyses symbolic>nonsymbolic and
nonsymbolic>symbolic. Specifically, the passive symbolic map reveals activation in the
left precuneus and the left fusiform gyrus and the passive nonsymbolic ALE map reveals
activation in the right precuneus, left superior parietal lobule, and left middle occipital
gyrus. The cluster of activation is larger in the right parietal lobule compared to the left
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parietal lobule. Therefore, similarly to the contrast analyses that included both passive
and active conditions, a qualitative comparison of passive symbolic and passive
nonsymbolic single file ALE maps reveals trends of lateralization. Specifically, passive
single file ALE meta-analyses suggest that symbolic numbers activate the left parietal
lobe and nonsymbolic numbers activate a larger region in the right parietal lobe.
Therefore, the passive maps reflect similar patterns of activation to the active and passive
single dataset maps as well as the contrasts for both symbolic and nonsymbolic number
processing. Together, these passive maps suggest that activation in the bilateral parietal
cortex and the left cingulate gyrus may be related to format-dependent and independent
magnitude processing, rather than task demands.
Taken together, the present meta-analysis does not support the argument that frontal
regions are involved in task demands while parietal regions are involved in semantic
processing. Instead, these data indicate that both the frontal cortex and the parietal cortex
may be involved in general cognitive processes associated with number tasks and
magnitude representations. Ultimately, the field of numerical cognition needs to
acknowledge that frontal regions are consistently engaged, even during basic number
processing, and in accordance with this, reduce biases towards parietal activation.

2.4.4

Limitations and Advantages of ALE

As the present study used ALE methodology, it is important to note several specific
limitations with ALE such as difficulty accounting for differences in statistical
thresholding approaches across studies and difficulty determining the spatial extent and
magnitude of the activation for each focus (for a more detailed discussion of these
limitations: Ellison-Wright et al. 2008; Christ et al. 2009; Di Martino et al. 2009;
Arsalidou and Taylor 2011). Additionally, as ALE uses data from fMRI and PET studies,
it is important to consider that the blood-oxygen-level-dependent (BOLD) signal and the
PET signal are indirect signals. Specifically, the PET signal and BOLD response
estimate brain activity by detecting changes associated with blood flow (Logothetis,
2003). Moreover, these indirect signals are typically corrected for motion, smoothed, and
averaged across participants. Therefore, at best, these signals only reveal mass activation
of a brain region, and not individual neuronal firing (see Scott and Wise, (2003) for a
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more detailed critical appraisal of functional imaging). Since fMRI and PET detect an
indirect mass signal that is smoothed across a large number of neurons in the brain and
averaged across subjects, it is likely that one region of activation within a single
empirical study, represents several neural networks (Nieder, 2004). This idea is
supported by data in primates that revealed that less than 20% of neurons in the
intraparietal sulcus responded to numbers (Nieder and Miller, 2004). This is particularly
important to consider when examining which brain regions support numbers abstractly
versus a format-dependent manner. Therefore, when interpreting the results of the
current meta-analysis, it is perhaps more accurate to argue that regions which seem to
process numbers abstractly contain a larger number of “abstract number-selective
neurons,” whereas regions that are sensitive to number format have a larger number of
“format-dependent number-selective neurons.” As the field of functioning imaging
develops, future research will be needed to more precisely examine abstract and formatdependent regions at the neuronal level in humans.
Despite these limitations, ALE has several important advantages as a tool for
synthesizing neuroimaging data. Particularly, the algorithms that underlie ALE allow for
the quantification of foci among empirical papers with varying methodologies. For
example, this method can account for differences in the number of runs, the duration of
the presentation of the stimuli and the type of design (e.g., block vs. event-related). It is
likely that this diversity in methodologies is one of the main drivers of conflicting
findings often reported between studies. Additionally, because neuroimaging research is
so costly, the majority of empirical studies have small sample sizes. ALE groups different
studies with varying methodologies by domains in order to increase sample sizes and
ultimately address broader theoretical questions. Overall, ALE is a valuable meta-analytic
tool that can quantitatively integrate large amounts of neuroimaging data to reveal
converging patterns of findings.

2.4.5

Conclusions

In conclusion, this meta-analysis has reaffirmed the body of research suggesting that the
ability to process numbers relies on a large number of brain regions. This quantitative
meta-analysis shows that overlapping and distinct regions in the frontal and parietal lobes
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are activated by symbolic and nonsymbolic numbers, revealing the specific roles of
parietal and frontal regions in supporting number processing. The finding that several
neural regions were activated by the conjunction of symbolic and nonsymbolic number
maps supports the notion that the human brain represents numbers abstractly. This study
also illuminates the lateralization of symbolic compared to nonsymbolic number
processing within the parietal lobes. Specifically, the left angular gyrus is potentially
important for the mapping of symbols onto quantities (nonsymbolic numbers) while the
right superior parietal lobule may be important for processing nonsymbolic sets of items.
The lateralization of symbolic and nonsymbolic number is an intriguing avenue for future
research. Additionally, this research highlights the consistency of activation within the
frontal cortex during number processing. Ultimately, the current meta-analysis extends
our understanding of the brain regions associated with basic number processing and
initiates future research on the neural mechanisms that underlie our essential ability to
comprehend numbers.
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Chapter 3

3

Symbols are Special: An fMRI Adaptation Study of
Symbolic, Nonsymbolic and Non-numerical Magnitude
Processing in the Human Brain
3.1

Introduction

Humans have the exceptional ability that emerged over the course of human cultural
history, to represent numbers symbolically (e.g.,‘3’ or ‘three’). This capacity to represent
numbers symbolically is necessary for mathematical thinking, which is a major pillar of
contemporary civilization. The uniquely human ability to process these symbolic
numerical magnitudes is thought to be supported by the same brain regions that are
associated with a pre-existing, innate and evolutionarily ancient abstract number
processing system used to process nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes (e.g., three dots
‘•••’), in human adults (Brannon, 2006; Dehaene, 2007; Dehaene et al., 2003; Nieder &
Dehaene, 2009). However, a growing body of recent evidence suggests that the neural
systems used to process symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes are more
distinct than has been previously assumed (Ansari, 2007; Bulthé, De Smedt, & Op de
Beeck, 2014; Cohen Kadosh & Walsh, 2009; Lyons, Ansari, & Beilock, 2012, 2014;
Lyons & Beilock, 2013; Sokolowski & Ansari, 2016), thus conflicting with the notion
that numbers are processed entirely abstractly. Despite years of research, and a recent
meta-analysis of neuroimaging papers, presented in Chapter 2 of the current thesis
(Sokolowski, Fias, Mousa, & Ansari, 2017), there remains no clear conclusion about
whether symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes are supported by the same or
distinct brain regions.
Research examining whether symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes are
represented in the same way in the adult human brain is further complicated by the fact
that nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes are inherently confounded by non-numerical
magnitudes. For example, physical size is related to nonsymbolic magnitude processing
because more objects take up more space. More specifically, a set of six objects takes up
more physical space than a set of five of the same sized objects (For review see:
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Leibovich & Henik, 2013). Additionally, brain regions associated with numerical
magnitude processing are also activated during the processing of non-numerical
magnitudes such as physical size, duration, and luminance (Cantlon, Platt, & Brannon,
2009; Cohen Kadosh, Lammertyn, & Izard, 2008; Sokolowski, Fias, Bosah Ononye, &
Ansari, 2017; Walsh, 2003). This finding of common brain regions supporting numerical
and non-numerical magnitude processing has been taken to suggest that the neural system
that has been identified as an abstract number processing system (used to process both
symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes) may, in fact, be a general system used
to process both numerical and non-numerical magnitudes. However, it is clear that
previous studies have not sufficiently controlled for continuous properties of the
nonsymbolic stimuli. Therefore, the question of whether symbolic and nonsymbolic
numerical magnitudes are processed using the same system while controlling for brain
regions associated with non-numerical magnitude processing, must still be addressed.
More problematic still is the use of active tasks in the vast majority of studies that
compare the neural correlates of symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical thinking. In active
tasks, it is notoriously difficult to discern whether neural activation is associated with
processing the magnitude of the stimulus or with decision making and motor processing
required to complete the active task (Göbel et al., 2004). Additionally, it is challenging to
equate difficulty levels on active tasks, which means that a comparison of task effects of
active tasks may reflect relative levels of difficulty rather than representational
differences between the tasks. To overcome these limitations of active tasks, a small
subset of research has used functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging adaptation (fMR-A).
fMR-A is a passive design that measures the neural correlates associated with stimuli of
interest without requiring participants to make a decision or motor response. This task
relies on the principle that neural populations habituate (i.e., adapt) their activity
following repeated presentations of the same stimulus (Grill-Spector et al., 2006). In
fMR-A paradigms, a particular stimulus (i.e., the habituation stimulus) is repeatedly
presented to evoke adaptation of brain regions associated with encoding this stimulus.
Following this period of adaptation, a stimulus that differs in some way from the
habituation stimulus (i.e., a deviant stimulus) is presented. The presentation of the deviant
stimulus results in a rebound of activation in regions that are associated with the

102

attributes of the particular deviant compared to the habituation stimulus. This rebound of
activation in response to a deviant stimulus is referred to as the ‘neural rebound effect’.
The extent of the neural rebound effect in response to a deviant is a function of the
difference between the adapted stimulus and the deviant. For example, within the number
domain, if a participant is adapted to symbolic number ‘6’ the neural rebound effect will
be greater for a symbolic number deviant stimulus that is farther from the adapted
stimulus (e.g.,‘9’) compared to a symbolic number that is closer to the adapted stimulus
(e.g.,‘7’). The use of fMR-A is necessary to identify whether symbolic and nonsymbolic
numerical magnitudes are sub-served by the same neural systems, in human adults.
Using fMR-A, researchers have found that the left inferior parietal lobule responds to
processing the magnitude of number symbols (Cohen Kadosh, Cohen Kadosh, Kaas,
Henik, & Goebel, 2007; Damarla & Just, 2013; Holloway, Battista, Vogel, & Ansari,
2013; Notebaert, Nelis, & Reynvoet, 2011; Piazza, Pinel, Le Bihan, & Dehaene, 2007;
Vogel et al., 2017), whereas bilateral regions in the parietal lobes respond more to
nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes (Damarla & Just, 2013; Demeyere, Rotshtein, &
Humphreys, 2014; Piazza et al., 2004; Roggeman et al., 2007). Problematically, most
previous research only includes a symbolic or a nonsymbolic condition, but not both
conditions. In the few studies that examined the passive processing of both symbolic and
a nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes using fMR-A (Damarla & Just, 2013; Piazza et al.,
2007; Roggeman et al., 2007), participants were adapted to either symbolic numbers and
then presented with nonsymbolic deviants, or were adapted to nonsymbolic numbers and
then presented with symbolic deviants. This cross-format adaptation can allow
researchers to make inferences about whether representations of one format is
generalizable to another. For example, the finding that the neural distance effect of one
format is also activated by a cross-format deviant might suggest a reliance on the same
underlying representations. However, this cross-notation adaptation paradigm cannot
reveal whether similar brain regions are adapted to symbolic and nonsymbolic stimuli.
This is because in the two conditions compared (symbolic vs. nonsymbolic), the stimuli
to which the participant is adapted to are different. Consequently, the finding of
overlapping representations using cross-format effects may be driven by a common
representation or by the activation of a mechanism that allows for the translation of
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representations. To directly compare the passive processing of symbolic and nonsymbolic
numerical magnitudes using an fMR-A paradigm, it is necessary to adapt the brain to
both symbolic and nonsymbolic stimuli, simultaneously. To do this, the habituation
stimuli for symbolic and nonsymbolic number processing must be identical.
In this study, we address the fundamental question of whether the culturally acquired,
uniquely human, ability to process numbers symbolically is underpinned by the same
brain regions that are activated during the processing of nonsymbolic quantities and
physical size. This will identify whether different number formats are processed
abstractly, using a single system, or in a format-dependent way in the human adult brain.
In the present preregistered study
(https://osf.io/jrmpf/register/5771ca429ad5a1020de2872e), we develop and implement
parallel fMR-A to isolate and directly compare the neural representations of symbols,
quantities, and physical size. Importantly, our design controls for brain activations
associated with other conditions in the paradigm, as well as inherent confounds
associated with active tasks (Grill-Spector et al., 2006). Specifically, in our parallel
fMR-A design, participants are repeatedly presented with a specific quantity of the same
symbolic number in a white coloured font of a specific size. This set of symbols will be
referred to as an ‘array’. Following this, one aspect of the array is changed (either the
symbol, the quantity, or the size) while the other aspects remain constant. This design
allows us to identify whether the culturally acquired ability to process symbolic
numerical magnitudes activates the same brain regions that are activated during the
processing of nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes and/or non-numerical magnitudes, in
the adult brain.

3.2
3.2.1

Methods
Participants

Fifty-two healthy adult participants from London, Ontario, Canada participated in the
fMR-A experiment. Our final sample included 45 participants (MeanAge = 23.6, Standard
DeviationAge = 4.3, Age Range = 18-39; 30 women and 22 men), all of whom did not
exceed our motion cut-offs (i.e., no overall deviation greater than 3 mm from the 1st
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volume acquired within a run, and no deviation greater than 1.5 mm between subsequent
volumes) and our accuracy cut-offs (Vogel et al., 2015). Accuracy was determined by
asking participants to press a predefined button with their right index finger when the
numbers appeared in blue font. These trials are referred to as “catch trials”. The scanner
runs where the participant did not “catch” at least five out of seven trials were excluded
from analyses. Participants with fewer than two out of three usable runs were excluded
from the study. All included participants were right-handed, spoke fluent English,
reported no known history of psychiatric or neurological disorders, and had normal or
corrected to normal vision. The procedures of this study were approved by the Health
Sciences Research Ethics Board for human subjects at the University of Western Ontario
(See Appendix A and https://osf.io/ru4xb/).

3.2.2

Stimuli

Stimuli were created using MATLAB (Figure 3.1A). The code to create the stimuli is
available on the OSF at (https://osf.io/9gfj4/). Habituation stimuli contained white ‘6’s in
the font size 60 on a grey background (see Fig 3.1A for example of a habituation array).
Participants were simultaneously adapted to three aspects of the array: the numerical
symbol, the quantity, and the physical size of the digits. Deviant stimuli (i.e., stimuli that
differed from the habituation stimuli in a particular way) were variations of an array of
white Arabic digits randomly positioned on a grey background. Catch trials (i.e., trials for
which participants were instructed to press a button) contained Arabic digits printed in
blue on the same grey background. As previously stated, to meet our accuracy cut-offs,
participants were required to “catch” at least 5 out of the 7 trials per run (Vogel et al.,
2015). Multiple versions of the array for each condition were generated to ensure that
participants did not learn the position of the Arabic digits within the array. E-prime 2.0
presentation software (Schneider, Eschman, & Zuccolotto, 2002) was used to project the
stimuli onto a computer screen (resolution=800x600 pixels; colour bit depth = 16). The
paradigm is available at (https://osf.io/gx63r/). The participants viewed the computer
screen using a mirror system that was attached to the magnetic resonance imaging (MRI)
head-coil.
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3.2.3

Experimental Procedure

The fMR-A task was modelled after previous adaptation studies ( Holloway et al., 2013;
Vogel et al., 2015, 2017). Participants were instructed to attend to the screen and press a
button when the digits on the screen turned blue (i.e., catch trials). The experiment
included three fMR-A runs, each consisting of a stream of arrays of Arabic digits in
Helvetica font punctuated by blank grey screens that were the same colour as the
background of the arrays. The arrays were presented for 200 milliseconds and the blank
grey screen for 1200 milliseconds (Figure 3.1A). During habituation, participants were
presented with the digit '6' in four random locations of the screen in size 60 font between
5 and 9 times (average of 7 repeats). This allowed for a natural oversampling of the
hemodynamic response function as the presentation of one trial (1400ms) was not
synchronized with the scan repetition time (TR=1000ms). At jittered intervals (i.e., after
5-9 habituation trials), participants were presented with either a deviant trial (48 total
trials across 6 conditions), a null trial (9 total), or a catch trial (7 total). In deviant trials,
one aspect of the array of sixes was changed a small amount or a large amount. There
were six conditions of deviant trial types (8 trials per deviant). Specifically, there were
three types of deviants (symbolic, nonsymbolic, physical size), and each type changed a
large amount or a small amount (small change, large change). In the symbolic condition,
the numerical symbols changed from ‘6’s to '7's (small change), or to '2's (large change),
while the quantity and physical size were held constant. In the nonsymbolic condition,
the quantity changed from four to three (small change) or eight (large change) ‘6’s, but
the symbol and physical size were held constant. For symbolic and nonsymbolic deviant
conditions, the small change was a distance of 1 and the large change was a distance of 4.
In the physical size condition, the size of the symbols decreased to font size 51 (small
change) or increased to font size 86 (large change), but the symbol and quantity (i.e., four
‘6’s) remained unchanged. Critically, for the physical size condition, the area of the four
digits was matched to the area taken up by the three digits in the quantity small change
condition or the eight digits in the quantity large change condition. Specifically, the
number of white pixels in the physical size condition was matched to the corresponding
nonsymbolic deviant conditions using MATLAB. The code is available at
(https://osf.io/rncv7/). In null trials, the participant was presented with another
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habituation trial array (i.e., four ‘6’s in size 60 font). In the catch trials, participants were
presented with one of the 6 deviant trials, or a null trial in blue font. Participants pressed
a button with the index finger of their right hand when the digits on the screen turned
blue (i.e., catch trials). Catch trials were pseudo-randomly dispersed throughout each
run. Participants had to push the button for at least five of the seven catch trials for the
run to be included in the statistical analyses. See Figure 3.1B for an illustration of the
adaptation, deviant, null, and catch trials.

6
6
6

A

6
1200ms
200ms

7

Habituation Stimuli

B

6
7

6
6
6
6

Physical Size

Nonsymbolic

6

7

Distance 1
Distance 4

6

Ad
ap
tat
ion
pe
rio
d

6

6

Deviant Stimuli
Symbolic

6
6

6

6
6

De
via
nt

Tim
e

7

6

6
6

7

6

Catch Trial

6

6

6
7

6

7
7

6

6

2

6
2

2

6
6

2

6

6

6

6

6
6
6

6

6

6

6
6

Figure 3.1 A) Example of the parallel adaptation paradigm: including the continuous
presentation of the adapted stimulus (habituation period) followed by a deviant stimulus
(in this case a symbolic deviant). B) Illustrations of examples of the adaptation stimulus,
six deviant stimuli types (symbolic distance 1, symbolic distance 4, nonsymbolic distance
1, nonsymbolic distance 4, physical size small change, and physical size large change),
and catch trial types (i.e., trials for which participants were instructed to press a button, to
assure a minimum degree of attentiveness towards the stimuli presentation in the
scanner).
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3.2.4

fMRI Data Acquisition

Structural and functional images were acquired using a 3T Siemens Prisma Fit wholebody MRI scanner, using a 32-channel receive-only head-coil (Siemens, Erlangen
Germany). A whole-brain high resolution T1-weighted anatomical scan was collected
using an MPRAGE sequence with 192 slices, and a scan duration of 5 minutes and 21
seconds (isovoxel resolution = 1 × 1 × 1; TR = 2300 ms; TE 2.98 = ms; TI = 900 ms;
FOV = 256 mm; flip angle = 9). Functional MRI data were acquired using a blood
oxygen level dependent (BOLD) sensitive T2* echo-planar (EPI) sequence. Forty-eight
slices were acquired in a sequential multi-slice interleaved series with a multi-band
accelerator factor of 4 (slice thickness = 2.5 mm; TR = 1000 ms; TE 30.00 = ms; FOV =
208 mm; flip angle = 40). All data are publicly available at
(https://openneuro.org/datasets/ds001848/versions/1.0.1).

3.2.5

fMRI Data Preprocessing

Structural and functional data were pre-processed and analyzed in Brain Voyager 20.6
(Brain Innovation, Maastricht, The Netherlands) using the software’s preprocessing
workflow (For workflow see: https://osf.io/3hr2g/). The structural brain data was
extracted from the head tissue and intensity inhomogeneities were corrected to reduce the
spatial intensity of the 3D volumes. Functional data were corrected for slice-scan time
acquisition (cubic-spline interpolation algorithm), high-pass filtered (Fourier; cut off
value of 2 sines/cosines cycles) and corrected for in-scanner head motion (Trilinear/sinc
interpolation). A Gaussian smoothing kernel of 6-mm Full-Width-of-Half Maximum
(FWHM) was applied to smooth the images. Structural and functional images were coregistered using a header-based initial alignment followed by a gradient-driven finetuning adjustment and normalized to MNI-152 space. A two gamma hemodynamic
response function was used to model the expected bold signal (Friston, Josephs, Rees, &
Turner, 1998). Baseline was calculated using the adaptation period as well as the between
trial fixation periods. Catch trials were modelled as a predictor of no interest.

108

3.2.6
3.2.6.1

Data Analysis
Statistical Threshold

All of the statistical maps reported in the current study were first thresholded with an
uncorrected p-value of .005. This statistical threshold was chosen based on reports from
recent symbolic fMR-A studies (Vogel et al., 2015, 2017). The statistical whole-brain
maps were corrected then for multiple comparisons at a statistical level of p<.05 using the
cluster-level correction plugin in BrainVoyager (for review of this approach see Forman
et al., 1995). The full width at half maximum (FWHM) in units of functional voxels (i.e.,
the smoothness) as well as the minimum cluster size (p=.05) based on the log-linear
intra/extrapolation in millimeters (i.e., the cluster extent) are reported for each contrast
with clusters of activation that reached a minimum threshold of p < 0.005, uncorrected
and p < 0.05 cluster corrected at on whole-brain level.

3.2.6.2

Whole-brain Analyses

Whole-brain random-effects analyses were conducted using a general linear model
(GLM) to examine overlapping and distinct BOLD responses to symbolic numerical
magnitudes, nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes and the magnitude of physical size. All
primary analyses were preregistered on the open science framework (OSF) (see
https://osf.io/jrmpf/register/5771ca429ad5a1020de2872e for preregistration).

3.3
3.3.1
3.3.1.1

Results
Preplanned Analyses
Change Detection

Preliminary contrast analyses were run to examine what brain regions responded to
changes in different stimulus dimensions. Regions that were associated with stimulus
change detection were identified as regions associated with the change of one stimulus
type (at both distances) over the change of the other two stimulus types (at both
distances) (e.g., the symbolic change effect is calculated as [(symbolic distance 1 +
symbolic distance 4) > (nonsymbolic distance 1 + nonsymbolic distance 4 + physical size
distance 1 + physical size distance 4)]).
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Results revealed that symbolic change detection (Cluster-Level: smoothing = 2.49; extent
= 920 mm) was associated with activation in a widespread frontal-parietal-occipital
network (Table 3.1, Figure 3.2). There were no brain regions that were activated above
threshold in response to nonsymbolic change detection (Table 3.1, Figure 3.2). Physical
size change detection (Cluster-Level: smoothing = 2.25; extent = 688 mm) was
associated with activation in the right premotor cortex, right superior temporal gyrus, and
left occipital region (Table 3.1, Figure 3.2). Critically, although these preliminary
analyses highlight regions that are associated with the passive perception of change
detection, these brain regions are not specifically associated with magnitude processing
of symbols, quantities, and physical size.
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Figure 3.2 Change detection signal recovery from adaptation in the three deviant
conditions (green = symbolic change detection, blue = nonsymbolic change detection, red
= physical size change detection).
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Table 3.1 Brain Regions Associated with Change Detection Signal Recovery from
Adaptation
Hemisphere

Peak

Brain Region
Juelich
Histological
Atlas

t

Coordinate
Harvard-Oxford
Structural Atlas

p

Cluster
Size
(Number

x

y

z

of
Voxels)

Symbolic Change
Detection

R

Anterior

Superior Parietal

Intraparietal

Lobule, Angular

Sulcus

Gyrus

33

-52

43

5.46

0.000002

9264

42

38

25

3.70

0.0006

1286

42

-88

-2

4.69

0.00003

1095

12

-10

4

4.80

0.00002

1563

6

32

31

4.36

0.00008

2060

3

-34

28

4.46

0.00006

2754

0

26

52

4.37

0.00008

2573

-6

-89

-32

4.45

0.00006

2322

-45

-76

-17

5.80

0.000001

6928

-30

-61

46

4.44

0.00006

5670

Frontal Pole,
R

Middle Frontal
Gyrus

R

R

Lateral Occipital
Cortex
Thalamus

Visual Cortex
Corticospinal
Tract
Paracingulate

R

Gyrus, Cingulate
Gyrus

R

Callosal Body,
Cingulum

Cingulate Gyrus
Superior Frontal

R

Premotor

Gyrus,

Cortex

Paracingulate
Gyrus

L

L

Cerebellum
Visual Cortex
V4

Anterior
L

Intraparietal
Sulcus,

Lateral Occipital
Cortex, Occipital
Fusiform Gyrus
Lateral Occipital
Cortex, Superior
Parietal Lobule,
Angular Gyrus
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Superior
Parietal Lobule
L

Frontal Pole

-42

53

4

3.97

0.0003

1298

-

-

-

-

-

-

60

-37

22

4.46

0.00006

3008

48

-49

13

4.27

0.0001

1098

-30

-88

-2

4.51

0.00005

2538

Nonsymbolic Change
Detection
-

-

Physical Size Change
Detection

R

R

Inferior Parietal

Supramarginal

Lobule

Gyrus

Inferior Parietal
Lobule

Angular Gyrus
and Middle
Temporal Gyrus
Lateral Occipital

L

Visual Cortex

Cortex, Occipital
Pole

3.3.1.2

Neural Distance Effects

We examined neural distance effects (i.e., distance 4>distance 1) to isolate brain regions
associated with magnitude processing, of each deviant stimulus type (symbolic,
nonsymbolic, physical size). To reveal neural correlates of the distance effects for each
condition, we statistically compared distance four to distance one for the symbolic
condition (symbolic distance 4 > symbolic distance 1), the nonsymbolic condition
(nonsymbolic distance 4 > nonsymbolic distance 1) and the physical size condition
(physical size large change > physical size small change). This analysis revealed that
symbolic magnitude processing (Cluster-Level: smoothing = 2.10; extent = 571 mm) was
associated with activation in the left inferior parietal lobule (Peak MNI Coordinate: -57, 64, 22; Cluster Size = 878 voxels) and the left orbitofrontal cortex (Peak MNI
Coordinate: -36, 35, -14; Cluster Size = 944 voxels) (Figure 3.3A). Distinct from this,
nonsymbolic magnitude processing (Cluster-Level: smoothing = 2.26; extent = 693 mm)
was associated with activation in the right intraparietal sulcus (Peak MNI Coordinate: 27,
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-67, 49; Cluster Size = 2381 voxels) (Figure 3.3B). Finally, physical size magnitude
processing (Cluster-Level: smoothing = 2.45; extent = 836 mm) correlated with
widespread activation spanning right parietal and occipital lobes (Peak MNI Coordinate:
42, -61, -11; Cluster Size = 25418 voxels), and a smaller region in the left occipital cortex
(Peak MNI Coordinate: -45, -67, -11; Cluster Size = 5086 voxels) (Figure 3.3C). These
results demonstrate that the processing of symbolic numerical magnitudes is leftlateralized, whereas the processing of nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes and physical
size is right-lateralized. These data demonstrate that the brain regions that support
symbolic and nonsymbolic number processing are potentially quite distinct. Furthermore,
nonsymbolic numerical magnitude processing may actually be supported by brain regions
used to process non-numerical magnitudes, such as physical size.
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Figure 3.3 The neural rebound effects for: A) symbolic numerical magnitude processing
defined as the degree of neural rebound for symbolic distance 4 deviant > symbolic
distance 1 deviant, shown in green, B) nonsymbolic numerical magnitude processing,
defined as the degree of neural rebound for nonsymbolic distance 4 deviant >
nonsymbolic distance 1 deviant, shown in blue, C) physical size magnitude processing,
defined as the degree of neural rebound for physical size large change deviant > physical
size small change deviant, shown in red. This reveals that symbolic numerical
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magnitudes are represented using distinct brain regions from those that support
nonsymbolic and nonnumerical magnitude processing.
Following our pre-registered analysis plan, we next used a conjunction () analysis to
assess whether the brain regions associated with symbolic, nonsymbolic and physical size
magnitude processing overlapped. This analysis [(Symbolic Distance 4 > Symbolic
Distance 1)  (Nonsymbolic Distance 4 > Nonsymbolic Distance 1)  (Physical Size
Large Change > Physical Size Small Change)] revealed that there are no brain regions
commonly activated by symbolic, nonsymbolic and physical size magnitude processing.
To identify which brain regions support numerical magnitude processing specifically, the
conjunction of the symbolic and nonsymbolic distance effects was contrasted against the
physical size distance effect [((Symbolic Distance 4 > Symbolic Distance 1) 
(Nonsymbolic Distance 4 > Nonsymbolic Distance 1)) > (Physical Size Large Change >
Physical Size Small Change)]. No brain regions that were significantly activated for
numerical magnitude processing (symbolic and nonsymbolic) over and above brain
regions associated with physical size processing were found.
The final set of preplanned analyses were included to identify whether the brain regions
associated with symbolic, nonsymbolic and physical size magnitudes were formatspecific. To do this, the neural distance effect of each format-specific magnitude was
contrasted against the other two distance effects. The contrast examining symbolic
specific activation [(Symbolic Distance 4 > Symbolic Distance 1) > ((Nonsymbolic
Distance 4 > Nonsymbolic Distance 1)  (Physical Size Large Change > Physical Size
Small Change))] (Cluster-Level: smoothing = 2.21; extent = 654 mm) revealed that the
left inferior parietal lobule supports symbolic magnitude processing over and above
nonsymbolic and physical size (Peak MNI Coordinate: -57, -64, 22; Cluster Size = 1195
voxels) (Figure 3.4). In contrast, no brain region was specifically activated by
nonsymbolic magnitude processing (i.e., the contrast [(Nonsymbolic Distance 4 >
Nonsymbolic Distance 1) > ((Symbolic Distance 4 > Symbolic Distance 1)  (Physical
Size Large Change > Physical Size Small Change))]). The contrast examining which
brain regions were specifically associated with physical size over and above numerical
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magnitude processing [(Physical Size Large Change > Physical Size Small Change) >
((Symbolic Distance 4 > Symbolic Distance 1)  (Nonsymbolic Distance 4 >
Nonsymbolic Distance 1))] (Cluster-Level: smoothing = 1.98; extent = 510 mm)
implicated the right fusiform gyrus (Peak MNI Coordinate: 42, -67, -17; Cluster Size =
687 voxels). Together these analyses provide further evidence to support our key finding
that the symbolic numerical magnitudes are processed using brain regions that are distinct
from the regions that support the processing of nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes and
physical size. In other words, the brain regions used to process culturally acquired
symbols seem to be spatially distinct from the evolutionarily ancient systems that support
nonsymbolic numerical magnitude processing and non-numerical magnitude processing,
in human adults.

3.3.2

Post-Hoc Analyses

The findings from the pre-registered contrasts reveal that the neural correlates associated
with the magnitude processing of symbolic numbers are spatially distinct from brain
regions that support nonsymbolic and non-numerical magnitude processing. Critically,
these pre-registered contrasts revealed that nonsymbolic magnitude processing and
physical size magnitude processing both activated the right intraparietal sulcus, a region
typically associated with number processing. Furthermore, although symbolic magnitude
processing was specifically associated with activation in the left parietal lobe, no region
in the parietal or frontal cortex was specifically activated by nonsymbolic or physical size
processing. In view of this, a post-hoc conjunction analysis was run examining
overlapping activation between nonsymbolic magnitude processing and physical size
magnitude processing [(Nonsymbolic Distance 4 > Nonsymbolic Distance 1)  (Physical
Size Large Change > Physical Size Small Change)], (Cluster-Level: smoothing = 2.06;
extent = 565 mm). Results revealed that one cluster in the right intraparietal sulcus was
activated by the conjunction of nonsymbolic and physical size magnitude processing
(Peak MNI Coordinate: 30, -67, 40; Cluster Size = 1412 voxels) (Figure 3.4). This posthoc analysis suggests the right-lateralized parietal region is used to process both
nonsymbolic and non-numerical magnitudes. Therefore, the brain regions that support
nonsymbolic numerical magnitude processing may reflect a general magnitude system
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that processes both numerical and non-numerical, nonsymbolic information, rather than
an abstract number processing system, that specifically supports the processing of
numerical magnitudes.
To identify whether the brain region related to the conjunction of nonsymbolic and
physical size processing was significant over and above symbolic number processing, the
conjunction of the nonsymbolic and physical size distance effects was contrasted against
the symbolic distance effect [(Nonsymbolic Distance 4 > Nonsymbolic Distance 1) 
(Physical Size Large Change > Physical Size Small Change) > (Symbolic Distance 4 >
Symbolic Distance 1)]. There were no brain regions that were significantly activated for
nonsymbolic numerical and non-numerical magnitude processing over and above brain
regions supported by symbolic numerical magnitude processing. This post-hoc analysis
indicates that while there is evidence that symbolic numerical magnitude processing is
spatially distinct from nonsymbolic numerical magnitude processing and the processing
of physical size, there is no strong spatial evidence for unique representations of
nonsymbolic and physical size when contrasted to symbolic.
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Figure 3.4 Symbolic specific rebound effect depicted in green. The conjunction between
the rebound effects for nonsymbolic deviants and physical size deviants is depicted in
purple.
Together, the preplanned combined with post-hoc univariate analyses indicate that
nonsymbolic magnitudes are processed in the same brain region that is used to process
physical size magnitude, namely the right intraparietal sulcus. In contrast, symbolic
numerical magnitude processing is specifically associated with activation in the left
inferior parietal lobule. However, though these univariate analyses suggest some spatial
distinction between symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitude processing, the
conjunction of nonsymbolic and physical size processing was not significant over and
above symbolic numerical magnitude processing. This suggests that while symbolic and
nonsymbolic numerical magnitude processing seems to be lateralized in the parietal
cortex both formats may still activate overlapping regions. Additionally, univariate
analyses do not allow us to conclude that the underlying representations are unrelated. To
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address this outstanding issue, we used a multivariate approach to identify similarities
and differences in the spatial patterns of neural activity for symbolic numerical
magnitude processing, nonsymbolic numerical magnitude processing and the processing
of physical size. More specifically, we used the multivariate method representational
similarity analysis (RSA), to extract information about distributed patterns of
representations within regions of interest in the brain. This method is valuable in
advancing our understanding of similarities and differences in the underlying
representations of symbolic, nonsymbolic and non-numerical magnitudes, rather than
coarsely estimating spatial overlap.

3.3.2.1

Representational Similarity Analyses

We implemented RSA using Brain Voyager 20.6 (Brain Innovation, Maastricht, The
Netherlands), to analyze the similarity between evoked fMRI responses for the symbolic
distance effect, the nonsymbolic distance effect and the physical size distance effect in
select regions-of-interest (ROIs). The ROIs were constructed by creating a sphere with a
radius of 10mm around the weighted centre of the bilateral parietal clusters in the
numerical passive viewing map from chapter 2 (Sokolowski, Fias, Mousa, & Ansari,
2017). The coordinates for the weighted centre of the parietal clusters are: 1) right
hemisphere: MNI coordinates (x, y, z): 26, -55, 53) 2) left hemisphere: MNI coordinates
(x, y, z): -28, -67, 43). For each ROI, a representational distance (or dissimilarity) matrix
(RDM) was computed to assess the dissimilarity between the symbolic distance effect,
the nonsymbolic distance effect, and the physical size distance effect (Figure 3.5). Note
that the correlation calculated between patterns is a reflection of the similarity of the
spatial patterns since this measure abstracts from the mean (and standard deviation) of the
original values. The RDM contains a cell for each pair of experimental conditions. The
colour of each cell represents a number that reflects the dissimilarities between the
activity patterns associated with the two experimental conditions. Specifically, a Pearson
correlation coefficient was calculated and subsequently transformed to a distance
measure using the equation: d = 1 – r. These calculated d values, thus, range from 0.0
(minimum distance) to 2.0 (maximum distance) with value 1.0 in the middle representing
no correlation. This data is further visualized using a multi-dimensional scaling (MDS)
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plot, which depicts the similarity between the conditions in a two-dimensional
representation (Figure 3.5). Specifically, the conditions that are positioned closer
together on the MDS plot have more similar neural activation patterns. Notably, results
from this multivariate analysis revealed that nonsymbolic magnitude processing and
physical size processing correlate more strongly at the multivariate level than either does
with symbolic magnitude processing in both the right and the left hemispheres. Notably,
this pattern of greater similarity between nonsymbolic and physical size compared to
symbols is especially strong in the right hemisphere. In sum, these multivariate results
revealed a dissimilar normalized pattern of activation for symbolic compared to
nonsymbolic numerical magnitude processing in both the left and right parietal lobes.
Together the converging evidence from the univariate and multivariate analyses show
that, in the adult human brain, symbols are processed using distinct brain regions, and
distinct patterns of activation, compared to nonsymbolic and non-numerical magnitudes.

Figure 3.5 The left side of this figure illustrates the representational distance matrices
(RDM) between the symbolic distance effect, the nonsymbolic distance effect, and the
physical size distance effect in the left (top) and right (bottom) hemispheres. The
numerical values that correspond to colours in the RDM refer to the distance measure
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calculated using the equation: d = 1 – r. Therefore, the values can range from 0.0
(minimum distance) to 2.0 (maximum distance) with value 1.0 in the middle representing
no correlation. The right side of this figure depicts the multi-dimensional scaling (MDS)
plots, which are visualizations of the similarity between the three distance effects
(symbolic, nonsymbolic, physical size) in two-dimensional space. The MDS plot is a
visualization of the distances between conditions in a two-dimensional space that
maximally satisfies the pairwise distances to all other conditions.

3.4

Discussion

The goal of the current study was to examine whether the uniquely human capacity to
process symbolic numerical magnitudes relies on the same brain regions that support the
processing of nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes (i.e., quantities). Parallel fMRI
adaptation was developed and used to isolate and directly compare the semantic
representations of symbols, quantities, and physical size while controlling for neural
activation associated with other conditions, as well as inherent confounds of active tasks
(Grill-Spector et al., 2006). Results revealed that the neural correlates of symbolic
numerical magnitude processing are more distinct from nonsymbolic magnitude
processing than has been assumed, at both the univariate and multivariate levels. At the
univariate level, symbolic numerical magnitudes are represented in the left inferior
parietal lobule, whereas both nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes and non-numerical
magnitudes (i.e., physical size) are represented in the right intraparietal sulcus. These
findings align with previous research indicating that different number formats (symbolic
and nonsymbolic) are lateralized within the parietal cortex (For review see: Sokolowski
& Ansari, 2016). Specifically, activation in the left parietal lobule is specific to symbolic
number processing, whereas the right parietal lobule is more activated during
nonsymbolic magnitude processing (Sokolowski, Fias, Mousa, et al., 2017). At the
multivariate level, normalized patterns of activation for symbolic numerical magnitude
processing in both the left and right parietal lobes were different compared to patterns of
activation for nonsymbolic magnitude processing; this also converges with previous
research (Bulthé et al., 2014; Eger et al., 2009; Lyons et al., 2014). This suggests that in
the adult human brain, symbolic numerical magnitudes are processed in a way that is
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spatially and representationally distinct from the processing of nonsymbolic numerical
magnitudes.
The findings from the current study suggest that adult humans possess two distinct
systems to support magnitudes: 1) a symbolic system used specifically to represent
symbolic numerical magnitudes, and 2) a general magnitude system used to represent
both discrete and continuous magnitudes. These findings directly contrast the findings
from Chapter 2 of this thesis, as well as the predominant view in the field of numerical
cognition, namely that symbolic and nonsymbolic numbers are processed using both
overlapping as well as distinct neural mechanisms (For review see: Cohen Kadosh, 2008;
Sokolowski, Fias, Mousa, et al., 2017; Sokolowski & Ansari, 2016). The parallel
adaptation paradigm developed and employed in the present study overcomes major
confounds of previous research that use active tasks such as decision making, and motor
processing for these active tasks (Grill-Spector et al., 2006). Indeed, previously reported
overlapping activation during the processing of symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical
magnitudes likely resulted from overlapping task demands, or the effortful process of
mapping symbols onto quantities in the case of cross-format designs. Using our parallel
adaptation approach, we discovered that the underlying brain regions supporting
symbolic number processing are quite distinct from the regions that correlate with
processing nonsymbolic magnitude processing in human adults.
Results from the current study also show that the neural representations of nonsymbolic
numerical magnitudes are nearly indistinguishable from the neural correlates that support
the processing of non-numerical magnitudes, specifically physical size. This aligns with
the growing body of research highlighting that nonsymbolic numbers are inherently
confounded by non-numerical magnitudes, such as physical size (Leibovich & Henik,
2013). Additionally, our finding that nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes and nonnumerical magnitudes are supported by the same neural substrates directly contradicts the
dominant view in numerical cognition, that symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical
magnitudes are supported using an abstract number processing system that is specifically
attuned to the processing of discrete quantities (Brannon, 2006; Cantlon, 2012; Dehaene
et al., 1998, 2003; Nieder & Dehaene, 2009). Our findings also show that the system used

122

to process nonsymbolic numbers may, in fact, be part of a general magnitude processing
system used to process both discrete as well as continuous magnitudes (Cohen Kadosh et
al., 2008; Lyons et al., 2012, 2014; Sokolowski, Fias, Bosah Ononye, et al., 2017; Walsh,
2003).
A key finding from our study, that symbols are processed using different brain regions
and produce different patterns of activation compared to nonsymbolic and non-numerical
magnitudes, highlights the need to consider what is actually special about symbols. One
key way in which symbols differ from the quantities that they represent is that symbols
are processed exactly rather than approximately, regardless of magnitude (Hyde, 2011;
Negen & Sarnecka, 2015; Núñez, 2017; Pica, Lemer, Izard, & Dehaene, 2004). This
means that to understand the meaning of a large symbolic number, an adult does not need
to map that symbol onto a pre-existing representation for the corresponding nonsymbolic
numerical magnitude. Instead, learning counting principles that underlie symbolic
numbers is a sufficient condition for understanding any symbolic number (Gallistel &
Gelman, 1992; Gelman & Gallistel, 1978; Le Corre & Carey, 2014). The idea that
symbols can be represented exactly, whereas nonsymbolic and non-numerical magnitudes
can only be processed approximately, provides a potential explanation for why the
passive processing of symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes are associated
with separate brain regions.
The multivariate results of this study provide very clear evidence for representational
dissimilarity between symbolic numerical magnitude processing compared to
nonsymbolic and non-numerical magnitude processing. However, the univariate results
indicate that the neural correlates of symbolic number processing are spatially distinct,
but the brain region associated with the conjunction between nonsymbolic and nonnumerical magnitude processing is not significantly activated over and above symbolic
numerical magnitude processing. This suggests that although there is evidence that
symbolic number processing is spatially distinct from nonsymbolic and non-numerical
magnitude processing, there is no strong spatial evidence for unique representations of
nonsymbolic and physical size. In other words, the brain region that supports
nonsymbolic and non-numerical magnitude processing is also at least partially activated
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by symbolic number processing. Therefore, the data from the current study provides
some evidence that the brain regions that are activated during the passive processing of
nonsymbolic and non-numerical magnitudes are also activated by symbolic numerical
magnitudes. However, the neural correlates the support the uniquely human, culturally
acquired, ability to represent numbers symbolically is supported by a set of brain regions
that is quite distinct from the brain regions that support nonsymbolic numerical
magnitude processing and non-numerical magnitude processing.

3.4.1

Limitations

There are several important limitations to the current study. First, as the stimuli consist
of arrays that include both symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes, the
possibility that these different formats automatically influence each other during
processing (e.g., Morton, 1969; Naparstek & Henik, 2010; Pansky & Algom, 2002)
cannot be ruled out. However, the fact that a neural distance effect was found for both
symbolic and nonsymbolic deviants, in distinct brain regions, suggests that the paradigm
captured elements of magnitude processing that were specific to each format. In chapter
4, of the current thesis, I address this question by empirically evaluating the automatic
influence of symbols and quantities on each other at the behavioural level. A second
limitation of the current study is that, due to attentional time constraints of the
participants, it was not possible to include multiple numerical values for the habituation
stimulus and within deviant categories. In other words, only one symbolic and
nonsymbolic numerical magnitude was included for the habituation array and each
change condition. In view of this, the results from this study are specific to the particular
magnitudes we included and should not be generalized to all numerical magnitudes.
Future research is needed to examine whether these effects hold across multiple different
symbols and quantities for both habituation and deviant stimuli.

3.4.2

Conclusions

This study provides evidence in support of the notion that the human adult brain
processes symbolic numerical magnitudes and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes using
regions that are more distinct than has been assumed. Indeed, these findings directly
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conflict with the dominant view in the field that symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical
magnitudes are supported by a single abstract number processing system (Cantlon, 2012;
Dehaene, 2007; Dehaene et al., 1998; Nieder & Dehaene, 2009). Instead, data from the
current study suggest that in human adults, culturally acquired symbolic representations
and evolutionarily ancient nonsymbolic representations may be represented by two
distinct systems. Our data highlight the need for the field of numerical cognition to move
away conducting research with the goal of canvassing the brain in search of an abstract
number processing system. Instead, efforts should be shifted towards uncovering the
multifaceted behavioural and neural consequences of learning the complex, uniquely
human skill of symbolic abstraction.
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Chapter 4

4

Number Symbols are Processed More Automatically
than Nonsymbolic Numerical Magnitudes: Findings
from a Symbolic-Nonsymbolic Stroop Task

4.1 Introduction
Basic number processing is a cognitive foundation that supports mathematical thinking.
Basic number processing is defined as the ability to understand, estimate, and/or
discriminate between numerical magnitudes. From very early in development humans
have the ability to process nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes (often referred to as
quantities) (e.g.,‘•••’ vs. ‘••’) (Brannon, 2006). This capacity to process nonsymbolic
numerical magnitudes is shared with non-human primates as well as other species (For
reviews see: Cantlon, 2012; Dehaene, 2007). This suggests that the ability to process
nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes has a long evolutionary history. Critically, unlike
non-human species and infants, human adults, in cultures that teach math symbolically,
have the unique, culturally acquired ability to process numbers symbolically (e.g.,‘3’).
The dominant assumption in the field of numerical cognition has been that this culturally
acquired ability to represent numbers symbolically is linked to an evolutionarily ancient
system used to process nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes (Brannon, 2006; Dehaene,
2007; Dehaene, Piazza, Pinel, & Cohen, 2003; Halberda, Mazzocco, & Feigenson, 2008;
Nieder & Dehaene, 2009). However, a growing body of research, including data from
Chapter 2 and 3 of this thesis, has revealed that symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical
magnitudes are processed more distinctly than has been assumed (Cohen Kadosh et al.,
2011; Cohen Kadosh, Kaas, Henik, & Goebel, 2007; Cohen Kadosh & Walsh, 2009; De
Smedt et al., 2013; Holloway et al., 2010; Lyons, Ansari, Beilock, 2012; Sokolowski et
al., 2016). Previous research has used effortful number processing tasks (e.g., Ansari,
2008; Dehaene, Dehaene-Lambertz, & Cohen, 1998; Fias, Lammertyn, Reynvoet,
Dupont, & Orban, 2003; Fulbright, Manson, Skudlarski, Lacadie, & Gore, 2003;
Holloway & Ansari, 2008, 2009; Moyer & Landauer, 1967) and automatic number
processing tasks (e.g., Furman & Rubinsten, 2012; Naparstek & Henik, 2010, 2012;
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Naparstek, Safadi, Lichtenstein-Vidne, & Henik, 2015; Pansky & Algom, 2002; Pavese
& Umiltà, 1998, 1999; Windes, 1968) to attempt to unravel how human adults process
symbols and quantities. Effortful processing tasks require participants to actively attend
to the presented stimuli and typically, make a decision based on these stimuli. For
example, a number comparison task where participants are presented with two numerical
magnitudes and asked to indicate which of the two numerical magnitudes has more items
is an example of an effortful number processing task (e.g., Buckley & Gillman, 1974;
Holloway & Ansari, 2009; Moyer & Landauer, 1967). Automatic processing refers to
information processing that occurs in situations where the information is not taskrelevant. An example of an automatic number processing task is the Numerical Stroop
Task. In a Numerical Stroop Task a participant is presented with two digits that differ
both in numerical magnitude and in physical size (e.g., 3 and 4) and are asked to indicate
which digit is numerically or physically larger (Henik & Tzelgov, 1982; Leibovich,
Diesendruck, Rubinsten, & Henik, 2013). When participants complete this task a socalled size congruity effect (SCE) is obtained. The SCE reflects the finding that the
dimension to which the participant does not need to attend automatically influences speed
and accuracy on the comparison task. For example, when making a physical size
judgment, on a Numerical Stroop task that includes two different Arabic numerals in
different size fonts, the numerical magnitude of the symbols being compared
automatically influences judgments of the physical size. This finding, that the semantic
meaning of a symbols affects physical size judgments, despite the fact that the
participants do not need to process the semantic meaning of the number to succeed at the
task, has been taken to suggest that the system used to process the physical size of an
Arabic numeral is overlapping with the system used to process the semantic meaning of
the Arabic numeral. Critically, although this task is useful in revealing the way humans
automatically process symbolic numerical magnitudes in relation to the non-numerical
magnitude, physical size, this paradigm cannot be used to address questions pertaining to
the difference and similarities in processing symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical
magnitudes.
An important way to advance our understanding of how (or whether) symbolic and
nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes are connected is to study the degree to which one
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automatically influences the other during processing. Currently, there is a limited
understanding of the connection between symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical
magnitudes at different levels of processing. An automatic processing (i.e., Stroop-like)
task is an ideal way to explore the link between symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical
magnitudes. If symbols and quantities are processed using the same system, then they
should automatically activate each other, but if they are not closely connected then the
processing of one format (i.e., symbol or quantity) should not activate or influence the
processing of the other format. Notably, in line with research suggesting that symbols
and quantities are not as connected as has been assumed (including chapter 2 and 3 from
the current thesis and reviewed here: Cohen Kadosh & Walsh, 2009; Sokolowski &
Ansari, 2016), it is possible that there will be an asymmetry in activation, namely that
only one of the formats will automatically activate the other. Despite years of research,
the question of whether symbolic (i.e., Arabic digits) and nonsymbolic numerical
magnitudes (i.e., quantities) influence each other in the same or an asymmetrical way has
not been examined. The current study will identify whether symbols and quantities are
processed similarly during effortful and automatic, processing.
Amongst the most frequently cited evidence to support the notion that symbols are
fundamentally linked to nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes is the finding that human
adults produce a ‘distance effect’ when making comparative judgements of both
symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes (e.g., Dehaene, Dehaene-Lambertz, &
Cohen, 1998; Holloway & Ansari, 2008, 2009; Krajcsi, Lengyel, & Kojouharova, 2016;
Moyer & Landauer, 1967; Pavese & Umiltà, 1998; van Opstal & Verguts, 2011). The
distance effect is the highly replicable finding that humans are faster and more accurate at
judging which of two numerical magnitudes is numerically greater when those
magnitudes are numerically close together, rather than far apart. There have been many
reports of similar distance effects during the processing of symbolic and nonsymbolic
numerical magnitudes that have been replicated across many studies (Buckley &
Gillman, 1974; Holloway & Ansari, 2008; Holloway, Price, & Ansari, 2010; Krajcsi,
Lengyel, & Kojouharova, 2016; Moyer & Landauer, 1967) and taken as evidence that
symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes are represented using a shared
analogue magnitude system (Dehaene, 2007; Dehaene et al., 1998). Numerical distance
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has been shown to affect effortful (Buckley & Gillman, 1974; Holloway & Ansari, 2009;
Moyer & Landauer, 1967) as well as the automatic processing of symbols and quantities
(Henik & Tzelgov, 1982; Pavese & Umiltà, 1998, 1999). The finding that numerical
distance influences automatic processing of numerical magnitudes has been taken to
suggest that the presence of a numerical distance effect is a general property of activating
a numerical magnitude, rather than a consequence of attention when processing
magnitudes. More generally, the effect of numerical distance has been used to assess the
degree to which the underlying representations that support the processing of numerical
magnitudes are overlapping and thus have been interpreted to be a measure of
representational precision (Nieder & Dehaene, 2009; Verguts & Fias, 2004). Therefore,
assessing the whether the influence of symbols and quantities on each other is modulated
by numerical distance will add to the current understanding of the connection between
symbols and quantities by identifying not only whether symbols and quantities are
processed in parallel, but also whether the representational precision of this influence is
symmetrical. In other words, we will explore whether numerical distance influences
symbols and quantities differently during effortful and automatic processing to
understand whether the representational structures supporting symbolic and nonsymbolic
numerical magnitude processing are the same or distinct.
In the current study, we assess whether symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes
are processed similarly by examining whether the processing of one format activates the
processing of the other format. We will conclude that symbols and quantities are
processed in parallel if the automatic processing of both symbols and quantities do indeed
influence the effortful processing each other. Additionally, we will conclude that
symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes are processed using the same
representational structure if the automatic influence of symbols and quantities on each
other are modulated by numerical distance in the same way. However, finding that
symbols and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes do not influence each other will be
taken to suggest that symbols and quantities are processed by distinct systems. Moreover,
the finding of an asymmetry between the processing of symbols and quantities, namely
that only one of the two dimensions automatically influences the other, or that the
automatic influence of symbols and quantities are differentially modulated by numerical
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distance will be taken as support for the idea that similar but ultimately distinct
representational systems support the processing of symbols and quantities. In the
following experiments, we examine the effortful and automatic processing of symbolic
and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes (i.e., symbols vs. quantities). Additionally, we
examine how numerical distance influences the effortful and automatic processing of
symbols compared to quantities. This study will reveal whether there is an asymmetry in
the automaticity of the processing magnitudes of different number formats.
.

4.2
4.2.1

Experiment 1
Experiment 1: Introduction

In the current study, we adapt the famous colour Stroop paradigm (Stroop, 1935), to
measure both the effortful and automatic processing of symbolic and nonsymbolic
numerical magnitudes within the same task. Stroop paradigms have been widely used in
psychology to examine the degree to which an irrelevant stimulus influences the
processing of a relevant stimulus. The original Stroop effect revealed that participants are
slower and less accurate at naming a font colour of a printed word if the meaning of the
word and font colour conflict (Stroop, 1935). For example, participants were slower and
less accurate at identifying that the font colour of a word if the font colour is different
from the semantic meaning of the printed word (i.e., red).
Previous research studies have used Stroop-like tasks to assess the automatic processing
of symbolic numbers (Henik & Tzelgov, 1982; Naparstek et al., 2015; Pansky & Algom,
2002). As discussed above, the Numerical Stroop Task, a task that requires participants to
judge which of two digits (e.g., 3 vs 5) was larger either in physical size or in numerical
magnitude, is the most widely used assessment of the automatic processing of symbolic
numerical magnitudes (Henik & Tzelgov, 1982). Results revealed that judgments of
physical size were faster than judgments of symbolic magnitude, suggesting that
participants are more efficient at effortfully processing size compared to the numerical
magnitude represented symbolically. However, physical size judgments were affected by
the numerical magnitude of the digit. Moreover, the degree to which the numerical
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magnitude of the symbol influenced the processing of the physical size was associated
with numerical distance. Specifically, physical size judgments were more influenced by
Arabic numeral pairs with relatively larger numerical distances. Therefore, in the same
way that larger numerical magnitude is more obvious when comparing two magnitudes
with a large numerical distance, larger numerical distances between two irrelevant
numerical magnitudes make the automatic influence of the irrelevant dimension more
salient. This indicates that numerical distance is automatically processed even when it is
irrelevant to form the judgment of which of two symbols is physically larger. This
finding, that numerical distance of the symbols is automatically computed during the
effortful processing of physical size, has been taken to suggest that physical size and
semantic meaning of the numerals are processed in parallel. Other research that has
examined the automatic processing of symbols and quantities presented participants with
a single array containing a quantity of symbolic digits (e.g., a single array containing six
of the Arabic digit ‘7’). Participants were instructed to compare either the symbolic or
nonsymbolic numerical magnitude in the array to the number five (comparison task), or
to indicate if the numerical quantity was an even or odd number (parity task) (Naparstek
& Henik, 2010). Results revealed that symbols influenced the processing of quantities for
both the comparison and parity tasks, whereas quantities only influenced the processing
of symbols on the comparison task. This suggests that symbols may be processed more
automatically than quantities. Critically, Naparstek and colleagues included a single array
of symbols (e.g., six of the symbol ‘7’), and asked participants to compare either the
symbol or the quantity to the number five. Therefore, in these tasks, both symbols and
quantities were being compared to a symbolic referent held in mind. Consequently, it is
possible that the asymmetry between the symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical
magnitudes is due to the fact that, for the nonsymbolic task, the participants were
comparing between formats (i.e., nonsymbolic to symbolic), whereas in the symbolic
task, participants were comparing a symbol to a symbolic referent. Consequently, in the
current study, we create a Symbolic-Nonsymbolic Stroop paradigm which allows us to
examine how symbols and quantities influence each other, without requiring a
transformation between formats, and also assess whether the influence of symbols and
quantities on each other is symmetrically modulated by numerical distance. Findings
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from the current study will illuminate whether the influence of symbols and quantities on
each other is symmetrical and will, therefore, allow us to identify whether symbols and
quantities processed separately or in parallel, and with the similar to distinct
representational precision. These findings are important to identify whether symbols are
processed using the ancient system that evolved to process nonsymbolic numerical
magnitudes, or if symbols are supported by a similar but ultimately distinct
representational system.

4.2.1.1

The Symbolic-Nonsymbolic Stroop Paradigm

In the current study, we examined whether the effortful and automatic processing of
symbolic numerical magnitudes (e.g., 3) is distinct from effortful and automatic
processing of the nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes they represent (e.g., •••) using a
Symbolic-Nonsymbolic Stroop paradigm. Critically, the stimuli in this paradigm
consisted of two quantities of symbols (e.g., 3333 vs. 444). The inclusion of two sets of
symbols and quantities in all stimuli meant that we were able to not only assess effortful
and automatic processing of symbols and quantities independently but also the influence
that symbols and quantities have on each other. During this paradigm, participants were
asked to compare adjacent arrays of number symbols (e.g., 4444 vs 333) and indicate the
side containing either the greater quantity of symbols (nonsymbolic task) or the side
containing the numerically larger symbol (symbolic task). This means that symbolic and
nonsymbolic numerical magnitude acted as both the relevant dimension (i.e., the
dimension that the participant was instructed to attend to) and the irrelevant dimension
(i.e., the dimension that the participant needed to ignore). There were congruent trials,
where the larger symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitude appeared on the same
side of the screen (e.g., 333 vs. 4444), incongruent trials, where the larger symbolic and
nonsymbolic numerical magnitude appeared on opposite sides of the screen (e.g., 3333
vs. 444), and neutral trials, where the irrelevant dimension was the same across both sides
of the screen (e.g., 3333 vs. 333 for nonsymbolic; 333 vs. 444 for symbolic). In this task,
the numerical distance between the numerical magnitudes being compared was
systematically varied across trials. The use of the Symbolic-Nonsymbolic Stroop
paradigm is optimal to test the following predictions and ultimately assess whether
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symbolic numerical magnitudes are processed in the same way as the nonsymbolic
numerical magnitudes under different attentional conditions.
We anticipate several possible outcomes for the effortful and automatic processing of
symbols compared to quantities. The first of these is that symbolic and nonsymbolic
numerical magnitudes will be processed in the same way both effortfully and
automatically. Specifically, this would mean that no difference will be observed in
participants ability to compare symbols and quantities, and symbols and quantities will
automatically influence each other in the same way. This idea is supported by research
suggesting that symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes are processed by the
same analogue magnitude processing system (e.g., Cantlon et al., 2009; Dehaene, 2007;
Dehaene et al., 1998; Nieder & Dehaene, 2009; Piazza et al., 2007). In view of research
that reports an asymmetry of the processing of symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical
magnitudes, including chapter 2 and 3 of the current thesis, (Krajcsi et al., 2016; Krajcsi,
Lengyel, & Kojouharova, 2018; Lyons et al., 2012; Lyons, Nuerk, & Ansari, 2015;
Sokolowski, Fias, Mousa, & Ansari, 2017; Vogel, Grabner, Schneider, Siegler, & Ansari,
2013) we also predict a second possible outcome. The second possible outcome is that
results will reveal an asymmetry in the processing of symbols and quantities either during
effortful processing, automatic processing, or both. For this potential outcome, we predict
that symbols will be processed more efficiently than quantities during effortful
processing and automatic processing. This prediction runs in contrast to the finding that
symbols are processed less automatically than physical size (Henik & Tzelgov, 1982).
However, we argue that enumerating a large set of discrete objects (rather than focussing
on the size of a single object) requires a greater degree of processing, and therefore will
be less efficient and less automatic. In view of this, we also predict that if there is an
asymmetry between the processing of symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes
it will be due to the fact that symbols influence the processing of quantities more than
quantities will influence the processing of symbols. Finally, based on research reporting
an asymmetry in the distance effects of symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes
(Buckley & Gillman, 1974; Furman & Rubinsten, 2012; Holloway et al., 2010; Moyer &
Landauer, 1967; Rubinsten, Henik, Berger, & Shahar-Shalev, 2002) we predict that the
effortful processing of quantities will produce a larger distance effect than the effortful
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processing of symbols. In summary, this study uses a novel task to compare the effortful
and automatic processing of symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes.

4.2.2

Experiment 1: Method

4.2.2.1

Participants

Eighty healthy adult participants (Mage=21.4, SDage=3.01; 31 males, 49 females) were
recruited at the University of Western Ontario in London, Ontario. Participants provided
written consent before participating in the study. The session took approximately two
hours and participants were compensated $5 CAD per half-hour (average $20 CAD
total). All procedures were approved by the University of Western Ontario Non-medical
Research Ethics Board (See Appendix A).

4.2.2.2
4.2.2.2.1

Materials
Symbolic-Nonsymbolic Stroop Task.

Each participant performed two kinds of magnitude comparisons on the same set of
stimuli. Stimuli were composed of two arrays of Arabic numerals (numbers 1 to 9) in a
four by four array (see Fig 1). An array contained a certain quantity of Arabic numerals
(e.g., six “6’s). The remaining spaces in the array were filled with the star symbol (*) as
has been done in previous research (Naparstek et al., 2015; Pansky & Algom, 2002), to
control for continuous properties such as area (Leibovich & Henik, 2013). Specifically,
including ‘*’ in all spaces that did not contain a symbol allowed us to keep the total area
of the numerical displays constant throughout all trials. Although this does not remove
all associations between continuous properties and quantities (i.e., the proportion of spots
filled by digits still changes based on quantity) it does control for salient continuous
magnitudes that have been reported to significantly influence the processing of
nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes, such as area, density, and convex hull (For review
see: Henik, Gliksman, Kallai, & Leibovich, 2017; Henik, Leibovich, Naparstek,
Diesendruck, & Rubinsten, 2011; Leibovich & Henik, 2013; Leibovich, Katzin, Harel, &
Henik, 2016). Twenty different versions of each array were generated using MATLAB to
ensure that participants did not learn the position of the Arabic digits within the arrays.
See figure 4.1 for an example of two arrays. The stimuli were presented using
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OpenSesame (Mathôt, Schreij, & Theeuwes, 2012), with a resolution of 800 x 600. The
stimuli, code to create the stimuli, and the OpenSesame experiments (which include trial
lists), are publicly available at on the Open Science Framework (OSF) at
https://osf.io/qyczk/.

Figure 4.1 An example of two arrays presented to participants the contain quantities of
Arabic numerals. The array on the left contains six of the Arabic numeral ‘6’, and the
array on the right contains two of the Arabic numeral ‘2’.
The participant performed both a symbolic comparison task and a nonsymbolic
comparison task on all pairs of arrays. In the symbolic task, the participant had to
indicate which array contained the numerical symbol with the larger magnitude. In the
nonsymbolic task, the participant had to indicate which array contained the greater
quantity of numerical symbols (five ‘3’s vs. two ‘2’s). In the congruent condition, the
larger symbol and the greater quantity appeared on the same side of the screen. In the
incongruent condition, the side with larger symbol appeared opposite to the side with the
greater quantity. Importantly, the participant was presented with the same set of stimuli
for the symbolic task and the nonsymbolic task for both the congruent and incongruent
conditions. In the neutral condition, the irrelevant dimension was the same across both
sides of the screen and depended on the condition. In the symbolic neutral condition, the
two arrays contained different symbolic numbers, but the quantity of symbolic numbers
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was held constant between the stimuli and matched one of the two symbolic numbers. In
the nonsymbolic neutral condition, the quantity of the symbolic numbers in the two
arrays was different, but both arrays contained the same symbolic numbers that were the
same as one of the two quantities. In the congruent and incongruent conditions, the
distance between the relevant dimension (i.e., what the participant is told to compare) and
the irrelevant dimension (i.e., what the participant must ignore) was the same and ranged
from 1-6, with 12 trials per distance. The distance between the relevant dimension in
neutral condition was matched to the congruent and incongruent conditions, and the
irrelevant dimension in the neutral condition was always 0. See Figure 4.2 for examples
of stimuli for congruent, incongruent, and neutral conditions for both the symbolic and
nonsymbolic comparison task.
Participants were randomly presented with two blocks of 216 trials (432 total trials) on
the symbolic task and on the nonsymbolic task. Of the 216 trials, 72 stimulus pairs were
congruent, 72 were incongruent, and the remaining 72 trials were neutral. Each of the 72
trials consisted of 12 trials at each of distance 1-6. Notably, only 108 of the 216 trials had
unique number pairs. The other 108 trials had the same numbers as the original 108
trials, but the numbers appeared on opposite sides of the screen. The stimuli in the
congruent and incongruent conditions were identical for the symbolic and the
nonsymbolic comparison tasks. The stimuli for the neutral conditions differed between
tasks because in the neutral condition, the irrelevant dimension was controlled to have a
distance of zero. Within a single trial, participants were presented with a fixation for 500
milliseconds (ms), then a blank screen for 300 ms. Following this, participants were
presented with two arrays (Figure 4.1) for 2000 ms or until a key response was made.
Once the participant either made a key response or the 2000 ms was up a blank screen
was presented for 500 ms. See the OSF page at https://osf.io/qyczk/.F for a list of the
trials.
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Figure 4.2 Examples of types of stimuli presented. For congruent and incongruent, the
same stimuli were used for both the symbolic and the nonsymbolic comparisons. The
stimuli for the neutral condition differed for the symbolic and the nonsymbolic
comparison conditions.

4.2.2.3

Procedure

All included measures were obtained during a single session that took approximately two
hours. During the session, participants completed a series of cognitive tasks including the
Symbolic-Nonsymbolic Stroop tasks. The symbolic-nonsymbolic Stroop tasks were
always given at the beginning of the session. Only the results from the SymbolicNonsymbolic Stroop task are reported here. Participants viewed the stimuli on one of two
identical Dell desktop machines that run Windows 8.1. Participants were seated roughly
60-70 cm from the screen, which was an 18.6 by 12.1 inch flat-screen LCD monitor with
1680 x 1050 resolution. All participants first completed both the symbolic and
nonsymbolic comparison task, but the order that the participant completed the task was
counterbalanced between participants. Each task (symbolic and nonsymbolic) began with
a practice block that randomly presented 5 of the 216 stimuli. Feedback was given at the
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end of the practice block. Participants continued to the actual experiment if they
correctly answered 4 out of 5 practice trials (i.e., 80% correct). If the participant did not
get at least 80% of the practice block correct the participant redid the practice block. The
actual experiment for each task was composed of two blocks. In each block, all 216
stimuli were randomly presented once. The participants got one break between the two
blocks.

4.2.3

Experiment 1: Results

Trials with an RT that were + or – 3SD from the mean of the trial type within an
individual were considered outliers and removed. This resulted in less than 1% of the RT
data being removed. Following this, the RTs for each trial were adjusted to reflect both
the speed and accuracy of performance. RTs and error rates were combined to produce
an efficiency score using the following formula.
𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 =

𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒
1 − 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑠

An efficiency score allows for the RTs to remain unchanged on correct trials and increase
proportionally with the number of errors. Efficiency scores are often used in the literature
(e.g., Sasanguie, Van den Bussche, & Reynvoet, 2012; Simon et al., 2008) as they
account for both speed and accuracy. Recently, it has been noted that although efficiency
scores do provide a better summary of the findings, these scores increase the variance of
the measure, and therefore, it is necessary to further check the data to ensure that the
pattern of results for the RT and accuracy is the same (Bruyer & Brysbaert, 2011). In the
current study, each of the RT and accuracy produce the same pattern of results as the
efficiency score. Consequently, all results will be reported as efficiency scores. The raw
data files are publicly available on the Open Science Framework (OSF) at
https://osf.io/qyczk/.
A three-way repeated-measures analyses of variance (ANOVA) was conducted to
examine the influence of three independent variables (task, congruency, distance) on
efficiency scores from the Symbolic-Nonsymbolic Stroop task. Task included two levels
(symbolic, nonsymbolic), congruity included three levels (congruent, neutral,
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incongruent), and distance included six levels (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6). All statistical tests were
carried out using a two-tailed test with an alpha of .05. Effect sizes were estimated using
partial 2. Mauchly’s Test of Sphericity was significant for all main effects and
interactions. Therefore, the Greenhouse-Geisser correction was used for all analyses.

4.2.3.1

Effortful Processing

The main effect of task and the interaction between task and distance was used to assess
similarities and differences in the effortful processing of symbolic and nonsymbolic
numerical magnitudes. These results assess effortful processing because these effects
collapse across conditions of congruity, functionally controlling for variability that is
attributable to the automatic processing of the irrelevant dimension. Results revealed a
significant main effect of task, F(1, 79) = 49.97, p <.001, η² = 0.39. Specifically,
participants were more efficient on the symbolic compared to the nonsymbolic task.
There was also a significant two-way interaction between task and distance F(2, 172) =
373.66, p <.001, η² = 0.83 (Figure 4.3). Post-hoc pairwise comparisons with a Bonferroni
correction for multiple comparisons with a critical p-value <.05 revealed that distance
had a stronger effect on performance on the nonsymbolic task compared to the symbolic
task. Specifically, in the nonsymbolic task, all distances were significantly different from
each other (p<.001). In the symbolic task, distances 1, 2 and 3 were significantly
different from all other distances (p<.001), distance 4 differed from distance 5 at a
threshold of p<.05 and from distance 6 at a threshold of p<.01. However, in the symbolic
task, distance 5 and distance 6 were not significantly different. Notably, there was a
significant main effect of numerical distance F(2, 190) = 1006.90, p<.001, η² = 0.93,
indicating that participants were more efficient at comparing trials with large distances
across tasks. However, this main effect should be interpreted with caution due to the
significant interaction effects. In sum, these results suggest that the effortful processing of
symbols is more efficient and less influenced by numerical distance than the effortful
processing on nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes.
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Figure 4.3 This figure depicts the effortful processing of symbols compared to quantities
across six numerical distances. Efficiency scores for the symbolic (orange) and
nonsymbolic (blue) tasks, collapsing across congruent, neutral and incongruent trials are
plotted at all six distances. Error bars represent standard error. This figure highlights the
task by distance interaction, which indicates participants are more efficient and less
influenced by numerical distance when processing symbolic compared to nonsymbolic
numerical magnitudes.

4.2.3.2

Automatic Processing

The main effect of congruity was used to assess whether symbols and quantities
influenced each other across tasks. By collapsing across conditions of task and distance,
we are controlling for differences in the effortful processing of the relevant dimension
and consequently, evaluating only the automatic influence of the irrelevant dimension.
Results revealed a significant main effect of congruity F(1, 106) = 297.64, p <.001, η² =
0.79. Post-hoc pairwise comparisons with a Bonferroni correction for multiple
comparisons with a critical p-value <.05 showed that congruent, neutral, and incongruent
trials all differed significantly from one another. Specifically, participant’s performance
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was strongest on congruent trials and weakest on incongruent trials. This main effect
reveals that, regardless of condition (i.e., making symbolic or nonsymbolic comparisons),
participants were more efficient at making comparisons when the relevant and irrelevant
stimulus dimensions were congruent compared to when they were incongruent with each
other. The fact that participants were fastest on the congruent trials suggests that the
alignment of magnitude between the relevant and irrelevant dimension improved or
facilitated performance. In contrast, the magnitude irrelevant dimension conflicting with
the magnitude of the relevant dimension was related to weaker performance. This is
evidence of an interference effect. Therefore, it follows to consider whether symbolic and
nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes influence each other in the same or distinct ways.
The two-way interaction between task and congruity, and the three-way interaction
between task, congruity, and distance were used to examine whether there were
differences in the congruity effects between tasks and whether this was modulated by
numerical distance. Results revealed that the two-way interaction between task and
congruity was not significant, F(1, 107) = 0.19, ns, η² = 0.002. However, there was a
significant three-way interaction between task, congruity, and distance, F(5, 357) =
34.51, p <.001, η² = 0.30 (Figure 4.4). Descriptive statistics for the three-way interaction
are reported in Table 4.1. These results suggest that there is a distance-dependent
asymmetry in the automatic influence of symbols and quantities. Post-hoc pairwise
comparisons with a Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons with a critical pvalue <.05 revealed that at symbols interfered with quantities across all distances, but
nonsymbolic interference was distance-dependent. Specifically, nonsymbolic interference
was significant for distances 2-6, but not for distance 1 (Figure 4.4, Table 4.2). Related
post-hoc pairwise comparisons examining the difference between distances for each
condition revealed that in the nonsymbolic task all six distances were significantly
different from each other at all congruity levels (p<.001). In contrast, for the symbolic
task the distance 5 and 6, did not significantly differ in the congruent condition, distance
4 and 5, as well as 5 and 6, did not significantly differ from each other in the neutral
condition, and distance 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 did not significantly differ from each other in the
incongruent condition. All other conditions differed significantly from each other at a
threshold of p<.05. This reveals that in addition to the nonsymbolic distance effect being
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stronger than the symbolic distance effect across congruity conditions, the symbolic
distance effects were weakest for the incongruent condition, followed by the neutral
condition, and strongest for the congruent. This suggests that the subtle distance effect in
the symbolic condition may actually be driven by the automatic influence of quantities.
Table 4.1 Descriptive Statistics for each Condition in Experiment 1.
Nonsymbolic Task
Congruity

Congruent

Neutral

Incongruent

Symbolic Task

Distance

Mean

SD

Mean

SD

1

928.0

195.8

715.8

153.3

2

761.6

164.9

651.6

132.7

3

676.7

136.5

618.0

141.9

4

620.8

128.4

590.8

136.5

5

597.4

122.1

569.8

124.0

6

575.9

104.1

561.6

123.5

1

1004.2

196.9

739.3

152.0

2

815.8

161.5

680.1

140.6

3

707.0

145.2

655.3

143.3

4

650.6

125.0

627.4

134.8

5

618.7

106.7

614.1

138.5

6

594.9

109.3

603.9

126.0

1

1174.3

264.3

762.5

155.1

2

881.5

156.2

731.8

160.6

3

777.5

140.0

718.6

151.7

4

694.8

129.2

712.6

171.2

5

662.1

127.8

699.4

164.8

6

628.5

115.9

705.4

177.8
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Figure 4.4 This figure depicts efficiency scores for symbolic (orange) and nonsymbolic
(blue) tasks at each congruity condition (congruent (darkest), neutral (medium) and
incongruent (lightest) across all six distances. Error bars represent standard error of the
mean. This figure highlights that at large distances, efficiency scores for congruent,
neutral and incongruent conditions differ significantly for both the symbolic and
nonsymbolic tasks. However, at small distances, participants have higher efficiency
scores (i.e., poorer performance) on the nonsymbolic task than the symbolic task and the
difference between congruent, neutral, and incongruent is larger on the nonsymbolic than
the symbolic task.
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Table 4.2 Bonferroni Corrected Post-hoc Pairwise Comparisons for 3-way
Interaction (Task*Congruity*Distance) for Experiment 1.
Task

Distance

1

Nonsymbolic

2

3

4

5

6

1

Symbolic

2

3

4

5

Congruity

Mean Dif

SE

P-Value

Neutral

vs

Congruent

76.21*

15.28

<.001

Incongruent

vs

Congruent

246.39*

27.24

<.001

Incongruent

vs

Neutral

170.18*

26.47

<.001

Neutral

vs

Congruent

54.18*

9.70

<.001

13.55

<.001

Incongruent

vs

Congruent

119.90*

Incongruent

vs

Neutral

65.71*

12.64

<.001

Neutral

vs

Congruent

30.27*

5.98

<.001

Incongruent

vs

Congruent

100.83*

9.91

<.001

Incongruent

vs

Neutral

70.56*

10.57

<.001

Neutral

vs

Congruent

29.83*

5.87

<.001

Incongruent

vs

Congruent

73.98*

8.46

<.001

6.74

<.001

Incongruent

vs

Neutral

44.15*

Neutral

vs

Congruent

21.37*

5.44

<.001

Incongruent

vs

Congruent

64.70*

7.57

<.001

Incongruent

vs

Neutral

43.33*

7.26

<.001

Neutral

vs

Congruent

18.99*

3.59

<.001

Incongruent

vs

Congruent

52.66*

5.08

<.001

Incongruent

vs

Neutral

33.67*

4.33

<.001

Neutral

vs

Congruent

23.50

10.61

0.089

Incongruent

vs

Congruent

46.70*

9.60

<.001

Incongruent

vs

Neutral

23.20

10.16

0.075

Neutral

vs

Congruent

28.49*

6.27

<.001

Incongruent

vs

Congruent

80.21*

7.89

<.001

Incongruent

vs

Neutral

51.72*

9.81

<.001

Neutral

vs

Congruent

37.33*

4.86

<.001

8.50

<.001

Incongruent

vs

Congruent

100.61*

Incongruent

vs

Neutral

63.28*

7.90

<.001

6.30

<.001

Neutral

vs

Congruent

36.62*

Incongruent

vs

Congruent

121.81*

10.95

<.001

Incongruent

vs

Neutral

85.19*

9.03

<.001

Neutral

vs

Congruent

44.33*

5.31

<.001
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Incongruent

vs

Congruent

129.60*

13.18

<.001

Incongruent

vs

Neutral

85.27*

12.25

<.001

Neutral

vs

Congruent

42.29*

5.61

<.001

14.30

<.001

12.43

<.001

Incongruent

vs

Congruent

143.79*

Incongruent

vs

Neutral

101.50*

Notably, the two-way interaction between congruity and distance from Experiment 1 was
also significant, F(4, 333) = 4.12, p <.01, η² = 0.05. However, these findings are not
informative as they collapse across symbolic and nonsymbolic number processing,
thereby combining effects of the relevant and irrelevant dimensions for this interaction.
In summary, the results from experiment 1 produce several key findings. First, findings
reveal that the effortful processing of symbolic numerical magnitudes is more efficient
and less affected by numerical distance compared to the effortful processing of
nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes. Second, the results from experiment 1 reveal that
symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes are both processed automatically.
Moreover, the automatic processing of symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes
influence each other. However, this automatic influence is not symmetrical. Indeed, we
find that symbolic numerical magnitudes are processed more automatically than
nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes. Specifically, irrelevant symbols influence the
processing of quantities more than irrelevant quantities influence the processing of
symbols. Additionally, in the nonsymbolic task, numerical distance affects the
processing of quantities across all levels of congruity. However, in the symbolic task, the
distance effect is greatest for congruent conditions, followed by neutral conditions, and
there is barely an effect of distance on incongruent trials. Together, these findings
provide evidence to suggest that the systems used to process symbols and quantities are
overlapping, as there is evidence that the automatic processing of one format
asymmetrically influences the effortful processing of the other format.
The findings from this study included numbers from 1-9. While this is helpful to
understand these effects across the full range of single-digit numbers, small and large
nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes are thought to be processed using distinct systems
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(Hyde, 2011), with small nonsymbolic numerical quantities being processed more
similarly to symbols. In view of this, it is necessary to examine whether these results can
be replicated when including only large nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes, that the
visual system cannot process exactly.

4.3
4.3.1

Experiment 2
Experiment 2: Introduction

Subitizing is a cognitive ability that allows for the fast, automatic, and accurate
identification of the quantity of a small set of items (i.e., sets containing 1-4 items)
(Mandler & Shebo, 1982; Trick & Pylyshyn, 1994). Large sets (i.e., sets containing 5 or
more items) are considered to be in the ‘counting range,’ as these sets are evaluated
through the effortful process of counting, or approximate estimation. The quantity of a set
of items in the subitizing range is named more quickly and accurately than the quantity of
a set of items in the counting range (Kaufman, Lord, Reese, & Volkmann, 1949; Trick &
Pylyshyn, 1993). Prior research has refuted the idea that there is a single estimation
system used to process quantities in both the subitizing and counting range and instead
supported the notion that humans possess a dedicated mechanism for processing small
subitizable quantities (Revkin, Piazza, Izard, Cohen, & Dehaene, 2008). Research has
revealed that the processing of small quantities (i.e., 1-4) is supported by a parallel
individuation system, used to track objects in order to identify the exact number of items
in small sets. In contrast, research suggests that an analogue magnitude system (often
referred to as an approximate number system (ANS)) supports the processing of
quantities with five or more objects. The analogue magnitude system uses approximate
estimation to process larger quantities (For review see: Hyde, 2011). We predict that
quantities in the subitizing range, that are processed using the PI system are processed in
a way that is more similar to symbols. Consequently, we predict that the differences
between the effortful automatic processing of symbols and quantities will be more
extreme for quantities in counting range, processed using analogue magnitude system.
In view of the fact that humans automatically perceive the exact quantity of a set in the
subitizing range, it is conceivable that nonsymbolic quantities in the subitizing range are
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more likely to activate exact representations of symbolic numerical magnitudes compared
to nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes in the counting range. The stimuli in experiment 1
included all single-digit numerical magnitudes (i.e., quantities one to nine).
Consequently, results from experiment 1, suggesting that symbolic and nonsymbolic
numerical magnitudes influence each other during the Stroop task, could be driven by
quantities in the subitizing range. In order to confirm that the Stroop effect (i.e., the
finding that symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes influence each other) is not
simply due to the fact that quantities in the subitizing range are activating exact symbolic
representations it is critical to replicate this paradigm using only numbers in the counting
range. Therefore, in experiment 2, an independent sample of participants completed a
modified version of the Symbolic-Nonsymbolic Stroop task that included only numbers
in the counting range (i.e., 5-9).

4.3.2

Experiment 2: Method

4.3.2.1

Participants

Sixty-three healthy adult participants were recruited at the University of Western Ontario
in London, Ontario. Four participants were excluded from analyses due to poor accuracy
(< 70% on at least one trial type). Therefore, all analyses for experiment two include 59
participants (Mage=23.86, SDage=3.79; 20 males, 39 females). Participants provided
written consent before participating in the study. The session took approximately one
hour and participants were compensated $5 CAD per half-hour (average $10 CAD total).
All procedures were approved by the University of Western Ontario Non-medical
Research Ethics Board (See Appendix A).

4.3.2.2
4.3.2.2.1

Materials
Symbolic-Nonsymbolic Stroop Task

Each participant completed both the symbolic and nonsymbolic version of the SymbolicNonsymbolic Stroop task with all the same parameters described in experiment one. The
trial list for experiment two differed from experiment one. Namely, the task only
included both symbols and quantities in the counting range (5-9). As with experiment 1,
the stimuli, code to create the stimuli, and the OpenSesame experiments, which include
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the trial lists, are available at on the Open Science Framework (OSF) at
https://osf.io/qyczk/.
Participants were randomly presented with two blocks of 36 trials repeated twice each
(144 total trials) on the symbolic task and on the nonsymbolic task. Of the 36 trials, 12
stimulus pairs were congruent, 12 were incongruent, and the remaining 12 trials were
neutral. Each of the 12 trials consisted of 4 trials at each of distance 1-3. Notably, half of
the 36 trials, had the same numbers as the other half, but the numbers appeared on
opposite sides of the screen. The stimuli in the congruent and incongruent conditions
were identical for the symbolic and the nonsymbolic tasks. The stimuli for the neutral
conditions differed between tasks because in the neural condition, the irrelevant
dimension was controlled to have a distance of zero. There were two versions of the task
that used different magnitudes for the trials. The versions were counterbalanced between
participants. Notably, both version A and version B of the paradigm are available on the
Open Science Framework (OSF) at https://osf.io/qyczk/.

4.3.2.3

Procedure

All included measures were obtained during a single session that took approximately one
hour, where participants completed a series of basic number processing tasks including
the Symbolic-Nonsymbolic Stroop tasks with numbers only on the counting range. Only
the results from the counting Symbolic-Nonsymbolic Stroop task are reported here. The
procedure is the same as for experiment one with the exception that participants were
randomly presented with two blocks containing the same 36 trials for each task. The
participants got one break between the two blocks.

4.3.3

Experiment 2: Results

As reported in experiment 1, the RT and accuracy produce the same pattern of results as
the efficiency score for experiment 2. Consequently, all results will be reported as
efficiency scores. As with experiment 1, the raw data files for experiment 2 are publicly
available on the Open Science Framework (OSF) at https://osf.io/qyczk/.
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A three-way repeated-measures analyses of variance (ANOVA) was conducted to
examine the influence of three independent variables (task, congruency, distance) on
efficiency scores from the Symbolic-Nonsymbolic Stroop task. Task included two levels
(symbolic, nonsymbolic), and congruity included two levels (congruent, neutral,
incongruent), and distance included three levels (1, 2, 3). Descriptive statistics for each
condition are reported in Table 4.3. All statistical tests were carried out using a two-tailed
test with an alpha of .05. Effect sizes were estimated using partial 2. Mauchly’s Test of
Sphericity was significant for the main effect of distance, and the following interactions:
task*distance, congruity*distance, task*congruity*distance. The Greenhouse-Geisser
correction was used for all analyses that violated the assumption of sphericity. As with
experiment 1, the main effect of task and interaction between task and distance was used
as a measure of effortful processing, as these analyses collapse across congruity
conditions, therefore controlling for the effect of the irrelevant dimension. The main
effect of congruity was used to assess the automatic effect of processing, as this effect
collapses across variability associated with effortful processing and distance. Finally, the
two-way interaction between congruity and task, and the three-way interaction between
congruity, task and distance were used to assess whether there are asymmetries in the
automatic processing of symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes.
Table 4.3 Descriptive Statistics for each Condition in Experiment 2
Nonsymbolic Task
Congruity

Congruent

Neutral

Incongruent

Symbolic Task

Distance

Mean

SD

Mean

SD

1

1324.8

336.5

666.0

144.9

2

1000.8

243.6

619.1

136.0

3

880.8

170.9

606.8

113.7

1

1421.7

441.5

689.4

149.1

2

1054.4

212.7

642.2

133.8

3

932.2

181.3

620.3

126.0

1

1604.1

406.6

699.7

152.0

2

1159.7

258.7

663.8

186.5

3

1031.1

176.0

649.8

135.1
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4.3.3.1

Effortful Processing

The main effect of task and the interaction between task and distance was used to assess
similarities and differences in the effortful processing of symbols and quantities. The
significant main effect of task indicated that participants were more efficient on the
symbolic compared to the nonsymbolic task F(1, 58) = 553.52, p <.001, η² = 0.91. There
was also significant two-way interaction between task and distance, F(1, 84) = 213.72, p
<.001, η² = 0.79 (Figure 4.5). Post-hoc pairwise comparisons with a Bonferroni
correction for multiple comparisons with a critical p-value <.05 revealed that distance
had a stronger effect on performance on the nonsymbolic task compared to the symbolic
task, as discovered in experiment 1. Specifically, the distances in the nonsymbolic task
were all significantly different from each other with at a p<.001. In the symbolic task,
distance 1 was significantly different from distance 2 and distance 3 (p<.001), but there
was no significant difference between distance 2 and distance 3. Notably, the main effect
of numerical distance was also significant F(2, 94) = 297.73, p <.001, η² = 0.84, with
participants most efficient at distance 3 and least efficient at distance 1 across tasks, but
this main effect should be interpreted with caution in view of the significant interactions.
Together, these results converge with results from experiment 1 to suggest that symbolic
numerical magnitudes are processed more efficiently and are less affected by numerical
distance, compared to nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes.
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Figure 4.5 This figure depicts the effortful processing of symbols compared to quantities
in the counting range across three numerical distances. Efficiency scores for symbolic
(orange) and nonsymbolic (blue) task, collapsing across congruent, neutral and
incongruent trials are plotted across all three distances. Error bars represent standard
error. This figure highlights the task by distance interaction, which indicates that
participants are more efficient and less influenced by numerical distance when processing
symbolic compared to nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes.

4.3.3.2

Automatic Processing

The main effect of congruity was analyzed to examine whether symbols and quantities
influenced each other across tasks. The significant main effect of congruity revealed that
congruent, neutral, and incongruent trials differed significantly from one another, F(2,
116) = 59.18, p <.001, η² = 0.51. Post-hoc pairwise comparisons with a Bonferroni
correction for multiple comparisons and a critical p-value <.05 showed that congruent,
neutral, and incongruent trials all differed significantly from one another. Specifically,
participant’s performance was strongest on congruent trials and weakest on incongruent
trials. This main effect indicates that at some level of processing symbolic and
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nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes influence each other, even when only including
numbers in the counting range. Therefore, we examine whether this influence of
symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes on each other is symmetrical for
numbers in the counting range.
The two-way interaction between task and congruity, and the three-way interaction
between task, congruity, and distance were used to examine whether there were
differences in the congruity effects between tasks and whether these differences were
modulated by numerical distance. In experiment 2, the two-way interaction between task
and congruity was significant, F(2, 116) = 26.09, p = <.001, η² = 0.31. Post-hoc pairwise
comparisons with a Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons with a critical pvalue <.05 revealed that symbols influence the processing of quantities more than
quantities influence processing of symbols, across all distances (Figure 4.6, Table 4.4).
Unlike the results from experiment 1, the three-way interaction between task, congruity,
and distance, was not significant in experiment 2 F(2, 136) = 2.36, ns, η² = 0.04.
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Figure 4.6 This figure depicts efficiency scores for symbolic (orange) and nonsymbolic
(blue) Stroop tasks when the symbolic and nonsymbolic stimuli are congruent (darkest),
neutral (medium) and incongruent (lightest) across all three distances. Error bars
represent standard error. This figure highlights that participants have higher efficiency
scores (i.e., poorer performance) on the nonsymbolic task than the symbolic task and the
difference between congruent, neutral, and incongruent is larger on the nonsymbolic than
the symbolic task, across all numerical distances.
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Table 4.4 Bonferroni Corrected Post-hoc Pairwise Comparisons with a 2-way
Interaction between Task and Congruity for Experiment 2
Task

Nonsymbolic

Symbolic

Congruity

Mean Dif

SE

P-Value

Neutral

vs

Congruent

67.267*

19.35

<.01

Incongruent

vs

Congruent

196.158*

23.35

<.001

Incongruent

vs

Neutral

128.891*

21.40

<.001

4.06

<.001

Neutral

vs

Congruent

20.012*

Incongruent

vs

Congruent

40.455*

5.95

<.001

Neutral

20.442*

5.38

<.01

Incongruent

vs

The two-way interaction between congruity and distance was not significant in
experiment 2, F(2, 135) = 1.33, ns, η² = 0.02. Critically, as with experiment 1, these
findings are not informative as they collapse across symbolic and nonsymbolic number
processing and congruity, thereby combining effects of the relevant and irrelevant
dimensions.

4.4

Discussion

A fundamental question in the field of numerical cognition is: are symbolic numbers
processed in the same way as nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes? To address this
question, we developed and used a Symbolic-Nonsymbolic Stroop paradigm to assess
effortful and automatic processing of symbolic and nonsymbolic numbers. By examining
whether nonsymbolic and symbolic representations automatically influence one another
we can probe how strongly they are linked. If they are strongly linked, then processing
one should activate the other. If, however, they are disconnected then they should not
influence each other, or the influence should be asymmetrical. In the SymbolicNonsymbolic Stroop paradigm we used to probe these possibilities, participants were
asked to compare adjacent arrays of symbols (e.g., 4444 vs 333) and instructed to
indicate the side containing either the greater quantity of symbols (nonsymbolic task) or
the side containing the symbol with the greater numerical magnitude (symbolic task).
This paradigm evaluates both processing of the relevant dimension (i.e., the dimension
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the participant is instructed to attend to) as well as the degree to which the irrelevant
stimulus condition influences judgments being made on the relevant condition. For
example, when comparing which side contains the numerically larger symbol (i.e., the
relevant dimension), does the actual number of symbols present (i.e., the irrelevant
dimension) influence performance? Using this approach, we found that symbolic
numerical magnitudes were processed more automatically than nonsymbolic numerical
magnitudes as both the relevant and the irrelevant dimensions.
Indeed, across conditions, participants performed better (i.e., responded faster and more
accurately) on the symbolic task compared to the nonsymbolic task. This suggests that as
the relevant dimension, symbols are processed more automatically. Additional
asymmetries were observed through much stronger distance effects during nonsymbolic
judgments compared to symbolic judgments, especially when comparisons were made in
the counting range. Critically, unlike other paradigms, this task has the capacity to
examine automaticity of processing symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes
when these number formats act as the irrelevant dimensions. By including a neutral
condition in our task, we were able to measure the extent to which the irrelevant
dimension either helped (facilitated) or hindered (interfered) task performance on the
relevant dimension. Our findings revealed an asymmetry in the interference and
facilitation patterns of symbolic compared to nonsymbolic numerical judgments.
Symbols, as compared to nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes, led to both greater
facilitation and interference effects. Notably, when including trials in both the subitizing
and counting range, as was the case in experiment 1, this asymmetry in the congruity
effects between the symbolic and nonsymbolic task is stronger for trials with small
distances. Taken together, our findings demonstrate that symbolic numerical magnitudes
are processed more automatically than nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes as both the
relevant and irrelevant dimensions. In what follows, we discuss how this finding indicates
asymmetric processing of symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes and suggest
differences in the ways in which each format is processed and potentially represented.
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4.4.1

Congruity Effects

Regardless of condition (i.e., making symbolic or nonsymbolic comparisons),
participants were more efficient at making comparisons when the two stimulus
dimensions were congruent compared to when they were incongruent with each other.
Furthermore, in the neutral condition, participants’ performance was in between that
obtained from the other two conditions, suggesting that congruent conditions facilitate
performance and incongruent conditions interfere with performance. These findings are
noteworthy in that they show the powerful effect of the irrelevant stimulus on one’s
ability to make basic numerical judgments. One interpretation of these findings is that
symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes are processed in parallel and
potentially under the same regulatory system (e.g., see Henik & Tzelgov, 1982).
Applying this line of reasoning to the current study, if symbolic and nonsymbolic
numerical magnitudes bore no relation to one another and were processed by independent
systems entirely, one would not expect to find evidence of facilitation or interference
effects. In other words, if symbolic and nonsymbolic numbers were processed using two
entirely distinct systems there would not be a Stroop-effect. Therefore, our findings
provide some evidence of parallel or simultaneous processing of symbolic and
nonsymbolic magnitudes. However, these findings should be interpreted with caution in
light of the many significant interactions discussed below. Nonetheless, these findings
align with a large body of theory and empirical findings demonstrating a close relation
between number symbols and the nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes they represent
(e.g., Cantlon et al., 2009; Dehaene, 2007; Dehaene et al., 1998; Nieder & Dehaene,
2009; Piazza et al., 2007).
However, our findings also challenge this line of research and instead suggest that
perhaps there are key differences in the ways symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical
magnitudes are processed. Indeed, our results revealed that in comparison to nonsymbolic
numerical magnitudes, number symbols (i) were processed more efficiently (i.e., faster
and more accurately) as the relevant dimension, (ii) had a greater influence on task
performance as the irrelevant dimension, and (ii) were less influenced by numerical
distance between magnitudes as the relevant and irrelevant dimension. Notably, distance
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only moderated the relationship between task and congruity when including all numbers
from 1-9, but not when only examining numbers in the counting range. We now address
each one of these points in turn and discuss the findings in terms of evidence of
asymmetrical processing of symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes.

4.4.2

Effortful processing: Effects of the Relevant Dimension

Overall, participants performed better (i.e., were more efficient) comparing symbolic
compared to nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes. Although other researchers have
reported similar findings (e.g., see Buckley & Gillman, 1974; Lyons & Beilock, 2009),
this is the first study to do so within the context of a Symbolic-Nonsymbolic Stroop
paradigm, where the task-irrelevant influence of one dimension on the other (e.g.,
symbolic on nonsymbolic) can be measured. In fact, our results run counter to findings
from the standard Numerical Stroop paradigm produces a size-congruity effect. Recall
that the standard paradigm has participants compare Hindu-Arabic digits based on either
the physical size of the numerals (e.g., 3 vs. 5) or the numerical value. Results from this
paradigm show that participants are faster at judging physical size and are less influenced
by the symbolic value of the digits than the size. The most straightforward explanation
for the discrepancy in findings is that in our task the nonsymbolic condition involves
serial processing of discrete units (i.e., the total number of number symbols present).
Conversely, the symbolic task can be approached by attending to a single unit (i.e., any
given symbol present). Thus, both the physical size and symbolic task within the
traditional Numerical Stroop paradigm is more akin to our symbolic task in which
comparisons can be made by attending to a single stimulus. This discrepancy between
the current study and previous Numerical Stroop paradigms that produce a size congruity
effect provides evidence in support of the notion that the quantity discrimination task in
the Symbolic-Nonsymbolic Stroop paradigm is capturing more than processing of
continuous magnitudes (e.g., area), an inherent confound of nonsymbolic number
comparison tasks (For review see, Leibovich & Henik, 2013). If participants were solving
the nonsymbolic task in the current study using purely a physical size strategy, one would
predict that the results would closely mirror the Size Congruity Effect, namely that like
participants are better at processing size than symbols, participants would be more
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efficient at processing nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes compared to symbols. Instead,
we find the reverse pattern of results, namely that as the relevant dimension, symbols are
processed more efficiently than nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes. Although the
finding that humans are better at effortfully processing symbols compared to quantities is
neither new (e.g, Buckley & Gillman, 1974; Lyons & Ansari, 2009), nor surprising, it
highlights the general efficiency and cultural utility of symbols and number symbols
more specifically (see Núñez, 2017).

4.4.3

Automatic Processing: Effects of the Irrelevant Dimension

As previously discussed, results revealed a congruity effect (i.e., greater efficiency in
processing congruent compared to incongruent trials) in both the symbolic and
nonsymbolic comparison conditions. Indeed, participant’s performance on comparisons
in both the symbolic task and the nonsymbolic task was most efficient when the two
stimulus dimensions were congruent, followed by when they were neutral, and
participants performance was worst on incongruent conditions. Therefore, both symbols
and the nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes that they represent are processed as the
irrelevant dimension and influence number processing of the relevant dimension. A
discussed above, the finding that the irrelevant stimulus influences the relevant stimulus
provides support for the idea that there is some parallel processing of symbols and
quantities, as there would be no effect of the irrelevant stimulus on the relevant stimulus
(i.e., no Symbolic-Nonsymbolic Stroop effect) if symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical
magnitudes were processed in serial or using two entirely distinct systems. Therefore, the
presence of a Stroop effect in the current study supports the idea that symbolic and
nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes are processed simultaneously at some stage of
processing.
Critically, however, our results also revealed important differences in how symbols
influenced and interfered with judgments of nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes
compared to the way that nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes influenced and interfered
with symbolic judgments. That is, irrelevant number symbols were found to have a much
larger impact on performance compared to when nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes
acted as the irrelevant dimension. Although many studies have reported that symbols
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influence the processing of quantities (Bush et al., 1998; Francolini & Egeth, 1980;
Morton, 1969; Pavese & Umiltà, 1998, 1999; Windes, 1968), relatively few have
examined whether quantities interfere with symbolic processing (Flowers, Warner, &
Polanski, 1979; Furman & Rubinsten, 2012; Naparstek & Henik, 2010, 2012; Naparstek
et al., 2015; Pansky & Algom, 2002). The only other study to quantify both symbolic and
nonsymbolic interference required participants to compare a quantity to a symbolic
referent (Naparstek & Henik, 2010). This study revealed that symbols interfered with
quantity processing regardless of task demands, whereas the interference of quantity
depended on the task. Results from the current study extend finding this to reveal that
this asymmetry in the automatic processing of symbols and quantities is present even in a
task that does not require participants to compare the nonsymbolic numerical magnitude
to a symbolic referent. Therefore, findings from the current study align with previous
research to suggest that while there is some overlap in the way that symbolic and
nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes are processed, symbols seem to more consistently
influence the processing of nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes.

4.4.4

Influence of Numerical Distance

As discussed above, participants perform better on comparative judgments of symbolic
compared to nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes across all distances. However, results
from the current study also highlight that in addition to symbols being processed more
efficiently than nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes, the effortful processing of symbols
is less influenced by numerical distance. This finding from the current study, namely,
that nonsymbolic processing is more influenced by distance than symbolic number
processing is has been previously reported in the literature in both adults and children
(e.g., Buckley & Gillman, 1974; Butterworth, 2005; Furman & Rubinsten, 2012;
Holloway & Ansari, 2010; Holloway & Ansari, 2008, 2009; Holloway et al., 2010;
Moyer & Landauer, 1967; Rubinsten, Henik, Berger, & Shahar-Shalev, 2002).
Several models for this discrepancy of the effect of numerical distance on effortful
symbolic and nonsymbolic number processing have been proposed. A seminal
computational model was put forward that suggests that symbolic and nonsymbolic
numerical magnitudes are transformed into cardinal representation (i.e., place-coded) by
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different pathways (Verguts & Fias, 2004). Specifically, nonsymbolic numbers are
transformed into cardinal representations through a noisy process referred to as
‘summation coding.’ The noise in this process proportionally relates to the number of
inputs being “summed.” In contrast, the summation step of this model is not required for
processing symbolic numbers, leading to sharper representations for symbolic numbers
(Verguts & Fias, 2004). This computational model, which has been supported with
empirical neuroimaging data (Holloway et al., 2010; Lyons et al., 2014; Piazza et al.,
2007; Roggeman et al., 2007), provides a compelling explanation for the discrepancies
found in the current data between the way that distance modulates the effortful
processing of symbolic compared to nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes. Notably, there
are other explanations for the differences between the processing of symbolic and
nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes. Converging recent behavioural data has indicated
that the similar behavioural effects observed in different formats of numerical magnitudes
(i.e., symbolic and nonsymbolic) do not correlate with each other (Holloway & Ansari,
2009; Krajcsi et al., 2016; Lyons, Nuerk, & Ansari, 2015), and may, in fact, be supported
by two similar, but distinct representational systems. Indeed, while nonsymbolic
numerical magnitudes are likely processed using an evolutionarily ancient analogue
magnitude system, where the ratio of the stimuli’s intensity affects performance (Weber’s
law) (Moyer & Landauer, 1967) the processing of symbols is likely supported by a
different more exact system. A proposed system that may support symbolic numerical
magnitudes is the discrete semantic system (DSS) (Krajcsi et al., 2016). In a DSS,
symbolic numerical magnitudes are stored within a large semantic network, with each
symbolic numerical magnitude acting as a node within that network. A DSS would
produce a ‘distance effect’ because the strength of the associations between symbolic
numerical magnitudes (i.e., nodes) would correlate with the strength of the semantic
relations between the numbers (Krajcsi, 2017; Krajcsi et al., 2016). Evidence that
symbolic numerical magnitudes may be supported by a DSS rather than an approximate
magnitude system has accumulated both behaviourally (Krajcsi et al., 2016, 2018) and at
the neural level of analysis (Lyons & Beilock, 2018). Data from the current study cannot
discern between various theories predicting what representations might underpin
symbolic compared to nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes. However, these data do

165

provide support for the growing body of evidence indicating that there are striking
differences in the way that symbols and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes are
effortfully processed.
The results from the current study provide some evidence to suggest that there may be an
asymmetry between symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes in the way that
distance modulates the influence of the irrelevant dimension. In experiment 1, distance
affects the influence of irrelevant quantities during the symbolic comparison more than
distance modulates the influence of irrelevant symbols during the nonsymbolic
comparison task. More specifically, numerical distance most strongly affects the
processing of symbolic numerical magnitudes when the magnitude of the symbol and the
quantity are congruent, suggesting that the influence of the congruent quantity may, in
fact, be responsible for the distance effect. Interestingly, previous research that has
examined whether distance influences the performance on nonsymbolic naming tasks and
tasks that require participant to refer to a symbolic referent revealed that when the
symbols were numerically close to the quantity that the participants had to verbally name,
there was a larger interference effect (Furman & Rubinsten, 2012; Naparstek & Henik,
2010, 2012; Pavese & Umiltà, 1998, 1999). Critically, in experiment 2, where only
numbers in the counting range were included, distance does not significantly modulate
the automatic processing of symbols or nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes. Instead,
symbols influenced the processing of quantities more than quantities influenced the
processing of symbols across all distances. In view of this, the current data suggest that
numerical distance does not influence the automatic processing of magnitude, for
numbers in the counting range. This null effect of distance on the automatic processing of
magnitude in the counting range may be due to the fact that by reducing the range of
numbers included, we removed conditions where the effect of distance on the automatic
processing of symbols and quantities diverged. Indeed, the three-way interaction from
experiment 1 was driven by the difference between automatic processing of symbols and
quantities at distance 4, 5 and 6. This suggests that distance may differentially relate to
automatic processing of symbols compared to quantities, but only in conditions where the
two numbers being compared have a large numerical distance and include magnitudes
both in the subitizing and counting range. This finding, that distance did not modulate
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the degree to which quantities influence the processing of symbols, in the counting range,
provides further evidence that nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes do not influence the
processing of numerical symbols. Indeed, even quantities with the strongest salience (i.e.,
quantities with large distances), in the counting range, do not influence effortful symbolic
number processing. Together, this research provides compelling evidence that symbols
and quantities are processed using similar, but ultimately distinct processing systems.

4.4.5

Interpretations and Future Directions

Taken together, our results provide strong evidence for asymmetrical processing of
symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes. Specifically, when we process
nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes, symbolic representations have an influence.
However, when we process symbolic magnitudes, nonsymbolic representations of
numerical magnitudes have a negligible effect. A predominant view in the field of
numerical cognition has been that symbolic number representations are formed by simply
attaching symbols to analogue nonsymbolic quantity representations (e.g., Cantlon, 2012;
Dehaene, 2007, 2008; Feigenson, 2007; Lyons & Ansari, 2009; Nieder & Dehaene, 2009;
Piazza, Pinel, Le Bihan, & Dehaene, 2007). In recent years, it has been suggested that
number symbols constitute a separate system in which processing symbols can be done
independently from accessing nonsymbolic representations of the quantities the symbols
represent. Instead, symbols may be understood based on their associations with other
symbols (For a comprehensive review see, Núñez, 2017). This view has been supported
by recent behavioural and neuroimaging research, including chapters 2 and 3 of the
current thesis, that reports that processing of symbolic numbers is at least somewhat
distinct from processing quantities (Bulthé et al., 2014; Cohen Kadosh, 2008; Lyons et
al., 2012, 2014; Lyons & Beilock, 2018). The finding from the current study, that
symbols are processed more automatically than the quantities that they represent provides
evidence that supports the notion that symbols may not simply be labels for pre-existing
representations of quantities. Indeed, the findings from the current study suggest that the
human mind does not need to access a representation of a nonsymbolic numerical
magnitude to automatically process the semantic meaning of a number symbol. Instead,
data from the current study provides evidence in support of the theory that symbols may

167

themselves be supported by culturally acquired automatic semantic representations
(Lyons & Beilock, 2018; Núñez, 2017). This convergent body of evidence that suggests
that adults process symbols more automatically than nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes,
introduces an important developmental question. Namely, it is of great importance to
learn how symbols are learned, and when in development symbols become automatic. A
longstanding question in the field of numerical cognition has been, ‘how do symbols
acquire meaning?’ However, based on this data, an equally important follow-up question
is ‘when does the symbolic system become independent?’ The use of the SymbolicNonsymbolic Stroop task in a developmental sample is ideally suited to answer this
question, as it can be used to illuminate how the representational precision (i.e., distance
effects) of symbols and quantities at different levels of processing (i.e., effortful and
automatic) change, and likely diverge, across developmental time.

4.4.6

Conclusions

In order to further our understanding of the association between evolutionary ancient,
nonsymbolic representations of numerical magnitudes and culturally constructed
symbolic representations, the current study examined whether the effortful and the
automatic processing of symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes are the same
or distinct using a Symbolic-Nonsymbolic Stroop paradigm. Results revealed that
regardless of the task, participants were more efficient at making comparisons when the
two stimulus dimensions were congruent compared to incongruent. This is could be taken
to suggest that at some stage of processing symbolic and nonsymbolic numbers are
processed in parallel; however, due to the fact that the interaction terms are significant,
this finding should be interpreted with caution. Interaction effects from the current study
revealed asymmetries in both the automatic and effortful processing of symbolic and
nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes. The key finding from the current study is that
symbols influenced nonsymbolic numerical magnitude processing more than
nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes influenced the processing of numerical symbols.
This highlights that there is an asymmetry in the way that the human mind processes
symbols and quantities. Further support for this idea that symbols and quantities are
processed distinctly is that the effortful processing of symbols was more efficient and less
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affected by numerical distance than quantities. Additionally, numerical distance
modulated nonsymbolic interference more than it modulated symbolic interference when
including all numbers (1-9). However, numerical distance did not influence the automatic
interference of symbols or quantities for numbers in the counting range. These data
provide support for the idea that there is an asymmetry in the way that humans process
symbolic compared to nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes, even during non-effortful,
automatic processing. Together, these findings, that symbols are processed more
automatically than numerically equivalent nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes, suggests
that processing symbols do not require accessing a representation of quantity. Instead, it
seems that the human mind has the capacity to automatically process the semantic
meaning of a number symbol. These findings contribute to efforts to forge a deeper
understanding of how the mind forms a symbolic number processing system that is
independent of the approximate, analogue magnitudes that the symbols represent.

4.5
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Chapter 5
Children’s Verbal Number Knowledge Influences Their
Attention to Numerical Quantity

5

5.1
5.1.1

Introduction
Learning Verbal Number Words

The ability to count a set of objects is a foundational skill that supports many
mathematical concepts and procedures. The process of learning to count involves
learning the number words sequence (Fuson, Richards, & Briars, 1982) and acquiring
several key principles of counting (Gelman & Gallistel, 1978). It typically takes children
several years to master counting skills. At roughly two years of age, children have
learned the count sequence by rote, but do not yet understand the meaning of these verbal
number words (Wynn, 1990; Wynn, 1992). It typically takes children two to three years
from the time they master the count list to acquire the cardinal principle, namely the
understanding that the last number counted when counting a set, refers to the total
number of objects within that set (Gelman & Gallistel, 1978). Children who do not know
the cardinal meaning of any number words are referred to as “pre-knowers.” Following
this, children learn the exact number word meanings of small numbers (i.e., numbers 1-4)
in predictable stages before they acquire the cardinal principle (Wynn, 1992). Children
who know the meaning of the word one are referred to as “one-knowers.” Several months
later, children progress to being “two-knowers”. Over time, children become “threeknowers” and some studies report the presence of “four-knowers.” Children who know
the meaning of the verbal number words one to four, but not the cardinal principle, are
collectively referred to as “subset-knowers”. Cardinal Principle knowers (CP-knowers)
are qualitatively different from subset knowers in that they can generate cardinality for all
numbers using their knowledge of the cardinal principle (Le Corre & Carey, 2007). It is
only once children have acquired the cardinal principle that they are considered to
understand the meaning of number words. The acquisition of the cardinal principle is a
major milestone in forming numerical understanding and predicts later mathematical
abilities (Geary et al., 2018).
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5.1.2

Linking Number Words to Quantities

It has been heavily debated whether acquiring the cardinal principle is a cause or a
consequence of the ability to process nonsymbolic quantities (e.g., Batchelor, Keeble, &
Gilmore, 2015; Dehaene, 2007; Gunderson et al., 2015; Le Corre & Carey, 2007; Mix,
1999, 2008; Mussolin, Nys, Leybaert, & Content, 2014; Negen & Sarnecka, 2015;
Shusterman et al., 2016, 2017; Slusser & Sarnecka, 2011; Slusser, Ditta, & Sarnecka,
2013; Wagner & Johnson, 2011). Previous studies have shown that children who have
acquired the cardinal principle are more successful than pre-knowers and subset-knowers
in several nonsymbolic number tasks (Abreu-Mendoza, Soto-Alba, & Arias-Trejo, 2013;
Mussolin, Nys, Content, Leybaert, & Leybaert, 2014; Shusterman et al., 2016; Wagner &
Johnson, 2011). For example, pre-school aged children’s knowledge of the cardinal
principle related to their ability to discriminate between arrays of quantities (Wagner &
Johnson, 2011). Similarly, when asked to sort cards based on colour, shape and
quantities, all children could sort based on colour and shape, but only CP-knowers were
able to sort based on quantity (Slusser & Sarnecka, 2011). Critically, other research has
hinted at the idea that some children are able to link verbal number words onto small sets,
even before they have acquired the cardinal principle (Le Corre & Carey, 2007).
Specifically, some children are able to map between nonsymbolic quantities and the
number words that they stood for, even if they do not yet grasp the cardinal principle
more generally (Batchelor, Keeble, et al., 2015; Mix, 1999, 2008). Notably, due to small
sample sizes, the majority of studies that assess the relation between verbal number
knowledge and nonsymbolic quantity processing collapse across knower-level groups
(Batchelor et al., 2015; Le Corre & Carey, 2007; Mix, 2008; Negen & Sarnecka, 2015;
Sarnecka & Wright, 2013; Shusterman et al., 2017; Slusser et al., 2013). This solution
may mask important differences within a heterogeneous group. Despite this, researchers
have concluded that there is indeed a link between verbal number knowledge and
nonsymbolic quantity processing, but it remains unknown whether it is learning
individual verbal number words or acquiring knowledge of the cardinal principle that
drives this link.
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Regardless, the existence of the link between verbal number knowledge and nonsymbolic
quantity processing has recently been questioned. Tightly controlled experimental
studies indicate that verbal number word knowledge and nonsymbolic numerical abilities
may be correlated because some experimental designs inadvertently allow children to
correctly identify which of two arrays of two dots is more numerous by estimating the
amount of surface area the dots take up rather than identifying the quantity of dots
(Negen & Sarnecka, 2015; Rousselle, 2004). Indeed, the correlation between verbal
number knowledge and nonsymbolic quantity processing disappears when the task
includes a control that does not allow children to rely on cues from non-numerical
magnitudes (such as the amount of surface area taken up by the dots) (Negen & Sarnecka,
2015). An example of a task that controls for non-numerical magnitudes in a task with
nonsymbolic stimuli that includes conditions where a relatively smaller quantity of dots
occupies a greater amount of surface area. In view of this, it is conceivable that nonnumerical magnitudes, such as physical size, may be more salient features of sets than
quantity for young children. In the current study, we aim to address the questions: ‘do
young children attend to quantity or size?’ and ‘does children’s learning of number words
affect whether children attend to number or size?’
Importantly, this finding, that forcing children to compare dots using quantity (rather than
non-numerical cues) leads to chance performance across knower-levels, suggests that
preschool-aged children may not yet have a clear concept of what ‘quantity’ is, and
therefore may not understand the instruction to ‘choose the side with more dots’. This is
concerning because the vast majority of studies that have examined the link between
verbal number knowledge and nonsymbolic number processing in young children have
used tasks in which children are explicitly asked to compare quantities (e.g., AbreuMendoza et al., 2013; Batchelor et al., 2015; Dehaene, 2007; Gunderson et al., 2015; Le
Corre & Carey, 2007; Mix, 1999, 2008; Mussolin, Nys, Leybaert, et al., 2014; Negen &
Sarnecka, 2015; Shusterman et al., 2016, 2017; Slusser & Sarnecka, 2011; Slusser et al.,
2013; Wagner & Johnson, 2011). A relatively smaller body of research has developed
and used non-directive number tasks to assess individual differences in the degree to
which children spontaneously focus their attention on quantities (SFON) (Baroody & Li,
2016; Baroody, Li, & Lai, 2008; Hannula & Lehtinen, 2005; Hannula, Räsänen, &
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Lehtinen, 2007). In these studies, the term “spontaneous” refers to the idea that the
process of focusing on quantity is un-cued by an experimenter and therefore selfinitiated. The use of SFON-like paradigms overcomes a key limitation within this large
body of literature, namely that experimenters cannot know for certain whether a child
understands the instruction to choose the array with the greater numerosity. Additionally,
SFON-style tasks have the advantage that it is possible to compare the degree to which
children attend to quantity, to related dimensions (such as physical size). Consequently,
the use of a SFON-like paradigm is ideal to assess 1) whether children spontaneously
attend to quantity or physical size, and 2) evaluate whether verbal number knowledge
affects the degree to which children attend to quantity vs. physical size.

5.1.3

The Current Study

Recent theories predict that acquiring verbal number knowledge may change the way
children attend to discrete quantities in their environment (Barner, 2017; Merkley &
Ansari, 2016), but this has not yet been tested empirically. Therefore, the goal of the
current study is to investigate how number word knowledge relates to the way children
spontaneously attend to number and size. To do so, we developed the train task, a task
that can be used to investigate whether preschool-aged children attend to discrete quantity
or physical size, without being cued to either. The train task is a SFON-like paradigm that
requires a child to build a train that is the “same” as a train built by the experimenter. In
the train task, the child and the experimenter have sets of blocks that differ in length.
These blocks are used to build trains with varied numbers of cars. Therefore, the child is
only able to make a train that matches the experimenter’s train based on either the
number of cars or the length of the train, but not both. The train task was developed and
used to measure whether children use a number strategy or a physical size strategy on a
matching task when they are not explicitly cued to either strategy. The second question
that the current study examines is how verbal number word knowledge relates to the use
of number and size strategies on the train task. Examining the relation between verbal
number knowledge and use of a number, compared to a size strategy on the train task,
addresses the key question of whether having a symbolic referent in a child’s mind
affects the degree to which he or she attends to number.
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We anticipated four distinct possible outcomes for the way that children may respond to
the train task. The first is that all children will use a number strategy, regardless of verbal
number knowledge. This idea is supported by research suggesting that children are born
with an innate number sense and automatically perceive discrete numerosity (Dehaene,
2007). In direct contrast is the prediction that all children will use a size strategy
regardless of verbal number knowledge. This is supported by the notion that nonnumerical magnitudes may be more salient to young children than discrete quantities
(Henik, Leibovich, Naparstek, Diesendruck, & Rubinsten, 2011; Leibovich et al., 2017;
Merkley, Thompson, & Scerif, 2016; Negen & Sarnecka, 2015; Szűcs, Nobes, Devine,
Gabriel, & Gebuis, 2013). The third potential outcome is that CP-knowers will attend to
number, whereas subset-knowers will attend either to size or neither number nor size.
This is supported by research suggesting that the acquisition of the cardinal principle
fundamentally changes the way that children process quantities (Abreu-Mendoza et al.,
2013; Mussolin, Nys, Content, et al., 2014; Wagner & Johnson, 2011). Finally, it is
possible that acquiring knowledge of each individual number word changes the way that
children process that particular quantity. For example, a child who knows the meaning of
the verbal number words one and two might use a number strategy for trains that have
one or two cars, but not trains with three or more cars. This hypothesis is supported by
data that suggests that knowing individual symbolic numbers relates to children’s ability
to attend to those numbers (Batchelor et al., 2015; Slusser & Sarnecka, 2011). In
summary, this study uses a novel task to investigate the degree that children use number
and size strategies during an un-cued matching task, and how the acquisition of verbal
number words affect the degree to which children used these strategies.

5.2
5.2.1

Methods
Participants

One hundred forty children between the ages of 2-2 and 6-0 (years-months) were
recruited to participate in this study. Of the 140 children whose parents consented for
their child to participate, three children were excluded because they refused to participate,
thirteen children were excluded due to failing at least one out of the two practice trials on
the train task, four children were excluded because their parent or teacher explicitly told
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them to “count” or “use numbers” while completing the train task, and one child was
excluded due to being the only pre-knower remaining in the sample. The final dataset
consisted of 119 children (Meanage = 4.05, SDevage = 0.84; Females = 51, Males = 68;
Age Range = 2-2-6-0 years). The non-medical research ethics board at the University of
Western Ontario approved all procedures (See Appendix A). Written consent and assent
were obtained from all legal guardians and children.
This sample size was based on an a priori power analysis, calculated using G*Power 3.1,
for a split-plot three-way ANOVA examining the effect of knower-level, train length, and
strategy type on the proportion of strategy use. The parameters used to calculate the
required sample size include an effect size of 0.25, an alpha error probability of .05, and a
power of 0.99. This a priori power analysis revealed that the required sample size was
n=50 with a minimum of 10 participants per knower-level group (1-knower, 2-knower, 3knower, 4-knower, CP-knower). One hundred and nineteen participants were collected as
this was how many children were needed to ensure the smallest group (1-knowers) had
ten usable participants.

5.2.2
5.2.2.1

Materials
The Train Task

The train task is a novel paradigm that measures whether children choose to use a number
or a size strategy on a matching task when it is not possible to match on both. This task
required a child to build a train that “matches” a train built by an experimenter. The task
was played on a premade board, with a premade engine block leading the row of blocks
for every example. The board contained two parallel train tracks with an engine at the
front (see Figure 5.1A). There were three sizes of blocks for this task; small (3cm x 3cm
x 4cm), medium (3cm x 3cm x 6cm) and large (3cm x 3cm x 9cm). All three block sizes
were the same height and width. The small blocks were two thirds the length of the
medium blocks and the medium blocks were two thirds the length of the large blocks (see
Figure 5.1B). During the experiment, the child was given nine medium-sized blocks, and
the experimenter had two medium-sized blocks, five small blocks, and five large blocks.
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Figure 5.1 A) Dimensions of the board used for the train task. B) Dimensions of the three
sizes of blocks used for the train task.
To begin the task, the experimenter built a train using two medium blocks on his or her
own side of the board. The experimenter then said “I want you to make your train the
same as mine. I will show you using your blocks.” The experimenter used two of the
child’s medium blocks to build the same train (with two blocks behind the engine) on the
child’s side of the board. The child was then asked, “is your train the same as my train”?
Once the child acknowledged that the experimenter’s train and their train were the same,
the experimenter conducted two practice trials. In the first practice trial, the experimenter
built a train using a single medium block and said, “make your train the same as mine”.
The child then used his or her blocks to build a train with one block. If the child did not
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understand the instructions, the experimenter tried one or both of the phrases “make your
train match mine,” or “make your train just like mine.” In the second practice trial, this
was repeated using two medium blocks. Subsequently, the experimenter began
experimental trials. Children who failed one or both practice trials (i.e., did not put one
block down for the first practice trial and two blocks down for the second practice trial)
completed the experimental trials but were excluded from analyses.
The experiment included 20 experimental trials. In each trial, the experimenter made a
train using one to five blocks that were either all small blocks or all large blocks. The
experimenter said, “make your train the same as mine.” The child tried to match their
train to the experimenter’s, using their medium-sized blocks. The child completed the
task by 1) making his or her train have the same number of blocks as the experimenter’s
train (i.e., number strategy), 2) making his or her train the same length as the
experimenter’s train (i.e., size strategy), or 3) making his or her train in a way that does
not match on number or on length (i.e., incorrect). Once a child finished building each
train, the experimenter confirmed that the child believed that the trains matched. The
experimenter did not provide feedback and then began the next trial.
The 20 trials in the experiment were grouped into four blocks of five trials. Within a
single block, the five trials included the experimenter building each of five different train
lengths (one-five). Therefore, there were four trials (one in each block) for each of the
five train lengths, meaning that a trial with each train length was built once in a block for
a total of four times in the task. For train length one (i.e., building a train with a single
block), the experimenter always used the large block. However, trials that include trains
with a single block (i.e., train length 1) were excluded from analyses because it is not
possible to tell whether a child is matching based on number or size for this train length.
For all other train lengths (two-five), experimenters presented two trials using small
blocks and two trials using large blocks. For example, a train made of four blocks was
built twice using the small blocks and twice using the large blocks in a completed data
set. There were four versions of the trial lists in which the order of blocks and the trials
within the blocks were randomized. Children who completed fewer than 10 trials were
excluded from analyses.
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The following formula was used to compute a score to determine the normalized
frequency of trials a child used a number strategy, and a size strategy for each train length
(two to five).

1) 𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑 𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑦 =
(

𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑦 𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑑
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑠 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑑

)×

(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡)
𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑦 𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑑

2) 𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑 𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑦 = (𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑠 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑑 ) ×
(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡)
Below is an example of a calculation to compute the proportion that a child used a
number strategy for train length of two if he or she completed all four trials and used a
number strategy on two of the trials.
𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑦 𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛 𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ 2
)
= (
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑠 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛 𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ 2
× (𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑠 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛 𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ 2 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡)
2
= ( )× 4=2
4
Critically, if a child uses a number strategy for half of the trials, it does not mean that the
child was at chance. For each trial, children have nine blocks with which to build their
train. Therefore, the probability of a child using a number strategy by chance for a single
trial is 1/9.

5.2.2.2

Give-a-Number Task

The give-a-number task (Give-N) is a widely used instrument that measures verbal
symbolic number knowledge (Wynn, 1990). In the current study, the child was presented
with 10 blocks and was asked to feed some number of these blocks to a finger puppet
named Dino (who likes to eat blocks), by placing them on a plate. Typically, the
experimenter says to the child, “can you feed Dino n blocks?” After the child finished
placing the blocks on the plate the experimenter asked the child a single question: “is that
n blocks?” If the child said no, the experimenter responded, “Dino really wants n blocks,
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can you make it n?” This is continued until the child confirmed that he or she believed n
blocks to be on the plate. The experimenter initiated the trials by asking for one block. If
the child was successful in feeding Dino one block, then the experimenter asked for three
blocks. If the child was successful, the experimenter asked for one more block. If the
child was unsuccessful, the experimenter asked for one fewer block. The experimenter
increased or decreased the number of blocks in this way until the child correctly gave a
certain number of blocks (n blocks) twice, and incorrectly n + 1 blocks twice. The
knower-level of the child was inferred as the highest number that the child correctly gave
twice. For example, a child who correctly fed Dino three blocks twice and incorrectly fed
Dino when asked for four blocks twice was considered a three-knower. Children who
correctly gave five or more blocks at least twice were considered cardinal-principle
knowers.

5.2.3

Procedure

All participants were recruited through preschools, daycares, schools and family care
centres in London, Ontario. The participants worked individually with an experimenter to
complete the tasks. All participants first completed the train task to avoid any potential
biases or priming of numbers that were present in the Give-N task. Participants were
randomly assigned the trial order version for the train task. Following the completion of
the train task, experimenters performed the Give-N task with the participant to assess
knower-level of a child. The participants completed an additional two short assessments
that were not analyzed for the current study. These two tasks included 1) children were
asked to count as high as they could, and 2) children completed a basic instruction
following task where the experimenter asked the children to touch their head or their toes
eight times in a random order. The entire session took approximately 30 minutes. All
participants received a certificate and stickers at the end of the testing session.

5.3

Results

The present study examined whether verbal symbolic number knowledge is related to the
type of strategy used in the train task across four of the five different train lengths.
Notably, for train length one, responding with a single block means that the participant
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and experimenter’s trains matched in both size and number. Therefore, trials with train
length “one” were excluded from all analyses. The give-N task was used to determine
each participant’s verbal symbolic number knowledge (i.e., knower-level). Of the 119
children who participated in the study, 10 children were one-knowers, 14 were twoknowers, 19 were three-knowers, 13 were four-knowers, and 63 were cardinal principle
knowers (CP-knowers). The train task was used to determine the degree to which
children spontaneously used a number strategy and size strategy. Each participant had 10
scores from the train task. Specifically, five scores were given for the proportion of a
number strategy used for each of five train lengths, and five scores were given for the
proportion of a size strategy used for each of five train lengths.
A three-way split-plot analysis of variance (ANOVA) was computed to examine how the
proportion of number and size strategies used at different train lengths relates to knowerlevel. The within-subject variables were strategy (number vs. size) and train length (2
blocks, 3 blocks, 4 blocks, 5 blocks). The between-subject variable was knower-level (1knower, 2-knower, 3-knower, 4-knower, CP-knower).
Levene’s test of homogeneity of variance was performed on each level of the betweensubjects factor to assess the equality of variances between the means of the groups. The
Levene’s test for the proportion of number used at train length three F(4, 114) = 3.96, p =
.005, and four F(4, 114) = 3.74, p = .007 and proportion of size used at train length two
F(4, 114) = 4.44, p = .002, were significant. The Levene’s test of equality of variance for
the proportion of number used at train lengths 2, and 5, and for the proportion of size
used at train lengths 3, 4, and 5, were not significant. Mauchly’s test of sphericity
revealed that the current data violated the assumption of sphericity for both train-length,
W = .79, X2 = 26.09, p = <001, Greenhouse-Geisser = .89, and the interaction between
strategy and train-length W = .79, X2 =26.73, p = <.001, Greenhouse-Geisser = .86.
Therefore, all subsequent analyses are reported using Greenhouse-Geisser adjusted
values.
An examination of the main effect of strategy is used to distinguish between hypothesis 1
and 2, namely whether children are more likely to use a number strategy or a size strategy
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across train lengths and knower-levels. Results revealed a significant main effect of
strategy, F(1, 114) = 4.87, p = 0.03, partial η2 = 0.04, that indicated that children of all
knower-levels used a number strategy (Mean = 1.53, Standard Error = 1.08) more often
than they used a size strategy (Mean = 1.10, Standard Error = 0.10) across all train
length trials (Figure 5.2). This supports the idea that in general children are more likely to
use a number strategy over a size strategy.

*

Figure 5.2 A) Main effect of strategy. Children use a number strategy significantly more
than a size strategy *p<.05.
The two-way interaction examining whether the use of a number strategy over a size
strategy is modulated by knower-level was used to measure whether verbal number
knowledge related to strategy use (hypothesis 3). Results revealed that the interaction
between strategy and knower-level was not significant F(4, 114) = 1.55, ns. This suggests
that across train lengths, there is no effect of knower-level on strategy use.
Therefore, an examination of the three-way interaction was used to assess whether the
use of a number strategy over a size strategy at different train lengths differs as a function
of knowledge of each individual number word (hypothesis 3). The 3-way interaction
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between strategy, train length and knower-level was significant F(10, 293) = 4.56, p =
<.001, η2 = 0.138, (Figure 5.3). This finding reveals that train length influenced whether
children were more likely to use a number strategy or a size strategy differently at each
knower-level. Post-hoc pairwise comparisons with a Bonferroni correction for multiple
comparisons were included to examine simple main effects. For one-knowers, there was
no significant difference between the use of a number strategy and length strategy at any
train length. Two-knowers used a number strategy more than a size strategy for train
length two (p = .001), but there was no significant difference for train lengths three, or
four. Two-knowers used a size strategy more than a number strategy for train length five
(p = 0.018). Three-knowers used a number strategy more than a size strategy at train
lengths two (p <.001), and three (p = .008) but there was no significant difference in
strategy use for train length four or five. Four-knowers also used a number strategy more
than a size strategy at train lengths two (p <.001), and three (p = .024), but not train
length four. Four-knowers used a size strategy significantly more than a number strategy
for train length five (p < .001). CP-knowers used a number strategy more than a size
strategy at train lengths two (p < .001), and three (p < .001). There was no significant
difference in strategy use for CP-knowers on train length four. CP-knowers used a size
strategy significantly more than a number strategy for train length five (p < .001). These
results suggest that children who are one-knowers, two-knowers and three-knowers were
more likely to use a number strategy for train lengths within their knower-level.
Additionally, all children except 1-knowers and 3-knowers used a size strategy
significantly more than a number strategy for train length five. Notably, four-knowers
and CP-knowers displayed similar patterns of strategy use to three-knowers in that they
were more likely to use a number strategy than a size strategy for train lengths two and
three.
Therefore, this significant three-way interaction indicates that acquiring knowledge of
each individual number word changes the way that a child processes that particular
number, particularly for small numbers (two and three). For example, two-knowers are
more likely to use a number strategy for trains that have two blocks but not trains with
three or more blocks.
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Figure 5.3 Three-way interaction of strategy by knower-level by train-length. Children
are more likely to use a number strategy when building a train where the length of the
train is within their knower-level. *p<.05, **p<.001.
There were several main effects and two-way interactions that did not correspond to the
hypotheses presented in the introduction but are reported here for completeness.
Specifically, there was a significant main effect of knower-level, F(4, 114) = 29.30, p =
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<.001, partial η2 = 0.51, which showed that use of a strategy (number or size) increased
as knower-level increased. The main effect for the length of train was also significant
F(3, 305) = 28.24, p <.001, partial η2 = 0.20, revealing that the use of any strategy
(number and size) decreased as train lengths increased. The two-way interaction between
train length and knower-level was not significant F(11, 275) = 1.33, ns, indicating that
there is no difference in the degree to which children use either strategy (number or size)
across train lengths and between knower-levels. Finally, the two-way interaction
between strategy and train length was significant F(3, 293) = 68.29, p <.001, partial η2 =
0.38, revealing that the use of a number strategy compared to a size strategy differed
depending on the length of the train being built across all children. Post-hoc pairwise
comparisons with a Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons revealed that children
used a number strategy significantly more than a size strategy for train length 2 (p <.001),
and 3 (p = .001). There was no difference in the use of a number vs. a size strategy for
train length 4. Children used a size strategy significantly more than a number strategy for
train length 5 (p <.001) (Figure 5.4). This finding suggests that children’s strategy use is
dependent on the length of the train they are matching, across all knower-levels.
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Figure 5.4 Two-way interaction of strategy by train-length. Children are more likely to
use a number strategy when building a train with a length of two or three blocks.
Children and are more likely to use a size strategy when building a train with a length of
five blocks. *p<.05, **p<.001.
As knower-level is often correlated with age, an additional control analysis was
computed to determine whether the effects from the previous analysis were driven by
knower-level and not by age. A three-way split-plot analysis of covariance (ANCOVA)
was computed to examine how the proportion of number and size strategies used at
different train lengths relates to knower-level while controlling for age. The within and
between-subject variables were the same as the ANOVA reported above for strategy
(number vs. size), train length (2 blocks, 3 blocks, 4 blocks, 5 blocks), and knower-level
(1-knower, 2-knower, 3-knower, 4-knower, CP-knower). The covariate was age. Results
from this control analysis revealed that all effects from the original three-way split-plot
ANOVA were unchanged when age was included as a covariate.
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In sum, the results from experiment 1 support those proposed in outcome four, namely
that learning verbal number words changes the way that children engage with numerical
quantities in the environment, but only for small quantities (i.e., train length two and
three). For trains with five cars, most participants used a size strategy more than a
number strategy.

5.4

Discussion

The current study examined a) whether children attend to number or physical size when
not explicitly cued to either and b) whether verbal number knowledge influences strategy
choice on a novel matching task. In view of previous research, we anticipated four
distinct potential outcomes for how children would respond to the train task. First, as
supported by research suggesting that children are born with an innate number sense
(e.g., Dehaene, 2007), it was possible that all children would use a number strategy,
regardless of verbal number knowledge. In direct contrast, research highlighting the
salience of continuous magnitudes to young children (e.g., Leibovich et al., 2017)
supports the outcome that all children would use a size strategy, regardless of verbal
number knowledge. It was also possible that children who have acquired the cardinal
principle would attend to number, whereas children who have not yet acquired the
cardinal principle would attend either to size or neither number nor size. Indeed, this
prediction was supported by the replicable finding that the acquisition of the cardinal
principle fundamentally changes the way that children process quantities (AbreuMendoza et al., 2013; Mussolin, Nys, Content, et al., 2014; Wagner & Johnson, 2011).
Our fourth and final anticipated outcome was that verbal number knowledge of each
individual number word would change how a child processed that particular quantity.
Results broadly aligned with outcome one, namely, that children used a number strategy
more than a size strategy (with the exception of trains with five cars, where children used
a size strategy more than a number strategy). However, the degree to which children used
a number strategy more than a size strategy increased as a function of children’s
knowledge of the cardinality of the count word that corresponded to the number of blocks
in the train that they were instructed to match, specifically for small quantities. This
suggests that, as proposed in outcome four, learning verbal number words that correspond
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to small quantities changes the way that children engage with numerical quantities in the
environment. Specifically, number symbols may be a tool for guiding children’s
behaviour on a task in which number and size are in conflict.

5.4.1

Learning Verbal Number Words Changes Attention and
Behaviour
Although there is a main effect demonstrating that children use a number strategy

more than a size strategy to complete the train task, this effect is further modulated by the
individual child’s number word knowledge. In particular, children’s use of a number
strategy over a size strategy increased as knower-level increased, particularly for small
numbers (i.e., quantities two and three). This highlights that greater knowledge of verbal
number words corresponds to greater use of a number strategy, particularly for small
numbers. The current study uses a SFON-like task to examine the effect of verbal number
knowledge on spontaneously attending to numerical quantities. Previous research has
shown that children’s verbal number knowledge relates to explicit nonsymbolic number
processing abilities (e.g., Le Corre & Carey, 2007; Mix, 1999, 2008). Indeed, when
explicitly cued, subset-knowers (i.e., children with some verbal number word knowledge,
but who have not yet learned the cardinal principle), can map small numbers (e.g., 1-4) to
quantities (Le Corre & Carey, 2007). Relatedly, subset-knowers were able to make
magnitude comparisons between dot arrays and verbal number words if they understood
the meaning of those verbal number words (Batchelor, Keeble, et al., 2015). Subsetknowers can also successfully judge numerical equivalence of small quantities (Mix,
1999, 2008), and have some basic understanding that number words pertain to discrete,
but not continuous quantities (Slusser et al., 2013). This research suggests that children
can link small number words to the quantities before they have acquired the cardinal
principle. The present findings build on this research, to evaluate whether children who
can link verbal number words to quantities actually use this knowledge in a non-directed
task.
Findings from the SFON literature reveal that spontaneously attending to quantities
correlates with symbolic number abilities. Specifically, individual differences in SFON
predict counting ability (Hannula et al., 2007) as well as subsequent mathematical
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knowledge (Batchelor, Inglis, & Gilmore, 2015; Hannula & Lehtinen, 2005; Nanu,
McMullen, Munck, Hannula-Sormunen, & Hannula-Sormunen, 2018). Critically,
previous SFON research has assessed counting using measures of procedural abilities.
Moreover, while previous SFON studies include dimensions aside from number (such as
colour or shape), these dimensions are not inherently correlated with quantity processing
like size. By using a SFON-like task where participants can use number or size, and
including a measure of conceptual verbal number knowledge, rather than procedural
verbal number knowledge, we discovered that children who have verbal number
knowledge, choose to use a strategy that relies on this knowledge for small numbers. This
finding suggests that children use their number word knowledge even when they have not
been cued to use it and when there is another strategy (size) available to solve the
problem. Specifically, the findings revealed that one-knowers, two-knowers and threeknowers are more likely to use a number strategy than a size strategy if the child knows
the verbal number word that corresponds to the number of blocks in the train. For
example, a two-knower was more likely to use a number strategy than a size strategy for
trains with one block or two blocks, but not for trains with three, four or five blocks.
However, This finding significantly extends previous research that has highlighted that
children can link quantities to verbal number words for which they have learned the
meaning (Batchelor, Keeble, et al., 2015). Specifically, the present data reveal that
children are more likely to use a number strategy when building a train where the length
of the train is within their knower level.
As previously discussed, the null finding that children do not use a number
strategy for trains with quantities above their knower-level does not necessarily mean that
children are unable to process quantities for which they do not yet know the label. In
other words, the current data cannot speak to whether children perceive number. Indeed,
it has been reported that infants have the ability to track one to three objects using the
parallel individuation (PI) system (Feigenson & Carey, 2003, 2005; Xu, 2003). This data
suggests that preschool-aged children who do not yet know their number words could
complete the task by matching quantity using the PI system, but they do not do so. The
current study measured children’s behaviour, and specifically, the frequency with which
children use number to guide their behaviour. Consequently, the term ‘attends’, in this
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context, refers to the degree to which children use a number strategy. Therefore, the
results from the current study align with outcome four to suggest that the acquisition of a
semantic label (i.e., a verbal number word) strengthens the degree to which a child
accesses and uses their conceptual knowledge of exact quantity to guide their behaviour
in a situation that does not explicitly require them to integrate that knowledge into their
behaviour.

5.4.2

Acquisition of the Cardinal Principle

The third potential outcome predicted for the current study was that children who have
acquired the cardinal principle would attend to number, whereas children who have not
yet acquired the cardinal principle would attend either to size or neither number nor size.
This hypothesis is supported by research suggesting that the acquisition of the cardinal
principle fundamentally changes the way that children process quantities (AbreuMendoza et al., 2013; Mussolin, Nys, Content, et al., 2014; Slusser & Sarnecka, 2011;
Wagner & Johnson, 2011). For example, ability to approximately estimate which of two
quantities has more dots on an ‘approximate number task’ has been linked to the
acquisition of the cardinal principle (Mussolin, Nys, Content, et al., 2014; Wagner &
Johnson, 2011). Knowledge of the cardinal principle has also been associated with
children’s ability to be fair (i.e., share equally) (Chernyak, Harris, & Cordes, 2018) and
successfully extend number words from one set to another based on quantity. This body
of research suggests that the acquisition of the cardinal principle fundamentally changes
the way children conceptualize quantities. Results from the current study conflict with
this conclusion. Indeed, our findings suggest that it is not becoming a cardinal principleknower that changes the way children attend to quantity, but instead, learning individual
numbers (i.e., shifting from a 1-knower to a 2-knower) relates to changes in the way
children approach the train task. Moreover, children who know some numbers (e.g., fourknowers) but have not yet acquired the cardinal principle, produce a pattern of results that
aligns more closely with CP-knowers than children who are just beginning to learn
number words (i.e., one-knowers). Thus, the current study indicates that it is the process
of acquiring labels for representations of quantities (i.e., verbal number words), rather

198

than acquiring knowledge of the cardinal principle, that relates to changes the way that
children attend to quantity in the absence of explicit cues.
Many previous studies that examined verbal number knowledge had small sample sizes
in each knower-level group (Batchelor, Keeble, et al., 2015; Le Corre & Carey, 2007;
Mix, 2008; Negen & Sarnecka, 2015; Sarnecka & Carey, 2008; Sarnecka & Wright,
2013; Shusterman et al., 2017, 2016; Wagner & Johnson, 2011). To overcome power
issues, researchers grouped together knower-level groups in several small groups (e.g., 1
and 2-knowers vs. 3 and 4-knowers) (Batchelor et al., 2015; Le Corre & Carey, 2007;
Sarnecka & Carey, 2008) or one large group (i.e., subset-knowers vs. CP-knowers) (Mix,
2008; Negen & Sarnecka, 2015; Sarnecka & Wright, 2013; Shusterman et al., 2017) for
statistical analyses. Results from the current study highlight that learning each verbal
number word influences the way that children attend to quantities. This indicates that a
group of “subset-knowers” is a heterogeneous group. In view of this, future research that
explores differences between knower-level groups should acquire a large enough sample
size to analyze each knower-level group separately.

5.4.3

Two-Systems of Nonsymbolic Cognition

When examining the patterns of results from the current study, it is important to note that
most children use a size strategy more than a number strategy on trains with five blocks.
Indeed, the complete pattern of results from the current study reveal that children use a
number strategy more than a size strategy for small quantities (i.e., up to three) if they
know the corresponding verbal number word, number and size strategies are used equally
frequently for trains with four blocks, and a size strategy is used more than a number
strategy on trains with five blocks.
A possible explanation for why children might consistently be using a size strategy more
than a number strategy for trains with longer lengths (i.e., five blocks), is that children
may be using two distinct systems to process small and large train lengths. It has been
suggested that humans have two systems that represent nonsymbolic quantities (for
review see, Hyde, 2011). These systems include 1) the parallel individuation system (PI),
used to track objects in order to process the exact amount of small sets of objects (i.e.,
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quantities of one-four), and 2) the approximate number system (ANS), which uses
approximate estimation to process larger quantities (i.e., quantities greater than four).
Here we speculate that perhaps children are more likely to use a number strategy for
trains with a small number of cars because they can track the exact number of cars in the
train using parallel individuation. In contrast, a size strategy is perhaps the more salient
strategy for trains with a greater number of blocks because these trains are processed
using approximate estimation. Indeed, as trains with larger lengths have more items than
can be processed using the PI system, the quantity of blocks in the trains can be
processed using either automatic estimation or effortful counting. Therefore, we speculate
that perhaps CP-knowers do not use a number strategy for long train lengths because an
approximate size-based strategy aligns more closely with the system used to process the
train.

5.4.4

Flexibility of Strategy

The finding that CP-knowers use a size strategy for trains with five cars, even when they
know the verbal number word for five aligns with a related body of work that reveals that
young children are more exploratory in their behaviour than are adults (Gopnik, 1996;
Gopnik, Griffiths, & Lucas, 2015; Gopnik et al., 2017; Gopnik & Wellman, 2012;
Plebanek & Sloutsky, 2017). Younger children outperform older children on learning
tasks such as remembering information that the experimenter did not cue the participant
to attend to, (Plebanek & Sloutsky, 2017; Sloutsky & Fisher, 2004) and learning atypical
abstract causal principles from patterns of evidence (Gopnik et al., 2015). Authors of
these studies have suggested that younger minds are intrinsically more flexible, and
consequently more exploratory. It is perhaps for this reason that data from the current
study revealed that children use a size strategy for a particular trial type when they likely
have the ability to use a number strategy for that trial type.
In view of this, it is logical that children who know their verbal number words will be
able to flexibly switch between a number strategy and size strategy, depending on which
strategy is optimal to solve the problem. We discuss above that a number strategy may
be more challenging to use for trains with five cars, as quantities with five or more
objects are supported by the ANS, rather than the PI system. However, a size strategy
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may also be a less cognitively demanding strategy to solve the problem for trains with
five cars because trains number and size are correlated. This means that, in order to
match a train on quantity, the participant must inhibit the fact that the two trains are
different lengths and trains with more cars differ more in length. Critically, size has been
reported to influence attention even when it is the irrelevant dimension (i.e., when
participants are told to ignore the size of an object) (Henik & Tzelgov, 1982; Henik,
Gliksman, Kallai, & Leibovich, 2017; Leibovich, Diesendruck, Rubinsten, & Henik,
2013). In the train task, although the size of the child’s individual blocks consistently
differs from the experimenter’s blocks at a ratio of 2 cm to 3 cm, the absolute length of
the train is inherently related to the number of blocks included in the train (Leibovich &
Henik, 2013). For example, in a trial where the experimenter uses large blocks (length 9
cm) and the child uses medium blocks (length 6cm), the absolute length of a train with
two blocks would be 12 cm for the child and 18 cm for the experimenter (i.e., the
absolute length difference is 6 cm). In contrast, if the experimenter uses large blocks
(length 9 cm) and the child uses medium blocks (length 6cm) to build a train with five
blocks, the absolute length of the child’s train would be 30 cm and the absolute length of
the experimenter’s train would be 45 cm (i.e., the absolute length difference is 15 cm).
Therefore, to match based on number requires a child to inhibit the difference of the
absolute length of the two trains to a greater degree for trains with more blocks. In view
of this, it is conceivable that on trials with more blocks, less effort is required for a child
to use a size strategy compared to inhibiting the absolute length difference between the
two cars, in order to use a number strategy.
The key pattern of results from the current study (that children are more likely to use a
number strategy if they know the verbal number word corresponding to the train length)
is driven by one-knowers, two-knowers, and three-knowers. Four-knowers and CPknowers produce the same pattern of results as three-knowers. A potential explanation for
this finding is that children flexibly shift to a size strategy on trains with four or five
blocks to avoid the challenging task of inhibiting absolute length. Critically, future
research should examine whether adjusting the absolute length of the trains, for those
with more blocks, affects whether children use a number or a size strategy.
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5.4.5

Conclusions

Learning the meaning of verbal number words is a slow process that sets a critical
foundation for young children’s numerical thinking. The key finding of the current study
is that preschool-aged children were more likely to use a number strategy than a size
strategy if they knew the verbal number word that corresponded to the number of cars
comprising the train they were asked to match, particularly for small numbers. Results
also revealed that children are more likely to use a size strategy than a number strategy
for trains with five cars. Together, this study revealed that acquiring verbal number word
knowledge may fundamentally affect the way that young children attend to quantities. In
summary, this research provides a concrete example of how learning symbols influence
behaviour within the domain of early number processing.
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Chapter 6

6

General Discussion

The capacity to estimate and discriminate between nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes
(e.g., the number of objects in a set) emerges early in development and is shared with
non-human species (Cantlon, 2012; Dehaene, 2007; Dehaene et al., 1998; Nieder &
Miller, 2004). Consequently, this ability to represent and process nonsymbolic numerical
magnitudes is assumed to be evolutionarily ancient and biologically endowed. In
contrast, the uniquely human capacity to process numbers symbolically has emerged
relatively recently in human history and is acquired through enculturation (Ansari, 2008;
Coolidge & Overmann, 2012). The ability to conceptualize and use symbolic numbers is
a necessary foundation for higher-level mathematical thinking, which is essential to a
successful society (Bynner & Parsons, 1996; Duncan et al., 2007; Romano et al., 2010).
The culturally mediated process of learning symbolic numbers is thought to be rooted in a
pre-existing, innate and evolutionarily ancient abstract number processing system that
evolved to process nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes (Brannon, 2006; Dehaene, 2007;
Dehaene et al., 2003; Nieder & Dehaene, 2009).
However, a growing body of recent evidence suggests that systems used to process
symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes may be more distinct than previously
assumed (Ansari, 2007; Bulthé, De Smedt, & Op de Beeck, 2014; Cohen Kadosh &
Walsh, 2009; Lyons, Ansari, & Beilock, 2012, 2014; Lyons & Beilock, 2013;
Sokolowski & Ansari, 2016). These data conflict with the notion that numbers are
processed entirely abstractly. Despite years of research, the question of whether symbolic
numerical magnitudes are processed using the evolutionarily ancient system that evolved
to process nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes remains unanswered. To address this
question, this thesis examined the relationship between symbolic and nonsymbolic
numerical magnitude processing at the neural level in human adults. Additionally, this
thesis explored how symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitude processing is
influenced by the participant’s attentional state, and how the relationship between
symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitude processing changes across
developmental time. In the following sections, I will discuss the results of the four
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empirical chapters presented in this thesis and relate these findings to other data and
theories in the field. Following this, I will discuss the general limitations of these studies,
implications of the findings, and future directions.

6.1
The Neural Correlates of Symbolic and
Nonsymbolic Numerical Magnitude Processing
In recent years, there has been substantial growth in neuroimaging studies investigating
the neural correlates of symbolic (e.g., Arabic numerals) and nonsymbolic (e.g., dot
arrays) numerical magnitude processing. At present, it remains contested whether
numbers are represented abstractly, or if number representations in the human brain are
format-dependent (for review see: Cohen Kadosh, 2008). In chapter 2 of the current
thesis (Sokolowski, Fias, Mousa, & Ansari, 2017), I used activation likelihood estimation
(ALE) to conduct the first quantitative meta-analysis to synthesize all neuroimaging
papers that examined symbolic and/or nonsymbolic numerical magnitude processing in
the human adult brain. Results of this empirical chapter revealed that across all
neuroimaging papers there are convergent areas of activation that are common to
symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitude processing. More specifically,
conjunction analyses intended to quantify brain regions that supported both symbolic and
nonsymbolic numerical magnitude processing revealed overlapping activation for
symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitude processing in regions along the frontal
and parietal lobes. This finding of overlapping activation for symbolic and nonsymbolic
numerical magnitude processing is consistent with the idea that there are regions in the
human brain that process numerical magnitudes abstractly (Cantlon, 2012; Dehaene,
2007; Dehaene et al., 1998; Piazza et al., 2007). However, there were also brain regions
that were specifically associated with either symbolic or with nonsymbolic numerical
magnitude processing. Specifically, contrast analyses revealed anatomically distinct
frontoparietal activation associated with symbolic and with nonsymbolic numerical
magnitude processing. These findings that symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical
magnitudes are supported by distinct brain regions are consistent with the notion that
regions within the human brain processes numbers in a format-dependent way (Bulthé et
al., 2014; Cohen Kadosh, 2008; Holloway et al., 2010; Lyons et al., 2014; Lyons &
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Beilock, 2013; Sokolowski & Ansari, 2016). Specifically, these contrast analyses
revealed that the representations supporting symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical
magnitudes may be lateralized within the partial cortex. Indeed, the meta-analysis
reported in chapter 2, implicated the left angular gyrus as potentially important for
supporting symbolic numerical magnitude processing, whereas the right superior parietal
lobule may be important for processing nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes (Sokolowski
et al., 2017). Unsurprisingly, this finding of lateralization of symbolic compared to
nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes in the parietal cortex at the meta-analytic level aligns
with findings reported in many individual empirical studies (For review see: Sokolowski
and Ansari, 2016). Together, data from this chapter reveals that symbolic and
nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes are sub-served by both format-dependent and
abstract neural systems, thus suggesting that some components of the evolutionarily
ancient system used to process nonsymbolic magnitudes may be repurposed for the
processing of symbols. However, due to several key inherent methodological limitations
of meta-analyses that are discussed in the following paragraph, even the findings of
overlapping activation for symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes, reported in
chapter 2, cannot be used to conclude that symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical
magnitudes are processed in the same way, using a single evolutionarily ancient system.
The use of ALE methodology in chapter 2 is valuable because the algorithm can be used
to extract regularities across a large set of empirical studies with vastly different
methodologies. However, when using meta-analytic techniques, it is challenging to
account for differences in statistical thresholding, spatial extent, and magnitude of
activations across regions of activation both within and between studies (Arsalidou &
Taylor, 2011; Christ et al., 2009; Di Martino et al., 2009; Ellison-Wright et al., 2008).
Additionally, there are many limitations within the empirical studies that comprise the
meta-analysis in chapter 2. For example, the majority of the studies included in the metaanalysis 1) did not adequately control for non-numerical magnitudes and 2) used active
task designs. The lack of control for non-numerical magnitude processing means that the
system being examined, that is assumed to be an abstract number processing system,
may, in fact, be a general magnitude processing system used to processing both
numerical and non-numerical magnitudes (Cantlon, Platt, & Brannon, 2009; Sokolowski,
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Fias, Ononye, & Ansari, 2017; Van Opstal & Verguts, 2013; Walsh, 2003). Relatedly, the
use of these active tasks makes it impossible to conclude whether the overlapping brain
regions that support symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes is a consequence
of abstractly processing the magnitude or if this overlapping activation relates to decision
making, motor processing or task difficulty (Göbel et al., 2004). In view of these
limitations, it was critical to identify the neural correlates of symbolic and nonsymbolic
numerical magnitude processing in a single set of participants using a paradigm that
controls for non-numerical magnitude processing and activations associated with active
tasks.
In chapter 3 of the current thesis, I presented data from an experimental fMRI study in
which I assessed whether symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitude processing is
supported by overlapping neural activation when controlling for confounds associated
with active tasks and non-numerical magnitudes. Specifically, I developed and used an
fMRI adaptation paradigm that isolated the representations of symbolic numerical
magnitudes, nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes, and physical size (a non-numerical
magnitude), in forty-five human adults. Results from this chapter indicated that the neural
correlates associated with the passive viewing of numerical symbols were distinct from
the neural correlates that were associated with the passive viewing of nonsymbolic
numerical magnitudes and physical size. Surprisingly, no brain region was significantly
activated by the passive viewing of both symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical
magnitudes. Passive processing of symbolic numerical magnitudes correlated with
activation in the left superior parietal lobule, whereas the processing of both nonsymbolic
numerical magnitudes and physical size correlated with activation in the right
intraparietal sulcus. This finding aligns with results from chapter 2 as well as previous
research that reports hemispheric lateralization of symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical
magnitude processing within the parietal cortex. Data from chapter 3 also provide novel
evidence to suggest that the overlapping brain regions that support symbolic and
nonsymbolic numerical magnitude processing, reported in chapter 2, as well as previous
studies (e.g., Dehaene et al., 1998; Dehaene, 2007; Cohen Kadosh, 2008; Sokolowski and
Ansari, 2016), may be due to overlapping task demands, and consequently may not be
indicative of an abstract number processing region. Notably, results from chapter 3 also
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revealed that symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes are distinct at the
representational level, in addition to spatially. Specifically, representational similarity
analyses (RSA) were conducted within regions of interest derived from regions that
exhibited overlapping activation for symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitude
processing in chapter 2. These RSA analyses revealed that the passive processing
symbolic numerical magnitudes exhibited dissimilar normalized patterns of activation
compared to the passive processing of nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes in the regions
of interest in both the left and right parietal lobes. Notably, the patterns of activation
associated with nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes and were practically
indistinguishable from the patterns of activation associated with the non-numerical
magnitude, physical size. Therefore, the results from chapter 3 suggest the system used
to process symbolic numerical magnitudes are quite distinct from the system that is used
to process nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes in human adults. Additionally, these
results provide evidence in support of the idea that the evolutionarily ancient system used
to process nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes may be a general magnitude processing
system rather than a specific abstract number processing system (For other research
supporting the idea that numbers are processed using a general magnitude system see:
Cantlon, Platt, et al., 2009; Cohen Kadosh et al., 2008; Sokolowski, Fias, Bosah Ononye,
et al., 2017; Walsh, 2003).
In summary, the results from chapter 2, revealed overlapping and distinct regions of
activation for symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitude processing when
extracting regularities across a large set of attentional task demands. However, using a
paradigm that removed confounds associated with active task demands (i.e., chapter 3)
revealed that symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitude processing may be even
more distinct than previously assumed. These findings challenge the longstanding belief
that the culturally acquired ability to conceptualize symbolic numbers is rooted in an
evolutionarily ancient system that evolved to support nonsymbolic numerical magnitude
processing. Moreover, these data revealed that the system used to process nonsymbolic
numerical magnitudes may actually be a general magnitude processing system used to
process nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes and non-numerical magnitudes.
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6.2
Attentional Conditions Affect the Processing of
Symbolic and Nonsymbolic Numerical Magnitudes
Although the two methodologies reported in chapter 2 and chapter 3 are useful for
developing our understanding of the way the human brain represents symbolic and
nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes across multiple methodologies, and in the absence of
task demands, they do not identify how different attentional conditions affect symbolic
and nonsymbolic numerical magnitude processing. Key findings from research exploring
symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitude processing reveal that although both
symbolic and nonsymbolic magnitudes can be processed automatically, whether or not
they are processed automatically depends upon their relevance to the task at hand
(Furman & Rubinsten, 2012; Naparstek & Henik, 2010, 2012; Naparstek et al., 2015;
Pansky & Algom, 2002). In other words, the degree to which a task requires a participant
to attend to a symbolic and a nonsymbolic numerical magnitude affects the processing of
the stimuli. In Chapter 4 of the current thesis, I explore the degree to which symbolic
compared to nonsymbolic numerical magnitude processing is influenced by attentional
demands of the task.
In chapter 4, I developed and used a Stroop-like paradigm to assesses the effortful and the
automatic processing of symbolic numerical magnitudes compared to nonsymbolic
numerical magnitudes. In this paradigm, participants (NStudy1 = 80, NStudy2 = 63)
compared adjacent arrays of number symbols (e.g., 4444 vs 333). Participants were
instructed to indicate which side contained either the greater quantity of symbols
(nonsymbolic task) or the numerically larger symbol (symbolic task). This manipulation
allowed for both symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes to act as the relevant
dimension and the irrelevant dimension. The aspect of the stimulus that the participant
was instructed to focus on was considered the relevant dimension and was used to assess
effortful processing, whereas the aspect of the stimulus that participant could ignore
when making the comparison was referred to as the irrelevant dimension and was used as
a measure of automatic processing. Results revealed that the effortful processing of
symbolic numerical magnitudes is more efficient (i.e., faster and more accurate) and less
affected by numerical distance than the effortful processing of nonsymbolic numerical
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magnitudes. These results converge with findings from previous research that examined
the effortful processing of symbolic compared to nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes
using tasks that did not include an irrelevant dimension Holloway & Ansari, 2009;
Holloway et al., 2010; Lyons & Ansari, 2009; Moyer & Landauer, 1967). Results from
chapter 4 also provided novel evidence that, as the irrelevant dimension, symbolic and
nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes both automatically influenced processing, but
symbolic numerical magnitudes influenced the processing of nonsymbolic numerical
magnitudes more than nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes influenced the processing of
symbolic numerical magnitudes. Moreover, numerical distance influenced the automatic
processing of nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes more than it influenced the processing
of symbolic numerical magnitudes. Together, these findings indicate that symbolic
numerical magnitudes are processed more automatically that nonsymbolic numerical
magnitudes.
The finding that symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitude processing influence
each other aligns with the dominant perspective in the field of numerical cognition that
the same system is used to process symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes
(e.g., Cantlon et al., 2009; Dehaene, 2007; Dehaene et al., 1998; Nieder & Dehaene,
2009; Piazza et al., 2007). However, taken together, the results from chapter 4 provide
strong evidence that the processing of symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes
is asymmetrical. Indeed, symbolic numerical magnitudes are processed more
automatically than nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes. This finding could be taken to
suggest that symbols may not simply be labels for pre-existing representations of
nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes. Moreover, these data suggest that a representation of
a nonsymbolic numerical magnitude does not need to be accessed to automatically
process the semantic meaning of a symbolic numerical magnitude. In view of this, it
should be considered that symbols may not be supported by a system that evolved to
process nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes, but instead, by a superficially similar but
ultimately distinct system (Lyons & Beilock, 2018; Núñez, 2017).
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6.3

A Symbolic Number System

The predominant view in the field of numerical cognition is that symbolic numerical
magnitudes are processed using the system that evolved to process nonsymbolic
numerical magnitudes (e.g., Cantlon, 2012; Dehaene, 2007, 2008; Feigenson, 2007;
Lyons & Ansari, 2009; Nieder & Dehaene, 2009; Piazza, Pinel, Le Bihan, & Dehaene,
2007). However, the findings presented in chapter’s 2, 3 and 4 of the current thesis align
with the growing body of data that indicate that symbolic numerical magnitudes are
processed using a system that is distinct from the evolutionarily ancient system that is
thought to support nonsymbolic numerical magnitude processing in the adult human
brain (e.g., Krajcsi et al., 2016; Lyons et al., 2012, 2014). In view of this, it has been
suggested that number symbols constitute a separate system in which the processing of
symbols can be performed independently from accessing nonsymbolic representations of
the quantities the symbols represent (Krajcsi, 2017; Krajcsi et al., 2018; Lyons et al.,
2014; Lyons & Beilock, 2018; Núñez, 2017). This idea, that symbols constitute their own
system and can be conceptualized without accessing representations of associated
nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes motivations the question: what is the representational
structure of the symbolic number system? In the following two paragraphs I speculate on
the representational structure of the symbolic number system.
A key element of numerical symbols that differentiates them from the nonsymbolic
numerical magnitudes that the symbols represent is that while nonsymbolic numerical
magnitudes can only be represented approximately, symbols can and in fact must be
represented exactly. Therefore, while nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes may be
processed using an analogue number system (ANS), in which the representations are
noisy or approximate (Cantlon, 2012; Dehaene, 2007; Dehaene et al., 1998; Moyer &
Landauer, 1967) the processing of symbols is likely supported by a different more exact
system. Broadly, it has been suggested that symbols are understood based on their
associations with other symbols (For a comprehensive review see, Núñez, 2017). A
discrete semantic system (DSS) has been proposed as a potential candidate for a system
that represents symbolic numbers (Krajcsi et al., 2016). The DSS operates using a
network that resembles a conceptual network or mental lexicon. In the DDS system,
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symbolic numerical magnitudes are stored within a network with each symbolic
numerical magnitude acting as a node. The strength of the connections between the
nodes (i.e., the symbolic numerical magnitudes) would be proportional to the strength of
the semantic relations between the numbers, thus producing a distance effect. Recent
behavioural data assessed whether symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitude
processing is more likely to be sub-served by a single system or two distinct systems
(Krajcsi, 2017). Krajcsi and colleagues argued that if nonsymbolic and symbolic
numerical magnitudes are supported by the same system, the distance and size effects
should correlate with each other within formats, and the symbolic distance and size
effects should correlate with the nonsymbolic distance and size effects. Results revealed
that while distance and size effects correlate with each other for nonsymbolic numerical
magnitude processing, the distance and size effects did not correlate with each other for
symbolic numerical magnitude processing. Moreover, the nonsymbolic effects (distance
and size) did not correlate with the symbolic effects (Krajcsi, 2017). In view of this, it is
more likely that nonsymbolic and symbolic distance effects are sub-served by distinct
systems. This data converges with other related research to support the finding that
nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes are supported by an approximate number system,
whereas symbolic numerical magnitudes are supported by the DSS (Krajcsi, 2017;
Krajcsi et al., 2016, 2018; Lyons et al., 2015). This growing body of research supports
the idea that a semantic network model may be a better candidate than the evolutionarily
ancient approximate number system to explain the processing of symbolic numerical
magnitudes in human adults.
At the neural level, the representational patterns of activation that underpin symbolic
numerical magnitude processing is dissimilar to the representational patterns of activation
that support nonsymbolic numerical magnitude processing (Bulthé et al., 2014; Damarla
& Just, 2013; Lyons et al., 2014). Indeed, the representational structure of the neural
activity that supports the processing of nonsymbolic numerical magnitude aligns with
predictions of representational structures that would arise from nonsymbolic numerical
magnitude processing being supported by an analogue approximate number system.
Specifically, the representation patterns of activation associated with the nonsymbolic
numerical magnitudes relate to each other as a function of ratio (Bulthé et al., 2014;
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Damarla & Just, 2013; Lyons et al., 2014). In contrast, the patterns of neural
representations supporting symbolic numerical magnitude processing do not vary
systematically as a function of ratio (Bulthé et al., 2014; Damarla & Just, 2013; Lyons et
al., 2014). Instead, the representational structure of symbolic numerical magnitude
processing aligns with a semantic network model in which symbolic numerical
magnitudes operate like discrete categories that relate to one another based on lexical
frequency (Lyons & Beilock, 2018). Although this work is in its infancy, the
combination of this behavioural and neuroimaging data provides compelling evidence
that symbolic numerical magnitude processing is supported by a semantic
representational system rather than the evolutionarily ancient approximate number
system that supports nonsymbolic numerical magnitude processing in human adults. The
findings from the current thesis, that symbols are processed more distinctly from
nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes both at the neural and behavioural level in adult and
children lends further support to this account.

6.4

The Emergence of Symbolic Thinking

The majority of research reviewed above indicating that symbolic and nonsymbolic
numerical magnitudes are supported by two distinct systems has been conducted in
human adults and older children, who have already learned the semantic meaning of
symbolic numerals. However, in order to have a comprehensive understanding of the
system that supports the processing of symbolic numerical magnitudes, it is necessary to
explore how children acquire an understanding of the semantic meaning of these arbitrary
symbols. Indeed, this question of how children acquire the semantic meaning of a symbol
(such as a number word), often referred to as the “symbol-grounding problem,” is a key
problem within the field of numerical cognition (Leibovich & Ansari, 2016), and
cognition more broadly (Coolidge & Overmann, 2012; Harnad, 1990).
Based on the dominant theory in the field of numerical cognition (Dehaene et al., 1998;
Dehaene, 2007; Cantlon, 2012), that an evolutionarily ancient approximate number
system supports the processing of both symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes,
it has been predicted that children learn the meaning of symbolic numerical magnitudes
by mapping an arbitrary symbolic label onto the pre-existing representation supporting
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the corresponding nonsymbolic numerical magnitude (For review see: Leibovich and
Ansari, 2016). However, the growing body of evidence, including from chapters 2-4 of
this thesis, reveal that symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes are likely
supported by distinct systems suggests that the acquisition of symbolic number
processing may not be a straightforward mapping of symbols onto pre-existing
representations.
Indeed, based on the finding that symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes are
supported with distinct systems, it is conceivable that the acquisition of the semantic
meaning of symbolic numerical magnitudes actually constrains the pre-existing
representations that support nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes (Barner, 2017; Merkley
& Ansari, 2016). More specifically, it can be hypothesized the process of learning the
semantic meanings of number words influences how salient the property of quantity is to
a child when interacting with a nonsymbolic numerical magnitude (Barner, 2017;
Merkley & Ansari, 2016). In other words, learning the semantic meaning of number
words may direct children’s attention toward discrete quantities as a relevant dimension
to attend to when examining and interacting with a set of objects that contains a variety of
other non-numerical dimensions, such as non-numerical magnitudes, colours, and object
types (Merkley, Scerif, & Ansari, 2017; Mix, Levine, & Newcombe, 2016). Taking a
developmental approach to explore how acquiring knowledge of symbolic numerical
magnitudes relates to the processing of nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes is a key
avenue to enhance our understanding of how humans process symbolic and nonsymbolic
numerical magnitudes across developmental time.
Consequently, in chapter 5 of the current thesis, I used a developmental approach to
explore whether the acquisition of verbal number words relates to the degree to which
children spontaneously attend to nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes in the world.
Specifically, I developed and used a matching task called, “The Train Task,” to measure
whether children spontaneously used a number strategy or physical size strategy to build
a train that “matched” a train built by an experimenter. During this task, an experimenter
built a train using five or fewer blocks using sets of blocks where the length of the child’s
blocks differed from the length of the experimenter’s blocks. The experimenter then said
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to the child “make your train the same as mine”. Results revealed that for small numbers
(i.e., train’s that were made of two and three blocks) preschool-aged children used a
number strategy on trials for which they knew the verbal number word that corresponded
to the number of blocks that made up the train. However, children used a size strategy
more than a number strategy on trials with five blocks, regardless of verbal number
knowledge. These data indicate that verbal number word knowledge relates to the degree
to which preschool-aged children attend to nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes,
specifically for small numbers. Together, this suggests that when children learn the
semantic meaning symbolic numerical magnitudes, it changes the way that they attend to
small nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes in the world.
This finding from chapter 5, that children’s performance on a nonsymbolic numerical
magnitude matching task is be limited by their knowledge of the meaning of number
words provides support for developmental theories (Barner, 2017; Merkley & Ansari,
2016; Mussolin, Nys, Leybaert, et al., 2014) suggesting that learning the semantic
meaning of symbols might affect the processing of nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes.
Moreover, while this data cannot speak to whether children can conceptualize
nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes prior to acquiring knowledge of symbolic numerical
magnitudes, it certainly suggests that children who do not have knowledge of symbolic
numerals do not spontaneously attend to nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes. In
summary, the findings from this study relate to previous research in the field to support
the idea that the evolutionarily ancient capacity to process nonsymbolic numerical
magnitudes and the culturally acquired capacity to process symbolic numerical
magnitudes are related across development (For review see: Mussolin et al., 2014).
However, the findings from the current study also provide novel evidence for the less
explored idea that learning the semantic meaning of symbolic numerical magnitudes,
(i.e., forming a symbolic number system) may actually refine approximate
representations of nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes.

6.5

Implications

Together, the four studies reported in this thesis provide novel insights into the
relationship between symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes in both children
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and adults. Several of the studies in this thesis identify how this relationship between
symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes can be influenced by an attentional
state. The key finding from the data presented in the current thesis is that the way
humans process symbolic numerical magnitudes is quite distinct from the way humans
process nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes. Specifically, the behavioural and neural
signatures associated with processing symbolic numerical magnitudes diverge from those
that are associated with the processing of nonsymbolic magnitudes across methodologies,
attentional conditions, and developmental periods. These findings, namely that the
culturally acquired symbolic number system is more distinct from the evolutionarily
ancient nonsymbolic numerical magnitude system than previously assumed has several
important implications for how to support children’s learning of early mathematical
concepts.
The dominant assumption in the field, that symbols are learned by mapping arbitrary
symbolic labels onto pre-existing representations of quantities has led researchers to
attempt to improve symbolic numerical abilities by training students on nonsymbolic
numerical magnitude processing (Hyde, Khanum, & Spelke, 2014; Kuhn & Holling,
2014; Obersteiner, Reiss, & Ufer, 2013; Park & Brannon, 2013; Sasanguie et al., 2013).
Overall, there is no conclusive evidence that training nonsymbolic numerical magnitude
processing improves symbolic mathematical competence (For review see: Szűcs &
Myers, 2017). The findings reported in the current thesis supporting the idea that
symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes are processed using distinct systems
help illuminate why these nonsymbolic numerical magnitude training programs do not
lead to significant improvements in symbolic math. Indeed, training nonsymbolic
numerical magnitude processing likely does not lead to improvements in symbolic math
because the system that is being trained (i.e., the evolutionarily ancient nonsymbolic
number processing system) is a similar but ultimately separate from the system that
supports symbolic mathematical thinking (i.e., the symbolic number system). In view of
this, it is not surprising that these training studies have resulted in null findings.
Consequently, the findings from the current thesis can be taken to suggest that efforts to
train early numerical concepts should be focussed on training the symbolic number
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system, rather than the system that evolved to process approximate nonsymbolic
numerical magnitudes.
Relatedly, a focus of early mathematical learning has been on teaching children the link
between symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes, often referred to as mapping
(Barth, Starr, & Sullivan, 2009; Huang, Spelke, & Snedeker, 2010; Le Corre & Carey,
2007; Lipton & Spelke, 2005, 2006; Odic, Le Corre, & Halberda, 2015). Recent research
has implicated this ability to map symbols onto nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes as
being important for later mathematical achievement (Libertus, Odic, Feigenson, &
Halberda, 2016). Although mapping for small numbers is likely an important skill for
children to master at a particular point during development, findings from the current
thesis imply that the ability to map symbols onto their corresponding nonsymbolic
numerical magnitudes is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for children to form a
symbolic number processing system. In other words, in order for humans to develop a
system that processes exact symbolic numerical magnitudes, children need to acquire
knowledge of the structure of the symbolic number system, such as the learning that
symbolic numerical magnitudes have an order and a lexical frequency, in addition to
learning the semantic meaning of a symbolic numerical magnitude. Together, findings
from the current thesis can be used to inform our understanding of what basic number
processing abilities must be learned to facilitate a child’s development of a
comprehensive semantic system that can be used to support the higher-level processing of
symbolic numerical magnitudes.

6.6

Limitations and Future Directions

The limitations associated with each specific study are reported in the discussion sections
of each individual empirical chapter. However, in addition to the specific limitations
discussed in the individual chapters, there are several broad limitations. In what follows,
I will present and discuss these broad limitations and outline future directions that arise
from these limitations, as well as provide future directions that go beyond simply
addressing limitations.
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As outlined in the introduction of this thesis, the processing of nonsymbolic numerical
magnitudes is inherently confounded by non-numerical magnitudes such a physical size
(For review see: Leibovich and Henik, 2013). It was not possible to control for nonnumerical magnitudes in the meta-analysis, as this methodology requires using
previously collected data. There was a large amount of variability in the degree to which
the empirical studies included in the meta-analysis controlled for non-numerical
magnitude processing. However, in the three other empirical chapters presented in the
current thesis (chapters 3-5), I included controls for the effect of non-numerical
magnitudes. In chapter 3 and 5, I included physical size as a variable of interest in order
examine the neural representations supporting nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes
(chapter 3) and degree of attention directed toward nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes
(chapter 5), compared to physical size. In chapter 4, I included ‘*’s rather than blank
spaces in the arrays with the goal of ensuring that arrays with more symbols did not take
up more physical space. Critically, although I was cognizant of this need to account for
the effect of non-numerical magnitudes on nonsymbolic numerical magnitude processing
in some way, and included the optimal control variables whenever possible, there is no
way to create stimuli where at least one non-numerical magnitude (e.g., size, density,
convex hull) does not correlate with nonsymbolic numerical magnitude (Leibovich &
Henik, 2013). Indeed, the natural correlation between nonsymbolic numerical
magnitudes and non-numerical magnitudes makes it nearly impossible to study
nonsymbolic numerical magnitude processing in isolation from non-numerical
magnitudes. This tight link between the processing of nonsymbolic numerical
magnitudes and non-numerical magnitudes is reflected in the findings from the parallel
adaptation study reported chapter 3, showing that the brain region in the right
intraparietal sulcus that is associated with nonsymbolic numerical magnitude processing
is completely overlapping with the region associated with non-numerical magnitude
processing. Therefore, a key limitation of the current thesis is that the results associated
with nonsymbolic numerical magnitude processing may be influenced by correlated nonnumerical magnitudes. This interesting inherent limitation with studying nonsymbolic
numerical magnitude processing leads to an important future direction. Namely, future
research should not rest upon the assumption that nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes are
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processed using a specific system that only processes discrete magnitudes. Instead,
future research should explore the link between the processing of symbolic numerical
magnitudes, compared to the processing of nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes as well as
non-numerical magnitudes. Additionally, future research should test the role of nonnumerical magnitude processing in the formation of the symbolic number system
(Leibovich et al., 2017).
Another limitation associated with the experimental empirical studies included in this
thesis is that, due to time constraints within the testing sessions, we were unable to
include trial types that were of interest. Specifically, in the fMRI adaptation study
(chapter 3), we were only able to include a single deviant type within each condition. For
example, symbolic distance 1 only included the condition where the symbol six became
the symbol seven. This is because within a habituation paradigm each deviant trial must
be preceded by five to nine habituation trials. Including a small and large change of a
symbolic, nonsymbolic and physical size condition required participants to remain still
and attentive during a passive viewing task in an fMRI scanner for an hour. For this
chapter, the decision was made to use fewer than optimal different trial types in order to
increase the proportion of participants were able to remain still and attentive.
Additionally, it was important to make this paradigm as concise as possible in order to
have to option to implement this paradigm in a sample of children in the future.
Critically, with the included number of trial types, only 45 of the 52 adult participants
successfully passed the criteria for attention and motion. Relatedly, in chapter 4, all trials
included in the study used the same two symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical
magnitudes within each trial. For example, in a condition where the symbol was ‘2’ and
‘4’ the quantities were also two and four either congruently (i.e., two ‘2’s vs. four ‘4’s) or
incongruently (i.e., two ‘4’s vs. four ‘2’s). It would have been ideal to include all
combinations of symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes (as has been done with
the original Numerical Stroop task: Leibovich, Diesendruck, Rubinsten, & Henik, 2013).
However, as this was the first study to implement a Symbolic-Nonsymbolic Stroop task, I
included more trial types within conditions, rather than fewer trial types across many
conditions. In view of this, I was unable to examine the effect of differentially varying
the distance of the relevant dimension compared to the irrelevant dimension. In a future
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study, it would be ideal to compare participant’s speed and accuracy for trials where the
distance of the relevant condition is different from the distance in the irrelevant condition.
Finally, in chapter 5, there were many additional conditions that I was interested in
examining. For example, I could have included conditions where I changed the colours of
the trains, manipulated the ratio between the experimenter’s block size and the child’s
block size, built the trains behind a screen, included longer train lengths (beyond five
cars), and/or adjust the language of the instructions. However, as the sample of
participants in this study were between the ages of three and six years, the maximum
duration that the participants were able to remain attentive was approximately 30
minutes. Therefore, I chose a single set of conditions that best supported my key research
questions. Future studies should examine whether verbal number knowledge continues to
relate to the degree to which young children spontaneously attend to nonsymbolic
numerical magnitudes under different experimental conditions.
A final limitation that is specific to the neuroimaging studies is the fact that the vast
majority of the participants in the meta-analysis (>98%), and all participants in chapter 3
of the current thesis are right-handed. Recent research indicated that association between
the passive processing of symbolic numerical magnitudes and activation in the left
parietal lobule was significant in a sample of right, but not left-handed individuals
(Goffin, Sokolowski, Slipenski & Ansari, accepted 2019). Future research is needed to
further examine similarities and differences in the neural correlates of symbolic
compared to nonsymbolic numerical magnitude processing in left-handed compared to
right-handed individuals.
There are several additional future directions that are unrelated to the limitations of the
current chapters. Specifically, the possible co-existence of domain-specific neural
processes underlying numerical magnitude processing adults (reported in chapters 2-4),
raises questions about developmental trajectories of the systems underlying basic number
processing. An important avenue for future research is to conduct follow-up studies
where children complete the Symbolic-Nonsymbolic Stroop task and the Parallel
Adaptation task, to study developmental specialization of the symbolic number system.
More specifically, the paradigms developed for this thesis can be used cross-sectionally
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and/or longitudinally to examine age-related changes in the systems that support
symbolic, nonsymbolic and non-numerical magnitudes.
Moving forward, a fundamental goal for the field of numerical cognition should be to
understand individual differences in the way children learn symbolic numbers and to use
this knowledge in pursuit of optimized learning processes across development. Once we
as a field have reached a foundational understanding of the basic neuropsychological
mechanisms supporting symbolic number learning, it will be of critical importance to
focus on individual differences. A large body of future research is needed to unravel the
key question of why learning math is easy for some children and so challenging for
others.

6.7

General Conclusion

In conclusion, the body of research presented above has identified and described the
behavioural and neural signatures of symbolic compared to nonsymbolic numerical
magnitude processing. I identified converging brain activation associated with symbolic
and nonsymbolic numerical magnitude processing across all previously conducted
neuroimaging research (chapter 2) and examined the neural correlates of symbolic and
nonsymbolic numerical magnitude processing in the absence of task demands (chapter 3).
Additionally, I explored the role of attention on behavioural signatures of symbolic
compared to nonsymbolic numerical magnitude processing in human adults (chapter 4).
Finally, I investigated how learning symbolic numerical magnitudes relates to attending
to nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes in young children (chapter 5).
Studying the neurobiology of numeral magnitude processing is necessary to elevate our
understanding of how culturally-mediated information interacts with and potentially even
shapes biologically endowed systems in the human brain. This enhanced understanding
of the neuropsychological foundation that supports the uniquely human capacity for
symbolic thinking could simultaneously inform and inspire critical developments to math
education practices and policy and illuminate the multifaceted and dynamic interplay
underlying the uniquely human capacity for complex learning.
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